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The idea for this study occurred to me one day quite 
by chance as I read Emerson's essay Nature immediately after 
having read excerpts from Shaftesbury's Characteristics. It 
seemed to me that Emerson was remarkably like Shaftesbury, 
that he was not rejecting England and the eighteenth century 
as I had always believed he was. I thus set out to determine 
whether Emerson's critics had seen the same similarities that 
I had, and when I found that they as a rule had not, I began 
to explore the works of eighteenth-century Englishmen and of 
Emerson in order to define their relationship to my own 
satisfaction.
As I read, three major ideas seemed to recur over 
and over in the works of Emerson and eighteenth-century 
writers like Butler, Shaftesbury, and Price. The idea of 
self-reliance based on the God within seemed to permeate them 
all. The idea of correspondence between man and nature 
seemed to be a concept Emerson shared with his eighteenth- 
century English predecessors. And the idea of compensation, 
of evil offset by good, seemed to be a third area of common 
concern.
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In the following pages then I shall first deal with 
the existing scholarship on Emerson's relationship to 
eighteenth-century England and attempt to point out what I 
believe to be shortcomings in it. After doing this, I hope 
to define precisely the Emersonian doctrines of self- 
reliance, correspondence, and compensation and to show that 
they are anticipated to a considerable extent in the works of 
eighteenth-century English moralists. I realize, of course, 
that I shall not be talking about all of Emerson's major 
ideas. No man as complex as Emerson can be summed up in 
three short phrases. But if I am able to show that three 
concepts acknowledged to be of importance to Emerson are also 
of importance in eighteenth-century England, I believe 
Emerson's status as a rebel against this period will have 
been seriously called into doubt.
Many thanks go to Dr. David P. French and Dr. Bruce 
Granger who read and judged this study in its various stages 
of development. They have generously given much time to me, 
and I am very appreciative.
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ABBREVIATIONS
The following abbreviations will be used in the text 
of this study.
W The Complete Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson,
ed. Edward Waldo Emerson. Centenary Edition.
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JMN The Journals and Miscellaneous Notebooks of Ralph Waldo 
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RALPH WALDO EMERSON 
AND
THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLISH MORALISTS
CHAPTER I
EMERSON, EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY 
ENGLAND, AND THE CRITICS
Scholars have consistently denied the significance, 
if not the existence, of eighteenth-century English anticipa­
tions of Emersonian self-reliance, correspondence, and com­
pensation. Although Harold C. Goddard as early as I908 per­
suasively suggested in Studies in New England Transcendental­
ism that transcendentalism springs from a blend of 
eighteenth-century rationalism and sensibility, major studies 
of Emerson's philosophy have tended to ignore or oppose his 
argument.^ Some critics, of course, have recognized and dis­
cussed eighteenth-century anticipations of Emerson's ideas, 
but even they have tended to treat such anticipations in a 
rather cursory fashion.
^Haro]^ C . Goddard, Studies in New England Transcen­
dentalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1908),
p. 14- and p. 3 2 .
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Extensive studies of Emerson's philosophy tend to 
view it as the antithesis of eighteenth-century English 
thought. Indeed, the major studies of Emerson's philosophy 
cited by Floyd Stovall in Eight American Authors either pic­
ture Emerson's relationship to Augustan England as a bas-
2ically negative one or avoid discussing it at all. H. D. 
Gray's Emerson, A Statement of New England Transcendentalism 
as Expressed in the Philosophy of its Chief Exponent (1917)? 
a book Stovall calls "the earliest and one of the best books 
devoted exclusively to a study of Emerson's philosophy," 
largely ignores eighteenth-century England. Aside from cit­
ing Berkeley as a source for Emerson's idealism. Gray finds 
little that Emerson and neo-classicism hold in common.^ He 
questions the influence which Hutcheson is supposed to have
had on William Ellery Channing, and he emphasizes Emerson's
1+hostility to Locke. Furthermore, he views Emerson as a 
"consistent m y s t i c , a  phrase which could hardly be used to 
describe the typical eighteenth-century Englishman. Yet a
^Floyd Stovall, "Ralph Waldo Emerson," in Eight 
American Authors, ed. James Woodress et al. (New York: W. W.
Norton, 1963), pp. 37-84-.
^Henry David Gray, Emerson. A Statement of New 
England Transcendentalism as Expressed in the Philosophy of 
its Chief Exponent (Palo Alto:Standford University Press,
1917), p. 35.
^Gray, p. 18 and p. 22.
^Gray, p. 47.
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careful examination of Emerson's work will, I hope, reveal a 
very distinct parallel between Hutcheson’s mentor Shaftesbury 
and Emerson and will also reveal that Emerson's mysticism is 
tempered by a good deal of eighteenth-century rationalism.
Paul Sakmann’s R. W. Emerson’s Geisteswelt (1927) is 
the next important study of Emerson's ideas. Sakmann, a 
German, quite naturally tends to emphasize Emerson's simi­
larities to German rather than English thinkers. He does 
give credit to Berkeley and Hume for their influence upon 
Emerson's thought, but on the whole he associates the eight­
eenth century in England with a "cold, rational conception 
of nature as a machine," a conception he believes Emerson to 
be in revolt against. But I believe we shall find that 
Emerson's concepts of correspondence and compensation owe 
much to the rationalistic view of nature held in the English 
Enlightenment.
F. 0. Matthiessen's classic American Renaissance 
(19'+1) presents a reexamination of Emerson's philosophy, but 
perpetuates the belief that Emerson "was in reaction against 
the formal logic of the eighteenth century," against "the 
formulas of eighteenth-century r a t i o n a l i s m . A n d  Matthiessen 
argues that Emerson's belief that the poet must write about 
himself "put him in fundamental opposition to the norm of
Gpaul Sakmann, Emerson's Geisteswelt (Stuttgart:
Fr. Frommanns Verlag, 1927), p. 117*
7f . 0. Matthiessen, American Renaissance (New York: 
Oxford Univ. Press, 194^), p. 7*
the previous century, as it had been made explicit, for in-
O
stance, by Shaftesbury . . . Matthiessen is surely cor­
rect in saying that Emerson did not write in the very formal, 
very logical manner of eighteenth-century men and that his 
writing tends to be more personal than does the writing of 
many eighteenth-century English figures. Yet Emerson, as we 
shall see, shares the beliefs of many eighteenth-century 
rationalists, and if some eighteenth-century men do not talk 
about themselves directly, their talk is nevertheless quite 
personal beneath the masks of formality which they wear.
A very distinguished work, Sherman Paul’s Emerson's 
Angle of Vision (1952), offers still another consideration of 
Emerson’s thought, especially of his belief in correspond­
ence. And Paul, unlike his predecessors, suggests that 
Emerson does have some affinity with the eighteenth-century 
in England:
Dedicated to the Lockean understanding, early 
nineteenth-century New England selected from the 
manifold riches of the eighteenth-century those ele­
ments of method and philosophy which, in terms of 
their spiritual needs, were showing most the effects 
of hardening and inutility. It had been slow to 
grasp the subterranean currents of emotion already 
present in Edwards’ use of Hutcheson, which actually 
culminated in Wordsworth as a response to the irrec­
oncilable belief in both physical mechanism and 
spiritual free will.9
Paul thus recognizes that similarities between Emerson and
^Matthiessen, p. 6 7.
^Sherman Paul, Emerson’s Angle of Vision (Cambridge. 
Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1952), pp. 13-1^.
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the eighteenth-century English strain of sensibility exist, 
but he suggests that Americans tended not to be aware of 
these similarities.
Yet Paul stresses differences rather than simi­
larities between Emerson and his eighteenth-century English 
forebears. Most importantly, he suggests that the static 
view of the universe held in eighteenth-century England is 
totally different from the dynamic universe Emerson per­
ceives. He writes that eighteenth-century optimism
unrolled a future as irremediable as the past. The 
cosmic certainty that whatever is, or has been, is 
right and good, left change to the uninterrupted 
Newtonian mechanism. Change was linear, merely the 
reorientation in time and space of bodies smoothly 
operating to the divine purpose, but in themselves, 
will-less and isolated. Nowhere did the system admit 
of growth in the organic sense. Nowhere did it admit 
the perception that anticipated the future. For 
Emerson it admitted only an optimism of submission.'®
Paul makes a valid point when he argues that Emerson in the 
course of his career came to reject the static concept that 
"whatever is, is right" and to believe in melioration along 
the scale of being. But he neglects eighteenth-century fig­
ures like Thomson, Akenside, and Young who also believe in 
melioration. His view of eighteenth-century England is 
clearly too limited here and needs to take account of what 
he himself elsewhere calls "the manifold riches of the 
eighteenth century."
In addition, Paul writes that Emerson believes the
10Paul, p. 18.
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basis of self-reliance, "the self and its experience of de­
pendence on a higher source for spiritual power," to be an-
1 1tithetical to eighteenth-century English thought. But we 
shall see that references in Emerson's journals link 
Shaftesbury and Price to this concept. And I hope to demon­
strate that a variety of other eighteenth-century moralists 
anticipate Emersonian self-reliance, even though Emerson may 
not have recognized such a parallel between his work and 
theirs.
One year after Paul's book was published, Stephen
Whicher's Freedom and Fate (1953) appeared, offering the most
positive statement to that date of Emerson's relationship to
the eighteenth century. Whicher's purpose in his book is to
provide a spiritual biography of Emerson, not to discuss
Emerson's debt to the eighteenth century in England, but he
does briefly suggest areas of similarity. For instance,
Whicher notes that the "tradition of the 'moral sense'" seen
in Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Stewart was "easily enlarged
under later intellectual influences, into a full belief in
1 Pthe God within us." Further, he suggests in a rather ob­
lique way that Emerson's concept of compensation is an En­
lightenment idea.^3 And he also discusses the oft noted
 ̂̂ Paul, p. 9.
12Stephen E. Whicher. Freedom and Fate. An Inner 
Life of Ralph Waldo Emerson (1953; rpt. New York: A. S.
Barnes, 1961), p. 14-.
I^Whicher, p. 37*
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similarity between Emerson and Berkeley.However, Whicher 
does not go beyond suggesting the existence of these similar­
ities. His interest lies in other directions.
Whicher's study seems to lay a basis for a reexami­
nation of Emerson's relationship to the eighteenth century, 
but scholars in the sixties have steered away from such a 
reexamination. Philip L. Nicoloff in his book Emerson on 
Race and History (1961) tends instead to see Emerson as op­
posed to the eighteenth century in England. He writes that 
"The whole rationalistic postulate behind eighteenth-century 
historical study was diametrically opposed to Emerson's be­
lief that history was essentially a record of man's moral 
growth."15 Later in his book he does find that Emerson makes 
some use of "the great scientific tradition of the eighteenth 
century," but he also argues that Emerson's faith that the
universe is "progressive, ameliorative," opposes that tra- 
16dition. Nicoloff thus chooses not to discuss the progres­
sive view of history put forth by an Anglican apologist like 
Edmund Law or by a rationalist like Richard Price.
Jonathan Bishop in his Emerson on the Soul purposely 
avoids discussing possible sources for Emerson's works, but 
this policy at times leads him into distortions of Emerson's
I^Whicher, p. 15*
15philip L. Nicoloff, Emerson on Race and History. 
An Examination of English Traits iNew York: Columbia Univ.
Press, 1 9 61), p. 93•
’^Nicoloff, p. 101 .
8
position. For instance, he finds compensation to be 
"Emerson's most idiosyncratic contribution to ethical 
t h o u g h t , "^7 whereas the faith that virtue is rewarded in 
this world permeates eighteenth-century England. In addi­
tion, Bishop argues that the eighteenth century made Newton
1 Rthe "archenemy of the imagination," without considering 
the very positive effects eighteenth-century disciples of 
Newton had upon Emerson.
Maurice Gonnaud's Individu et Société dans L'oeuvre 
de Ralph Waldo Emerson (1964), like Bishop's study, does not 
seriously concern itself with parallels between Emerson and 
eighteenth-century England. Gonnaud notes that Stephen 
Whicher has already considered Emerson's relationship to 
Locke, Hutcheson, Berkeley, Hume, and Stewart and that he 
therefore will not cover that ground again.^ ̂  Gonnaud does 
briefly note, however, similarities and differences in the 
economic views of Emerson, Mandeville, Hume, and Smith and
PDdoes discuss Emerson's fondness for Burke.
William M. Wynkoop's Three Children of the Universe, 
Emerson's View of Shakespeare, Bacon, and Milton (1966) is 
yet another study unconcerned with eighteenth-century
^'^Jonathan Bishop, Emerson on the Soul (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press'̂  1 964 ), p. 72.
I^Bishop, p. 52.
I^Maurice Gonnaud, Individu et Société dans L'Oeuvre 
de Ralph Waldo Emerson (Parïsl Didier, 196^), p. 39•
PO Gonnaud, p. 63 and pp. 186-8?.
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England. This book centers instead on Shakespeare, Bacon, 
and Milton as the embodiments of Emerson's Knower, Doer, and 
Sayer. But, whereas Wynkoop does discuss the significance 
of Coleridge to Emerson's thought when he considers 
Coleridge's literary criticism, he tends to make short work 
of eighteenth-century critical opinions. He finds, for in­
stance, that Johnson's "criticism . . . could not satisfy"
p  -1Emerson and therefore does not explore it extensively.
Wynkoop's belief in the relative unimportance of Emerson's
relationship to eighteenth-century England is thus implicit
in his study.
Finally, Michael H. Cowan's very stimulating book
City of the West; Emerson. America and the Urban Metaphor
(1967) is only slightly concerned with neoclassicism in
England. Cowan notes that Emerson "kept in touch with the
metaphors and themes of this literature through his lifelong
22reading in the neoclassicists." And he argues that "popu­
lar romantics in America did not really protest against neo­
classical precepts as had many European Romantics, but 
rather grafted various Romantic modes of literature and 
architecture onto that n e o c l a s s i c i s m . Y e t  Cowan does not
21William Wynkoop. Three Children of the Universe 
(The Hague; Mouton, 1966;, pp. 76-7^
p p Michael H. Cowan, City of the West: Emerson,
America, and the Urban Metaphor (New Haven: Yale Univ.
Press, 1 9 6 7), p. 126.
^^Cowan, pp. 130-3 1 .
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develop these very suggestive statements. Indeed, he seems 
to overlook, for instance, the progressive view of history 
in Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire when he 
writes that
The lesson taught by Rome often seems too dark for 
Emerson's comfort (JMN, 2, 1640, since it implied 
that man's movement through time was governed by a 
series of vicious historical cycles. As he read 
Gibbon's recounting of Italy after the fall of the 
Empire, he was depressed by the impression that 'each 
year is a disastrous repetition of tyranny, revolution, 
and bloodshed . . . .'24
Emerson may truly have believed that Gibbon pictured history
in cyclical terms, but it is clear that Gibbon's moderately
progressive view of history foreshadows Emerson's own.
Thus, major studies of Emerson's philosophy published 
early in this century tend to ignore his relationship to 
eighteenth-century England or to suggest that the relation­
ship is one of revolt. And although Stephen Whicher suggests 
a positive connection between Emerson and the eighteenth 
century, the major studies of the sixties have failed to 
pursue energetically this rich vein, choosing instead to per­
petuate the earlier views.
-ii-
However, though not so extensively nor so centrally 
concerned with Emerson's philosophy as Whicher, a number of 
critics have shared his belief in Emerson's relationship to 




found self-reliance, correspondence, or compensation to be 
doctrines which clearly link Emerson to his neoclassical 
forebears.
Hesitant to directly suggest that Emerson's belief 
In self-reliance has eighteenth-century roots, several critics 
have nevertheless recognized Emerson's reliance upon the 
eighteenth-century concept of the moral sense, a concept 
which Is, as Whicher points out, essential to Emersonian 
self-reliance. Merrell Davis In "Emerson's Reason and the 
Scottish Philosophers" (1$44J persuasively argues that 
Emerson's belief In Reason Is very much like Stewart's belief 
In the moral sense. Indeed, he asserts that "Emerson was 
familiar with the Idea of an Intuitive moral faculty 'coeval 
with the first operation of the Intellect,' from his reading 
and study of Stewart during his undergraduate days at 
H a r v a r d .  "̂ 5" More explicitly, John Gerber (19'+9) finds dis­
tinct parallels between statements by Emerson and Adam Smith 
on self-reliance, though he does not emphasize Smith's very
g  X
un-Emersonlan materialistic bias. And Alexander Kern 
(1953) finds that Richard Price and the Scottish common sense 
school play a central role in establishing Emerson's belief 
In the moral sense, but he like Davis does not push on to
^^Merrell R. Davis, "Emerson's Reason and the 
Scottish Philosophers," N^, XVII (19^49, 218-19-
2&John C. Gerber, "Emerson and the Political Econo­
mists," XXII (1949), 3 3 8-3 9 .
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suggest a similarity in the area of s e l f - r e l i a n c e .
Joel Porte, however, in Emerson and Thoreau,
Transeendentalists in Conflict (1966) does find Richard Price
to be one source for Emerson's belief in the God within, the
belief which is the essence of Emersonian self-reliance:
Since Price has defined 'understanding' as that 
which apprehends absolute truth. God's 'nature'
(eternal mind and eternal truthJ is His 
'understanding.' But man, too, has the faculty 
of 'understanding,' which enables him immedi­
ately and intuitively to participate in this 
eternal mind. Thus, man's 'understanding' and 
'God' (God as eternal truth rather than eternal 
will) have deftly come together.2°
Porte here suggests that Price anticipates Emerson's belief 
in the God within, for Price believes that man like God can 
apprehend absolute truth. However, Porte does not go on to 
discuss other eighteenth-century English sources for this 
belief. Instead his emphasis is on Emerson's moral philoso­
phy.
Finally, J. Blakeney Richard in his article "Emerson 
and Berkeleian Idealism" (1970) suggests that Emerson shares 
with Berkeley a belief in "a transcendental reality toward 
which human reason was constantly s t r i v i n g . A n d  he
27Alexander Kern, "The Rise of Transcendentalism, 
1815-1860," in Transitions in American Literary History, ed. 
Harry Hayden Clark (Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ. Press, 1953),
pp. 264-66.
P RJoel Porte, Emerson and Thoreau: Transeendental­
ists in Conflict (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan Univ. Press,
1966), p. 7 3 .
. Blakeney Richard, "Emerson and Berkeleian 
Idealism," ESQ. No. 58 (I Quarter 1970), p. 92.
13
further argues that "God-reliance . . . becomes the very 
core of both Berkeley's and Emerson's philosophies . . . . 
Finally, he writes that a belief in correspondence is essen­
tial to both Berkeley's and Emerson's beliefs in self- 
reliance: "both men can be 'self-reliant' because both be­
lieve that 'the voice of nature, which speaks to our eyes, 
is not liable to that misinterpretation and ambiguity that 
languages of human contrivance are unavoidably subject 
to.'"31 This conclusion is particularly impressive because 
the quotation from Berkeley sounds distinctly Emersonian.
In addition to finding an eighteenth-century basis 
for self-reliance, critics have suggested that Emerson's 
belief in correspondence links him to the eighteenth cen­
tury. Harry Hayden Clark in his essay "Emerson and Science" 
(1 9 3 1) makes valuable suggestions concerning Emerson's rela­
tionship to eighteenth-century English correspondence with­
out developing them:
M  interesting study could be made of the way in which 
Emerson derived, in various degrees, his fundamental 
doctrine of the correspondence and analogy between 
matter and mind, natural history and human history, 
from such sources as Butler's Analogy. Paley's Natural 
Theology, Wollaston's Religion of Nature. Newton (whose 
theory of the centrality of matter in accordance with 
the law of grayity suggested Emerson's theory of ethi­
cal centrality), Plato (whose 'celestial geometry' 
affirms the coincidence of science and virtue).
3^Richard, p. 9*+« 
3lRichard, p. 95*
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Coleridge, Bacon, Swedenborg, Goethe, andWordsworth. 32
Butler, Paley, and Wollaston are, of course, eighteenth- 
century English moralists, and Clark's comment suggests a 
valuable study which could be made, but which he chooses 
not to make. He recognizes that Emerson's belief in cor­
respondence may well come from the eighteenth century, but 
he does not develop this idea beyond a further note upon 
Butler's influence. Like Clark, Joel Porte suggests that 
correspondence links Emerson to the eighteenth century, but 
he too presents this idea without developing it.33 He finds 
that "Emersonian correspondence is closer to eighteenth- 
century Christian evolutionary theory than to anything else," 
but does not go on to explore this similarity.
Finally, critics have seen compensation as a neo­
classical concept which endures in Emerson's thought. Clark 
notes that the eighteenth century may be a source for 
Emerson's doctrine of compensation when he writes "that the 
substance of the later essay 'Compensation' appears in the 
Journals of I826 (11,70-78) in connection with Emerson's 
praise of Butler's Analogy and its doctrine of 'a most exact 
and benign adaptation.' But again, Clark does not have 
the space to develop fully the relationship between
^^Harry Hayden Clark, "Emerson and Science," PQ, X
(1931), 226-27.
33porte, p. 1 3.
Clark, pp. 22 6-2 7 .
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eighteenth-century and Emersonian compensation.
Joel Porte echoes Clark's suggestion that compensa­
tion ties Emerson to the eighteenth century. Most notably, 
he cites these famous lines from Pope's "Essay on Man" to 
suggest that Emersonian compensation is a neoclassical con­
cept; "God sends not ill if rightly understood,/For partial 
evil is universal g o o d ."35 Yet Porte seems to confuse Pope's 
rather static view of the universe with a melioristic view 
when he calls a belief in meliorism "the basis for eighteenth- 
century optimism."3& He, in fact, fails to note that 
Emerson's view shifts from just such a static concept to a 
melioristic attitude more like Priestley's than Pope's.
Thus, if the major studies of Emerson's philosophy 
find him to be antithetical to neoclassicism, there are 
critics who have perceived distinct similarities between 
Emersonian and Augustan doctrines of self-reliance, corres­
pondence, and compensation. Yet no critic has examined the 
extent of these parallels or explored their subtleties. The 
eighteenth-century English anticipations of Emerson's phi­
losophy clearly need further study.





Here is the root of all romanticism; that man, the 
individual, is an infinite reservoir of possibil­
ities; and if you can so arrange society by the 
destruction of oppressive order then these possi­
bilities have a chance and you will get Progress.^
Surely T. E. Hulme's definition of this root of romanticism
is essential to understanding Emersonian philosophy, for
especially in his most radical works Emerson proclaims the
doctrine of self-trust. But to regard his proclamation of
self-sufficiency in the present as a rejection of the past
in general and of eighteenth-century England in particular
may be quite misleading. Indeed, Joel Porte argues,
it is worth noting that many of Emerson's major ideas 
bear a striking resemblance to those of the Age of 
Reason--that Emerson . . .  is intellectually much 
more a man of the eighteenth century than he is of 
the nineteenth— and that what Orestes Brownson called 
'the material soulless philosophy of the last cen­
tury' accounted in general for a good deal of Tran­
scendental gospel.2
^T. E. Hulme, Speculations, ed. Herbert Read (London: 




It seems in order, therefore, to examine the essence of 
Emerson's position on self-reliance, to look carefully at 
eighteenth-century English statements which insist on self- 
reliance, and then to determine whether Emerson renounces 
the eighteenth century.
-i —
Emerson's concept of self-reliance in the early years
of his career as an essayist (1836-1841) is truly radical.
Not content to argue merely for free will as opposed to fate,
he discovers that "God must be sought within, not without,
and believes, as Stephen Whicher persuasively argues, the
divinity of man's soul to be "an original intuition of the
private man, a principle of independence, creativity and
kyouth, the mainspring of all heroism and greatness." Such a 
view of the soul inevitably involves confusion and possible 
contradiction; by finding God in man, Emerson makes self- 
reliance and God-reliance, freedom and fate, power and form 
very similar. But Emerson believes that finding the God 
within frees man from seeking external validation for his 
beliefs and actions and allows him to share in the power of 
God.
3Ralph Waldo Emerson, The Journals and Miscellaneous 
Notebooks of . . ., ed. W. H. Gilman et al. (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1960-71), III, 4. All future
references to Emerson's journals and notebooks for the years 
1819-1848 will be to this edition and will be made paren­
thetically in the text. Hereafter cited as JMN.
\fhicher, p. 51*
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This extreme philosophy of self-reliance arises to
some extent from Emerson's particular situation in his home
of Concord. Henry Seidel Canby notes that
The world for Emerson was and remained a Concord, 
where of one hundred men and women, seventy were 
rising in the world, economically, intellectually, 
or spiritually, five had symptoms of greatness, twenty 
at most were clods, and five imbecile, degenerate or 
rawly Irish. From no other society could a theory of 
the infinite potentiality of man on his own responsi­
bility and by his own endeavors have so easily 
arisen . . .  .5
Concord certainly provides an environment conducive to the 
sort of optimism and individual effort in which Emerson be­
lieves, though Canby seems mistaken when he asserts that the 
world was always to be a Concord for Emerson. Later in his 
career Emerson comes to see a world which makes his philos­
ophy difficult to maintain, but early in his career, his 
world is Concord and his philosophy is self-reliance.
Nature (I8 3 6) most notably espouses this doctrine. 
Indeed, here Emerson reasons that "man has access to the en­
tire mind of the Creator, is himself the creator in the 
Afinite."” Man can feel himself one with God, can know a
transcendent reality. Moreover, Emerson writes that
From the child's successive possession of his several 
senses up to the hour when he saith, "Thy will be
%enry Seidel Canby, Classic Americans (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace, 1931)5 P* 157-
^The Complete Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. 
Edward Waldo Emerson, Centenary Edition (Boston: Houghton,
Mifflin, 1903-^) I, d'+. All future references to Emerson's 
essays will be to this edition and will be made parentheti­
cally in the text. Hereafter cited as W.
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done I" he is learning the secret that he can reduce 
under his will not only particular events but great 
classes, nay, the whole series, and so conform all 
facts to his character. . . . One after another, his
victorious thought comes up with and reduces all
things, until the world becomes at last only a re­
alized will,— the double of the man. (W, I, 39-^0)
Emerson suggests that because he has the God within, man can
see beyond the physical world of appearances and intuitively
perceive the spiritual order of the creation. And he further
suggests that because man is a "creator in the finite," the
order of nature will be his double just as it is the double
of the Creator. Thus, for Emerson the God within is the
source of tremendous self-confidence, for it guarantees that
the perceptions of an individual are not distortions but are
absolute truths. It guarantees that man's intuitive belief
that the "axioms of physics translate the laws of ethics".
(W, I, 33) is an eternal truth, not a transitory dream.
The God within is also a source of practical power 
for Emerson, for it allows man confidently to pursue in 
action what he believes to be right. The history of Jesus 
and the "achievements of a principle, as in religious and 
political revolutions, and in the abolition of the slave 
trade" (W, I, 73) are but two examples of practical power 
which can come from a belief in the God within. Knowledge 
that one's actions are sanctified eliminates any hesitation 
about undertaking action, Emerson seems to suggest.
Because he believes man can possess this intellectual 
and practical power, Emerson urges him to scorn slavish
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dependence upon the past. Thus, he begins Nature by noting, 
"Our age is retrospective. It builds sepulchres of the 
fathers. It writes biographies, histories, and criticism.
The foregoing generations beheld God and nature face to face; 
we, through their eyes." (W, 1,3) In Nature, therefore, 
Emerson finds the God within to be the source of man's power 
and freedom, to be the source of his self-reliance, and finds 
dependence upon the past and failure to recognize the God 
within to be sources of limitation.
Emerson argues along similar lines in "The American
Scholar" (1837)* In this address he finds that the duties
of the scholar "may all be comprised in self-trust" (W, I,
100). And he later indicates the full meaning of that term:
It is a mischievous notion that we are come late into 
nature; that the world was finished a long time ago.
As the world was plastic and fluid in the hands of 
God, so is it ever to so much of his attributes as we 
bring to it. To ignorance and sin, it is flint.
They adapt themselves to it as they may; but in pro­
portion as a man has anything in him divine, the 
firmament flows before him and takes his signet and 
form. (W, I, 105)
Emerson suggests that insofar as man knows God to be within,
he can see nature to be a symbol of himself. If he feels
himself divine, man need not see the universe as inert matter
but can see its unity and spiritual significance. Emerson
believes the American scholar will have the intellectual
power to perceive the meaning of the world around him only
when he views the world from the perspective of God and
trusts that his perceptions are God's. The source of man's
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power here as in Nature is thus the divinity of his soul.
The scholar must learn that "The world is nothing, the man
is all" and that in himself "slumbers the whole of Reason"
(W, I, 11M-). Emerson does acknowledge here more clearly
than he does in Nature the importance of the past, especially
of past literary efforts:
It is remarkable, the character of the pleasure we 
derive from the best books. They impress us with the 
conviction that one nature wrote and the same reads.
We read the verses of one of the great English poets, 
of Chaucer, of Marvell, of Dryden, with the most 
modern joy,— with a pleasure, I mean, which is in 
great part caused by the abstraction of all time from 
their verses. There is some awe mixed with the joy 
of our surprise, when this poet, who lived in some 
past world, two or three hundred years ago, says that 
which lies close to my own soul, that which I also had 
well-nigh thought and said. (W, I, 91-92)
Emerson writes that men of all times, even the neoclassical 
Dryden, have shared the same insights into eternal verities. 
But he elsewhere notes that no man can exclude local refer­
ences from his work and that each age must therefore produce 
its own books, must bring forth its own men of divine vision 
(W- I. 8 8).
If Emerson stresses self-sufficiency as opposed to 
limitation in "The American Scholar," he also does so in 
"The Divinity School Address" (I8 3 8). In this speech di­
rected to Harvard College's divinity students, Emerson as­
serts that "the gleams which flash across my mind are not 
mine, but God's" (W, I, 132). And although this may seem to 
'nig'V'st that man ;i s not in control of himself, Emerson be­
lieves that the divinity within is the source of true
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independence. Because he finds God in man, Emerson believes 
man shares in the power of God and is not merely subject to 
it. Indeed, he writes of Jesus Christ, "Alone in all history 
he estimated the greatness of man. One man was true to what 
is in you and me. He saw that God incarnates himself in man, 
and evermore goes forth anew to take possession of his 
World." (W, I, 128) Man may freely choose, Emerson argues, 
to recognize the divine within himself, to accept the power 
of insight that is legitimately his. But he believes that 
this sort of self-knowledge "is an intuition; it cannot be 
received at second hand" (W, I, 127). A minister, Emerson 
tells the future ministers in his audience, can truly rely 
upon himself when he has faith that God is within. And with 
such faith the minister will no longer need to mechanically 
follow the practices of the Wesleys and Oberlins (W, I, 1'+5)* 
He will be able to make his church come alive.
Finally, the concept of self-reliance permeates 
Essays: First Series (18̂ -1). Emerson again locates God in
the soul of man. In "History" he finds that "every man is a 
divinity in disguise . . ." (W, II, 31)* In "Self-Reliance" 
he writes that "We lie in the lap of immense intelligence, 
which makes us receivers of its truth and organs of its ac­
tivity" (W, II, 64). In "Compensation" he finds that "Jesus 
and Shakespeare are fragments of the soul" (W, II, 1243. In 
"The Over-Soul" he asserts that "within man is the soul of 
the whole" (W, II, 269). And Emerson pictures the divinity
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within as a source of power for the individual;
Trust thyself: every heart vibrates to that iron
string. Accept the place the divine Providence has 
found for you; the society of your contemporaries, 
the connexion of events. Great men have always done 
so, and confided themselves childlike to the genius 
of their age, betraying their perception that the 
Eternal was stirring at their heart, working 
through their hands, predominating in all their 
being. (W, II, >+7)
Here in "Self-Reliance" Emerson paradoxically calls for man
to trust himself while at the same time he acknowledges that
man's greatness comes through acceptance of God's will. By
sharing in the power of God, he suggests, man becomes self-
reliant, for he is no longer subject to outside forces. Man
need not defer to tradition, books, or advisors, if he will
merely look within himself.
A similar argument is advanced in "The Over-Soul,"
though the rhetoric here is much more restrained:
What we commonly call man,— the eating, drinking, 
planting, counting man,— does not, as we know him, 
represent himself, but misrepresents himself. Him 
we do not respect; but the soul whose organ he is, 
would he let it appear through his action, would make 
our Itnoes band. V/han it braathas through his intel­
lect, it is genius ; when it breathes through his will, 
it is virtue; when it flows through his affection, it 
is love. And the blindness of the intellect begins 
when it would be something of itself. The weakness 
of the will begins when the individual would be some­
thing of himself. All reform aims, in some one par­
ticular, to let the great soul have its way through 
us; in other words to engage us to obey. (W, II,
2 7 1)
Emerson suggests that intellectual, moral, and emotional 
self-reliance all originate in the God within. When man 
feels God within, he transcends his material desires and
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intellectually and intuitively perceives the unity of the 
creation. And this vision of unity is not a dream, for it 
is validated by the inner deity. In addition, when man feels 
God within, he has moral power. He knows how to act and 
knows that his actions are virtuous because they are in­
spired by God. Finally, when man is one with the Over- 
Soul, he views the world with love, a positive emotion 
rather than a self-destructive one. Man can thus be truly 
self-reliant, Emerson argues, when he knows God to be within.
-ii-
Th": basis of Emersonian self-reliance is therefore 
the God within. The God within brings man intellectual, 
moral, practical, and emotional power, and that power allows 
him to be self-sufficient. Yet this idea is not uniquely 
Emerson's, and it is certainly not foreign to eighteenth- 
century England. English common-sense moralists share 
Emerson's doctrine of self-reliance to a considerable ex­
tent, and British intellectual moralists share in the ideas 
on which this doctrine is based.
The eighteenth-century English common-sense moralists 
most clearly anticipate Emerson's belief in self-reliance. 
Leslie Stephen defines them as that group of philosophers 
who believe in vital truths even though those truths cannot 
be demonstrated by pure reason. This group finds that logic 
does not put God and virtue on a secure basis, but believes 
that both God and virtue can be known intuitively. To the
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rationalists this philosophy thus seems "mere empiricism," 
for it abandons the effort to prove moral dogmas deductively. 
And to the empiricists such a philosophy is objectionable 
because it possesses "an authority requiring no confirmation 
from experience."7 But to Emerson the beliefs of the common- 
sense moralists must be agreeable, for he argues that in­
tuition is man's highest faculty, and he denies the validity 
of mere empiricism.
More specifically, Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third
Earl of Shaftesbury and a common-sense moralist, anticipates
Emerson's position on self-reliance, for he too believes in
the God within. Indeed, Theocles, his spokesman in The
Moralists (I70 5), states:
thought we own pre-eminent, and confess the realest 
of beings, the only existence of which we are made sure 
by being conscious. All else may be only dream and 
shadow. All which even sense suggests may be deceitful. 
The sense itself remains still; reason subsists, and 
thought maintains its eldership of being. Thus, are we 
in a manner conscious of that original and eternally 
existent thought whence we derive our own. And thus 
the assurance we have of the existence of being above 
our sense and of thee (the great exemplar of thy works) 
comes from thee, the all true and perfect, who hast 
thus communicated thyself more immediately to us, so 
as in some manner to inhabit within our souls, thou 
who art original soul, diffusive, vital in all, in­
spiriting the whole.o
^Leslie Stephen, A History of English Thought in the 
Eighteenth Century, 3rd edl (1902; rpt. London: Harcourt,
Brace, 1962), II, 13.
^Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, 
Characteristics. ed. John M. Robertson (London: Grant
Richards, I9OO), II, 112.
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Shaftesbury thus finds God within, for he believes that God 
contrives "in some manner to inhabit within our souls." And 
for Shaftesbury the God within brings a sort of self- 
reliance or intellectual power because it alone assures man 
of the existence of God and of the order of the whole. As 
R. L. Brett notes, "Shaftesbury pins his faith to the in­
tuitive apprehensions of the universal mind by the individual 
mind.
Moreover, Shaftesbury, like Emerson, finds reality
in thought, finds that the world of the senses may "be only
dream and shadow." As Ernest Tuveson writes, Shaftesbury
"furthered the process by which, as Panofsky has said, the
dualism between Christian and classical 'ceased to be real,
. . . because the very principle of reality was shifted to
10the subjective human consciousness.'" Shaftesbury I30
years before Emerson thus suggests that man is self-
sufficient because reality must be known through intuition
1 1rather than sensory perception of externals. But
Shaftesbury elsewhere denies that the world of sense is an 
1 Pillusion, and he certainly is far more interested in moral
9r. L. Brett, The Third Earl of Shaftesbury (London: 
Hutchinson's Univ. Library, 1951)} P- 6 5 .
^*^Ernest Tuveson, "The Importance of Shaftesbury,"Em, 20 (1953), 2 8 3.
1 1Richard vaguely suggests a similar parallel in 
terms of Berkeley's thought in his article cited in the 
notes to Chapter I.
12ghaftesbury, II, 2 8 7.
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power than he is in experiencing transcendent reality. In 
addition, Shaftesbury does not suggest that man can achieve 
a total oneness with God, and consequently he does not ex­
perience the great surge of power Emerson does. Still, the 
similarities between Emerson and Shaftesbury are greater 
than their differences, for they differ only in degree, not 
in kind.
Shaftesbury's belief in the moral sense also antici­
pates Emerson's belief in the God within and in self- 
reliance. Shaftesbury states that man has a "sense of right 
and wrong" which is "as natural to us as natural affection 
itself" and is "a first principle in our constitution and 
make."^3 ^e does not identify this sense with the God 
within; he does not deify it. But like the God within, the 
moral sense is a source of independence for man. A belief 
in man's natural goodness, in his moral sense, Shaftesbury 
suggests, should open the way "to free men from the per­
versions engendered by religious dogmas and zeal, from false, 
derogatory ideas of human nature, and from artificial customs 
which separate man from nature, God from nature, and all 
three from the unity in which they should e x i s t . I f  men 
believe in a moral sense which can guide them, they need not 
debate over which narrow religious dogmas to follow. If 
men believe in a moral sense, they can see their own worth
^^Shaftesbury, I, 260.
^*^Tuveson, "The Importance of Shaftesbury," p. 2 7 6.
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and not feel depraved. And if men are naturally good, they
need not look to a future life for redemption, but can find
fulfillment in this life. The moral sense, like the God
within, is thus a source of freedom and power. Small wonder
then that Emerson records in his journal on July 6 , I8 3 1, the
following comment:
Shaftesbury's maxim. That wisdom comes more from the 
heart than the head. 'Do the will, know the doctrines.' 
Impera parendo. Obedience is the eye which reads the 
laws of the universe. For the moral sense is the 
proper keeper of the doors of knowledge . . . .  (JM,
III, 269)
Emerson cites Shaftesbury in his journal because the concept 
of the moral sense is an important one to him, and as Whicher 
notes it is easily enlarged "into a full belief in the God 
within us."1^ Shaftesbury and those who perpetuate his be­
lief in the moral sense--Hutcheson, Reid, Stewart, and 
Brown— thus clearly anticipate Emerson's concept of self- 
reliance.^^
A common-sense moralist who is very different from 
Shaftesbury and his followers also anticipates Emerson's 
concept of self-reliance. Bishop Joseph Butler truly 
stresses self-trust. He writes in "Sermon III" that man 
"from his make, constitution, or nature. . . . is in the 
strictest and most proper sense a law unto himself. He hath
 ̂̂ Whicher, p. 15*
^^See the article by Merrell Davis cited in the 
notes to Chapter I, and see also Alfred J. Kloeckner, "In­
tellect and Moral Sentiment in Emerson's Opinions of 'The 
Meaner Kinds' of Men," AL, 30 (1958), 322-38.
29
the rule of right within: what is wanting is only that he
honestly attend to it. And for Butler the "rule of right
within" or the conscience is identical to the God within.
As Stephen notes, "The God whom Butler worships is, in fact,
1 8the human conscience deified." Moreover, Butler describes
conscience in very Emersonian terms. He finds it to be "a
sentiment of the understanding or a perception of the
heart."^9 Neither purely rational nor purely emotional, it
POis truly an intuition. Butler thus clearly foreshadows 
Emerson's 1833 assertion that "A man contains all that is 
needful to his government within himself. He is made a law 
unto himself. . . . The highest revelation is that God is in 
every man" (JMN. IV, 8 3).
Yet this search for similarity must not be carried 
too far. If Butler deifies the conscience and makes it the 
source of moral power, he does not envision it as a source of 
great intellectual power. For Emerson the God within brings 
both. But for Butler the order of the universe is often in­
explicable and must be accepted on faith. Moreover, Butler's 
sense of evil in the world darkens his view of self-reliance; 
his concept of man's nature does not lead him into the
I^Joseph Butler, Works, ed. W. E. Gladstone (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, I8 9 6), II, 69.
18Stephen, I, 248.
I^Ernest 0. Mossner, Bishop Butler and the Age of 
Reason (New York: Macmillan, 1936), p. 123.
20Butler, I, 245-^6.
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optimism that Emerson or Shaftesbury's concepts lead them 
to. But this difference can perhaps best be considered when 
we discuss compensation in Chapters IV and V.
Despite these differences, Bishop Butler, a man
?1whose works ^merson carefully studied at Harvard, antici­
pates clearly the basis of Emersonian self-reliance. In 
fact, the idea of conscience is so closely linked to 
Emerson's belief in the God within that Porte writes "that 
Emerson's experience of God turns out to be no more than the 
shock of conscience." We have seen the God within to be 
more than a name for the conscience, but perhaps it is pri­
marily Emerson's word for this inner light.
^^E. W. Todd, "Philosophy at Harvard College," NEQ, 
16 (1943), 79-80.
^^Porte, p. 91 •
-̂ If Butler's deification of the conscience antici­
pates Emerson's belief in the God within, it also represents 
a belief held by a good many eighteenth-century English di­
vines. Robert South, for example, preaches a sermon in I69I 
in which he argues.
It cannot after this, with any Colour of Reason be 
doubted, but that the Holy Spirit of God, whose Power, 
and Influence to do Good is much greater, than that of 
the wicked Spirit to Evil, does frequently inject into 
and imprint upon the Soul many blessed Motions, and 
Impulses to Duty, and many powerfull Avocations from 
Sin. So that a Man shall not only (as the Prophet says) 
hear a Voice behind him, but also a Voice within him, 
telling him which way he ought to gol (Helen C. White 
et al. eds.. Seventeenth Century Verse and Prose (New 
York; Macmillan, 1952), II, 19^*)
South, like Emerson and Butler, finds God within and be­
lieves the God within to be a source of moral and practical 
strength. Of course, South argues that the God within can­
not always be such a source of strength and advises his
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Finally, John Norris, one of the Cambridge Platonists 
who had so much influence upon Shaftesbury, closely approxi­
mates Emerson's position on self-reliance. In his Essay 
toward the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World he argues 
for self-reliance on the grounds that man possesses the divine 
within himself. He states that the Truth
will tell thee that she is in God, and that he eter­
nally contemplates and loves her, and rejoices in her 
ever charming, and never fading Beauty. And if this 
does not satisfy, she will farther tell thee, that she 
is in thy self, because of the intimate Union thy Soul 
has with its Creator, and that she keeps an Oracle 
within thy own Breast and that instead of hunting after 
her among Books (which for the most part is seeking the 
living among the Dead) thou needst but enter into thyself 
to consult her, and receive her Answer. For the Word is 
nigh thee, and thou carriest thy Divine Master and 
Teacher, Truth, within thy own Bosom as unmindful as 
thou art of thy self and her, while she teaches thee in 
the School of the Breast, even that eternal and uni­
versal Reason that shines upon all Minds with a pure 
steady and uniform Light, gives to all Men the same com­
mon Answers, and instructs them while they think they 
teach themselves, or learn from others, by whose Par­
ticipation they are Rational and Intelligent, and in 
whose inward Light they see and understand whatever they
congregation to use the scripture as a supplement to their 
internal lights. South does not, therefore, picture man to 
be as self-sufficient as does Emerson, but he does share 
nevertheless in the doctrine of self-reliance. Similarly, 
Yorick's sermon in Tristram Shandy seems almost to echo 
South's. Yorick argues that man should attend to his inner 
light but also argues that he must validate private inspira­
tion by refering to scripture read with the aid of calm rea­
son (Laurence Sterne, The Life and Opinions of Tristram 
Shandy. Gentleman Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, P* 100).
And R. S. Crane's article "Suggestions Toward a Genealogy of 
the 'Man of Feeling,'" ELH. I (December, 193^)? 205-30, dis­
cusses numerous clergymen who believe man has a natural love 
of good which guides him. Butler, therefore, furnishes a 
major example of the similarity of the eighteenth-century 
conscience and the nineteenth-century God within. He in an­
ticipating Emerson is not a voice in the wilderness.
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know, even the increated [sic] Word and Wisdom of
God . . . .24
Norris here finds that man's soul has an "intimate Union" 
with its Creator. And he further finds that for this reason 
man should look for the truth within himself and not in 
books. Such an argument, of course, sounds much like the 
one advanced in "The American Scholar," and Norris clearly 
foreshadows Emerson's view of self-reliance as expressed 
there. Moreover, the God within allows Norris to understand 
that the sensible world is not the real world, that the world 
of ideas or the intelligible world is truly real. But Norris 
does differ from Emerson in two distinct ways. First, he 
seeks "participation in a transcendental God."^^ He does 
tiot seek to internalize God to the same extent that Emerson 
does. And secondly, Norris does not really see moral or 
practical power emerging from his concept of the God within. 
However, Norris does clearly suggest the idea of God within, 
and he does experience the intuitive, intellectual power 
which Emerson was to find as a result of this idea.
If the common-sense moralists foreshadow Emerson's 
actual concept of self-reliance, the intellectual moralists 
anticipate its basis. Emerson undoubtedly would object to 
the assertion by these moralists that man should rationally 
rather than intuitively determine how to act in a given
24John Norris, An Essay toward the Theory of the 
Ideal or Intelligible World [London, 1704), I, 190.
2^Tuveson, "The Importance of Shaftesbury," p. 269.
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situation, for he writes, "We love characters in proportion 
as they are impulsive and spontaneous" (W, II, 133)* But 
these moralists suggest that man can rationally determine 
how to act only by viewing a particular situation in terms 
of "a small number of truths" which are "intuitively appre­
hended."^^ And Emerson himself believes in such a priori 
truths. Indeed, he argues that man is not truly self-reliant 
if he must depend on external validations of his beliefs.
He writes that the knowledge that God is within must be an 
intuition; one cannot learn of this through reading or ex­
perience. Thus, it is especially significant that Emerson 
records in his journal for 1820 Dugald Stewart's comment on 
the intellectual moralist Dr. Samuel Clarke: "The argument
a priori has been enforced with singular ingenuity by 
Dr. Clarke" (JM, I, 377)* Emerson is quite aware early in 
his career of this eighteenth-century English concept which 
he will later adopt.
Emerson's affinity for the concepts of intellectual 
moralists is probably best seen in his relationship to the 
works of Dr. Richard Price. Emerson at first doubts the im­
portance of Price, for he writes in his journal for March 1*+, 
1821 :
^^Stephen, II, 6 .
2?Though, in a sense, the correspondences to man 
which Emerson finds in nature serve as external validations 
of his beliefs, he believes that man must intuitively know 
God to be within before he can perceive these correspondences. 
See p. 76 of this paper for a fuller discussion of this point.
3>+
I am reading Price on Morals [1758] & intend to read it 
with care and commentary. I shall set down what remarks 
occur to me upon the matter or manner of his argument.
On the 56 Page Dr. Price says that right and wrong are 
not determined by any reasoning or deduction but by an 
ultimate perception of the human mind. It is to be de­
sired that this were capable of satisfactory proof but 
as it is in direct opposition to the sceptical phi­
losophy it cannot stand unsupported by strong and suf­
ficient evidence. I will however read more and see if 
it is proved or no. (JMN, I, 51)
In 1821 Emerson is reluctant to accept a belief that right 
and wrong are known intuitively by "an ultimate perception 
of the human mind. " But by I836 he has accepted the exist­
ence of the intuitive power Price postulates and has deified 
it. Price's "ultimate perception of the human mind" thus 
anticipates Emerson's God within, and both are sources of 
moral power. They allow man confidently to distinguish be­
tween right and wrong. And such confidence is the essence 
of self-reliance.
Emerson's concept of self-reliance and of the God 
within is thus clearly anticipated in a variety of eighteenth- 
century works. No eighteenth-century English writer, however, 
believes in so complete an internalization of God as does 
Emerson. Shaftesbury sees God as "inhabiting" man; he does 
not talk of man becoming "the creator in the finite." Butler 
deifies man's conscience, not man himself. And Norris does 
not center his essay on man so much as he does upon the 
existence of a noumenal world— an ideal world in the mind of 
God rather than in the mind of man who is one with God. No 
eighteenth-century English writer, therefore, can suggest as
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Emerson does that man can become the equal of Jesus Christ 
if he will simply realize his potential. Eighteenth-century 
English concepts of self-reliance are thus not identical to 
Emerson's, but eighteenth-century views surely anticipate 
Emerson in a very definite manner. The self is more central 
and more exalted in early Emersonian thought than it is in 
eighteenth-century English writing, but Emerson unquestion­
ably shares with some eighteenth-century Englishmen a vision 
of God within and a belief in self-reliance on that basis.
—iii-
However, there is a tension in Emerson's thought 
early in his career. He does not always find self-reliance 
easy to achieve. And nowhere is his difficulty in becoming 
truly self-reliant more clearly seen than in the essay 
"Circles" (184C). Here Emerson pictures man as ever-growing 
in the power of self-reliance, but also describes man's 
awareness that only in transitory moments can he be divine.
On the positive side, he writes that "The life of a man is a 
self-evolving circle, which, from a ring imperceptibly small, 
rushes on all sides outwards to new and larger circles, and 
that without end. The extent to which this generation of 
circles, wheel without wheel will go, depends on the force 
or truth of the individual soul." (W, II, 30^) The indi­
vidual, Emerson asserts, can grow constantly in practical, 
moral, and intellectual power, can continually draw new 
circles. But the idea that man evolves toward God, that man
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develops, that he cannot become divine at once and remain so,
is also a disturbing one for Emerson:
Our moods do not believe in each other. Today 1 am 
full of thoughts, and can write what I please. I see 
no reason why I should not have the same thought, the 
same power of expression tomorrow. What I write, 
whilst I write it, seems the most natural thing in the 
world; but yesterday I saw a dreary vacuity in this 
direction in which 1 now see so much; and a month 
hence, I doubt not, I shall wonder who he was that 
wrote so many continuous pages. Alas for this infirm 
faith, this will not strenuous, this vast ebb of a 
vast flow! I am God in nature; 1 am a weed by the 
wall. (W, II, 306-3 0 7)
A sense of the God within and of self-reliance is thus dif­
ficult to achieve, Emerson writes, because man's faith is 
not strong enough. Only at intervals does our faith assure 
us that God is truly within and that therefore we can be 
self-reliant.
The difficulty Emerson finds in "Circles" is atypical 
of his early work. But it becomes quite frequent in his 
later essays, for his belief in self-reliance suffers severe 
intellectual and emotional blows between 184-1 and 1844. 
Emerson's reading of Lyell's geological studies brings him 
"a sense of the undreamed-of immensity and brute violence of 
the processes of nature" and makes the egoism of his early
28works seem "ridiculous." And the death of his young son 
in 184-2 surely brings Emerson to the realization that man's 
power is a rather paltry thing in the face of such facts. 
Emerson, of course, had faced and transcended great personal
28'Whicher, p. l46.
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tragedy before; the death of his first wife and of his 
brother Charles did not prevent his development of the theory 
of self-reliance. But after young Waldo’s death Emerson is 
able to find the God within only in fleeting moments. The 
possibility of consistently locating God in the soul is gone. 
Yet, as Whicher notes, Emerson saves his faith by "trans­
ferring it from the impotent self to the all-disposing fate. 
Before the parsimony of the God within, he anchors his 
faith on the God in the universe.
In Essays; Second Series (1844) Emerson certainly 
moves away from extreme self-reliance. He does refer to 
"divine persons" in "Character" (W, III, 100, 113)* In 
"The Poet," however, it is only the poet whom he identifies 
with God. And, as Whicher notes, the poet brings man only 
an "intoxicating glance of the inaccessible ideal."30 in 
"Manners" Emerson calls for self-reliance, but he does not 
suggest that the basis for self-tr .st is the God within. He 
writes that in social gatherings "we excuse in a man a great 
many sins, if he will show us a complete satisfaction in his 
position . . . ." (W, III, 132). Such self-reliance hardly
need be based on the God within.
In "Nature" Emerson at times seems to hold his 
radical faith in the self, but even in this essay he tends 
to place limitations upon the power man can possess. At
29whicher, p. 124. 
30whicher, p. 138.
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the end of the essay Emerson certainly suggests that man 
can find the God within. He argues that if "we feel that 
the soul of the workman streams through us, we shall find 
the peace of the morning dwelling first in our hearts, and 
the fathomless powers of gravity and chemistry, and over 
them, of life, preexisting within us in their highest form"
(W, III, 19^). If we know God to be within, Emerson sug­
gests, we can perceive the spiritual significance of all 
things. We can see how the laws of physical nature are also 
laws of our own being. We can, in short, perceive the unity 
of creation if we view it from the divine perspective.
But even in "Nature" Emerson writes that "No man is 
quite sane; each has a vein of folly in his composition, a 
slight determination of blood to the head to make sure of 
holding him hard to some one point which nature has taken to 
heart" (W, III, l85). Here Emerson feels that self-trust 
may be a "vein of folly," may not be based on the God 
within. Self-trust may prompt a man to hold hard to one idea 
rather than attempt to see interrelationships between ideas; 
self-trust may be a necessary self-deception, insuring that 
an important idea will be expressed, but warping the indi­
vidual's perspective. Indeed, Emerson writes that "The poet, 
the prophet has a higher value for what he utters than any 
hearer, and therefore it gets spoken" (W, III, I8 7). As we 
have seen, Emerson ends this essay on a note of faith in 
man's possibilities, but he devotes considerable space to
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these doubts in man's ability to consistently find the God 
within. He begins to suggest that faith must also be placed 
in "Nature" which "sends no creature, no man into the world 
without adding a small excess of his proper quality" and 
that self-reliance exists in a very different form than he 
had earlier supposed (W, III, 185).
Emerson's most serious doubts in the viability of
self-reliance in its radical sense appear in "Experience."
In this essay, Emerson writes that
It is very unhappy, but too late to be helped, the 
discovery we have made that we exist. That discovery 
is called the Fall of Man. Ever afterwards we suspect 
our instruments. We have learned that we do not see 
directly but mediately, and that we have no means of 
correcting these colored and distorting lenses which 
we are, or of computing the amount of their errors. 
Perhaps these subject-lenses have a creative power; 
perhaps there are no objects. Once we lived in what 
we saw; now, the rapaciousness of this new power which 
threatens to absorb all things engages us. Nature, art 
persons, letters, religions, objects, successively 
tumble in, and God is but one of its ideas. Nature and 
literature are subjective phenomena; every evil and 
every good thing is a shadow which we cast. The street 
is full of humiliations to the proud. As the fop con­
trived to dress his bailiffs in his livery and make 
them wait on his guests at table, so the chagrins which 
the bad heart gives off as bubbles, at once take form 
as ladies and gentlemen in the street, shopmen or bar­
keepers in hotels, and threaten or insult whatever is 
insultable in us. 'Tis the same with our idolatries. 
People forget that it is the eye which makes the 
horizon, and the rounding mind's eye which makes this 
or that man a type or representative of humanity, with 
the name of hero or saint. (W, III, 75-76)
Emerson here then argues that man creates his own world,
that perhaps there are no objects, that heart burn may be
the cause of what we see, or rather think we see, about us.
In Nature, believing in the God within, Emerson had joyfully
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proclaimed that "thought comes up with and reduces all 
things until the world becomes at last only a realized will." 
But in "Experience" he doubts that God is within and there­
fore feels that reducing the world to a "realized will" may 
not show man's intuitive, intellectual power so much as his 
inability to transcend the "colored and distorting" lense 
which he is. The validity of spiritual insight is surely 
in question when man no longer partakes of the authority of 
God.
When Emerson does argue for self-trust in "Experi­
ence," therefore, he does so in a spirit much different from 
the one he manifested in Nature ;
And we cannot say too litle of our constitutional 
necessity of seeing things under private aspects, or 
saturated with our humors. And yet is the God the 
native of these bleak rocks. That need makes in 
morals the capital virtue of self-trust. We must hold 
hard to this poverty, however scandalous, and by more 
vigorous self-recoveries after the sallies of action, 
possess our axis more firmly. The life of truth is 
cold and so far mournful; but it is not the slave of 
tears, contritions and perturbations. It does not 
attempt another's work, nor adopt another's facts.
It is a main lesson of wisdom to know your own from 
another's. (W, III, 8l)
Here then self-trust is advocated only grudgingly. It is 
seen as a kind of necessary poverty. We must have self­
trust, says Emerson, even though it keeps us from seeing the 
whole, because it enables us to keep to our necessary tasks 
by imagining them to be of importance. Emerson does not 
state that God incarnates himself in man; rather he argues 
that God encourages man to trust in his very limited self so
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that he will not be distracted by the "importunate frivolity 
of other people" and so that he can be "greatly useful."
Yet even in "Experience" Emerson suggests that for 
fleeting moments man can know God to be within, can have 
partial insight into the order and unity of creation. He 
writes that "The consciousness in each man is a sliding 
scale, which identifies him now with the First Cause, and 
now with the flesh of his body" (W, III, 72). And he adds 
that though moments of unity with the Over-Soul be few, man 
must "be suspicious of the deceptions of the element of 
time. It takes a good deal of time to eat or to sleep, or 
to earn a hundred dollars; and a very little time to enter­
tain a hope and an insight which becomes the light of our 
life." (W, III, 85) Trapped by subjectiveness, man can 
still escape in moments of insight. But these moments of 
insight are merely that. They cannot bring the power Emerson 
had earlier envisaged as coming from a faith that God is 
within.
This modified view of self-reliance continues to be 
seen in Representative Men (I8 5 0). In this volume Emerson's 
faith tends not to be in the self as an incarnation of God, 
but in a Divine Providence which beneficently orders the 
universe. In "Plato" Emerson perceives unity as that which 
absorbs all, including man (W, IV, 53)* No longer does man 
absorb everything into the self. In "Swedenborg" Emerson 
praises the Swedish philosopher because "he elected goodness
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as the clue to which the soul must cling in all this laby­
rinth of nature" (W, IV, Emerson does not suggest that
Swedenborg should have found God within. And in "Napoleon" 
when Emerson praises self-reliance, it is not a self- 
reliance based on the God within, but one based on "the mere 
force of such virtues as all men possess" (W, IV, 2̂ -7).
But if man cannot trust totally in his own powers, 
Emerson believes he can trust in a God who is largely ex­
ternal to man. In "Uses of Great Men" Emerson writes that 
the "destiny of organized nature is amelioration" (W, IV, 
35); his faith here lies in a power outside of man, though 
destiny decrees man shall grow in power. Similarly in 
"Montaigne" Emerson writes.
Let a man learn to look for the permanent in the mut­
able and fleeting; let him learn to bear the disap­
pearance of things he was wont to reverence without 
losing his reverence; let him learn that he is here, 
not to work but to be worked upon; and that, though 
abyss open under abyss, and opinion displace opinion, 
all are at last contained in the Eternal Cause . . . .  
(W, IV, 186)
Here Emerson finds that man's task is not to work, but to be 
worked upon. His faith is in providence, not in the self.
It is natural then that he finds Napoleon to be a "child of 
destiny" (W, IV, 231), that he argues in "Shakespeare" that 
a great man is "forced onward by the ideas and necessities 
of his contemporaries" (W, IV, 190), and that he believes 
Goethe was "born to write" (W, IV, 262). In Representative 
Men power is seen as largely external to man; man's fate is 
beneficently directed by the First Cause.
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This is not to say that Emerson has come to believe
in determinism. On the contrary, he continues to believe in
self-reliance even as he argues that there is a providential
order. He has merely abandoned the radical claim that man
can be god, that man can have total access to the mind of
God. Thus, he writes in "Shakespeare" that
A great man does not wake up on some fine morning and
say, 'I am full of life, I will go to sea and find an
Antarctic continent: today I will square the circle:
I will ransack botany and find a new food for man: I
have a new architecture in my mind: I foresee a new
mechanic power:' no, but he finds himself in the river 
of the thoughts and events, forced onward by the ideas 
and necessities of his contemporaries. He stands where 
all the eyes of men look one way, and their hands all 
point in the direction in which he should go. The 
Church has reared him amidst rites and pomps, and he 
carries out the advice which her music gave him, and 
builds a cathedral needed by her chants and proces­
sions. He finds a war raging: it educates him, by
trumpet, in barracks, and he betters the instruction.
He finds two counties groping to bring coal, or flour, 
or fish, from the place of production to the place of 
consumption, and he hits on a railroad. Every master 
has found his materials collected, and his power lay 
in his sympathy with his people and in his love of the 
materials he wrought in. What an economy of power! 
and what a compensation for the shortness of life! All 
is done to his hand. The world has brought him thus 
far on his way. (W, IV, 190-191)
In Nature Emerson had encouraged man to build his own world, 
but here Emerson finds that the great man works from within 
a given world. The circumstances into which he is born un­
avoidably shape his achievement. Man must be self-reliant 
in the sense that he must actively pursue the goals toward 
which his age directs him, but Emerson does not suggest that 
he need be divine. The radical nature of Emersonian self- 
reliance is thus gone. No longer does Emerson envisage the
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self-reliant man as capable of possessing unlimited power.
The self-reliant man may become great by doing all that is 
constitutionally possible for him to do, but Emerson suggests 
that there are indeed limits to man's possibilities.
In The Conduct of Life (i860) as in Representative 
Men this shift in Emerson's definition of self-reliance is 
clearly seen. Even in this late volume of essays, Emerson 
does not relinquish his belief in self-reliance. But here, 
the power that Emerson had formerly hoped to find in man, he 
sees largely as acting upon him. He admits that "A man's 
power is hooped in by a necessity which, by many experiments, 
he touches on every side until he learns its arc" (W, VI,
19)' And he writes that efforts to deny the power of this 
necessity are futile: "The force with which we resist these
torrents of tendency look so ridiculously inadequate that it 
amounts to little more than a criticism or protest made by a 
minority of one, under compulsions of millions" (W, VI, 19)* 
In Nature Emerson's dream was that man, because of the God 
within, could control the world; here he envisions the world 
controlling man.
Yet the existence of fate does not cause Emerson to 
despair. He continues to find that man can be self-reliant 
within the limitations of fate. In "Fate," for instance, he 
offers two sources of power for man: thought and the moral
sentiment. Thought, he writes, can bring man power because 
fate is a "name for facts not yet passed under the fire of
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thought; for causes yet unpenetrated" (W, VI, 31). To in­
tellectually understand anything from an engine to a philo­
sophical concept, Emerson suggests, is to have power over 
it. Thus, he goes on to write that "Just as much intellect 
as you add, so much organic power. He who sees through the 
design, presides over it, and must will that which must be. 
Me sit and rule, and, though we sleep, our dream will come 
to pass." (W, VI, 2 7) Emerson here sees thought as a 
source of power. Intellect, man's ability to see the unity 
in things, to see that spiritual as well as physical laws 
permeate creation, gives man the power on which self-trust 
can be based. Indeed, when man perceives the beneficent 
laws of the universe, his private desires become one with 
God's. He comes to want what is fated to be. He is no 
longer the victim of unforeseen or undesired events.
Another source of power upon which self-reliance can
be based lies in the moral sentiment. Emerson finds that
intellect allows man to perceive truths, but that man needs
the moral sentiment if he is to have the will to live by
those truths:
If thought makes free, so does the moral sentiment.
The mixtures of spiritual chemistry refuse to be 
analyzed. Yet we can see that with the perception of 
truth is joined the desire that it shall prevail; that 
affection is essential to will. . . . Whoever has had 
experience of the moral sentiment cannot choose but 
believe in unlimited power. Each pulse from that 
heart is an oath from the Most High. (W, VI, 28-29)
Emerson suggests that both intellect and emotion, thought
and the moral sentiment, are essential if man is to have
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freedom and power. Without the moral sentiment, he writes, 
man may find himself unable to act or to influence others.
If, for instance, an idea of his is challenged, man may be 
willing to give it up. But if an idea he believes to be a 
moral good is challenged, he will not easily relinquish it.
The moral sentiment is thus productive of self-reliance, for 
it can prompt a man to stand firmly by his inspirations.
Emerson thus finds God in man even in "Fate." The 
intellect and the moral sentiment in man prove that "the 
lightning which explodes and fashions planets, maker of 
planets and suns, is in him." But we must remember that 
Emerson does not believe the God within can wholly define 
man’s nature. In "The Over-Soul" Emerson had found that 
"What we commonly call man,--the eating, drinking, planting, 
counting man,— does not represent himself, but misrepresents 
himself." But in "Fate" Emerson believes that "the eating, 
drinking, planting, counting man" is as real as the divine 
man. He believes that man "betrays his relation to what is 
below him,--thick-skulled, small-brained, fishy, quadrumanous, 
quadruped ill-disguised, hardly escaped into biped" (W, VI, 
22). God is within, but that fact does not completely define 
man, and the limitation of fate must be accepted as an im­
portant part of life. Man is inevitably both animal and god, 
and vast powers are therefore not immediately available to 
him. However, Emerson reconciles himself to the power of 
fate by suggesting that this force gradually becomes the
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power of self: "If Fate is ore and quarry, if evil is good
in the making, if limitation is power that shall he, if ca­
lamities, oppositions, and weights are wings and means,--we 
are reconciled" (W, VI, 35)* The radical self-reliance of 
Nature is thus seriously qualified. Emerson in "Fate" be­
lieves that man can gradually escape his relation to what is 
below him and move toward the self-trust he had seen as 
easily accessible in his early essays.
In other essays in The Conduct of Life Emerson is not 
this hopeful. In "Power," an essay in which one would ex­
pect Emerson's most affirmative statement of self-trust to 
appear, he can only argue that "We must reckon success a 
constitutional trait" (W, VI, 55)* Health or temperament may 
determine what a man achieves. To be self-reliant a man can 
no longer merely recognize that God dwells within him and is 
a source of tremendous power. Instead man's ability to be 
self-reliant is determined at birth and has limits. Simi­
larly in "Culture" Emerson moves away from a radical belief 
in self-reliance. Here he finds man's self-trust to be a 
limiting rather than a broadening characteristic: "Nature
has secured individualism by giving the private person a 
high conceit of his weight in the system. The pest of so­
ciety is the egotists. The man runs round a ring formed by 
his own talent, and falls into admiration of it, and loses 
relation to the world" (W, VI, 132). Far from rejoicing in 
self-trust, Emerson here sees it only as a grim necessity.
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It is needed to insure individual effort, but it distorts an 
individual's view of the world around him.
-iv-
From the time of Essays: Second Series, therefore,
Emerson moderates his stance on self-reliance. He comes to 
see the power that man can possess as limited, to see man as 
man, not as God. And in moderating his position, Emerson at 
times moves closer to those eighteenth-century moralists we 
have already considered. In addition, however, Emerson's 
alterations in his view parallel other eighteenth-century 
English concepts. His belief that man can grow in power, 
can evolve toward union with God harkens back to views ex­
pressed by Thomson, Akenside, and Young. His doubts about 
the reliability of the self, especially as expressed in "Ex­
perience," surely recall the writings of David Hume. And his 
late tendency to depict physical forces controlling man sug­
gests that Emersonian self-reliance has been affected by 
necessitarian views like those of Joseph Priestley.
We have seen that Shaftesbury, Butler, and Norris 
differ from Emerson primarily in the extent to which they 
find God within man. They all locate the divine principle 
within man, but they do not suggest that man can know un­
limited power, that man can become a god. In the second 
part of his career as an essayist, Emerson moves toward 
agreement with these writers, for he suggests that it is only
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in moments of insight that man can become totally one with 
God. He agrees that man is limited.
But perhaps the limits he sees go beyond those seen 
by the common sense moralists. Perhaps Emerson's modified 
position on self-reliance is more clearly anticipated in a 
small, rather insignificant book published in 17^5 and read 
much later by E m e r s o n . J o h n  Mason, a non-conformist 
clergyman and author, in his book Self-Knowledge argues as 
does Emerson for an investigation of self. He writes:
"Know thyself, is one of the most useful and comprehensive 
precepts in the whole moral system: and it is well known in
huw great a veneration this maxim was held by the ancients 
. . . ."32 But for Mason, as for Emerson late in his career, 
knowledge of self is often knowledge of one's own limita­
tions. Mason does not talk, as Shaftesbury and Norris do, 
of man's ability to experience a sense of union with God. 
Instead he writes,
A man that knows himself will deliberately consider and 
attend to the particular rank and station of life in 
which Providence hath placed him; and what is the duty 
and decorum of that station: what part is given him to
act--what character to maintain; and with what decency 
and propriety he acts that part or maintains that char­acter .33
3 "'Kenneth Walter Cameron, finer son the Essayist 
(Raleigh, N.C.: Thistle Press, 19^5)5 P* 332.
32john Mason, Self-Knowledge, 15th ed. (London,
1809), p. 3 .
33Mason, p. 29.
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Mason in this passage in no way suggests that man can partake 
of God. He is interested instead in the fixed rank or sta­
tion in which he believes man must live his day-to-day life. 
Emerson, of course, believes in meliorism in his late es­
says, and so is little inclined to view man in a fixed po­
sition. But he does argue in some essays that man had best 
realize his role, had best accept his limitations. In 
"Experience" he finds that the life of truth "does not at­
tempt another's work, nor adopt another's facts." And in 
"Power" he writes that "You must elect your work; you shall 
take what your brain can, and drop all the rest" (W, VI,
7̂ -). Emerson, like Mason, then at times believes man must 
recognize and accept his limitations.
However, in "Circles" and "Fate" Emerson's consola­
tion for man's limited power, for his inability to be wholly 
self-reliant, lies in his belief that man can constantly grow 
in power. This evolutionary view, however, is not foreign to 
eighteenth-century English literature. James Thomson surely 
anticipates it. In Liberty (1735), for instance, Thomson 
writes of Pythagoras,
He taught that life's indissouluble flame.
From brute to man, and man to brute again.
For ever shifting, runs the eternal round;
Thence tried against the blood-polluted meal,
And limbs yet quivering with some kindred soul.
To turn the human heart. Delightful truth 1 
Had he beheld the living chain ascend, ,
And not a circling form, but rising whole.
3^James Thomson, The Poetical Works, ed. J. Logie 
Robertson (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1971),
51
Thomson here suggests that Pythagoras's philosophy could 
have been improved if he had seen that man mounts up the 
chain of being, that man progresses toward union with God. 
Thomson, of course, unlike Emerson, sees this progression 
taking place in successive reincarnations. But he clearly 
anticipates Emerson's melioristic view of the powers of an 
individual.
Similarly, Mark Akenside sees man as capable of
mounting through the great chain of being and of drawing
closer and closer to union with God. He writes in The
Pleasures of the Imagination (17^4^,
. . .  in their stations all may persevere 
To climb the ascent of being, and approach 
For ever nearer to the life divine.35
Here again we see Emerson's melioristic position fore­
shadowed. Indeed, Emerson even uses a metaphor much like 
Akenside's to describe man's gradual growth in power when 
he writes in "Circles" that "Step by step we scale this 
mysterious ladder: the steps are actions; the new prospect
is power" (W, II, 305). Moreover, in a later edition of his 
poem Akenside writes that man's union with the "life divine" 
cannot be achieved, though man can grow closer to God. And 
in this qualification he clearly anticipates Emerson's
pp. 34-1-*+2. See also G. R. Potter, "James Thomson and the 
Evolution of Spirits," Enelische Studien. 6l (1926-27), 57- 
65.
35Mark Akenside, The Poetical Works (Edinburgh: 
Ballantyne, 1857), P- 108. See also G. R. Potter, "Mark 
Akenside, Prophet of Evolution," XXIV (1926), 55-64-.
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position in "Fate." Akenside, like Thomson, believes this 
melioration occurs through successive reincarnations, but 
like Thomson he definitely anticipates Emerson's belief that 
limitation is power in the making.
Finally, Edward Young anticipates Emerson's view of 
self-reliance. Young sounds very much like the later 
Emerson in his poem Night Thoughts (l7'+6). In this poem, as 
Lovejoy n o t e s , t h e  poet sees that stars evolve from ob­
scure to bright, urges Lorenzo to imitate the stars, and 
adds :
When minds ascend.
Progress, in part, depends upon themselves . . .
0 be a man! and thou shall be a god!
And half-self-made! Ambition how divine!37
Man, Young suggests, can depend upon himself, can be self-
reliant, and can grow toward the power and perfection of God.
Emerson surely argues along similar lines in "Circles."
The skepticism that at times marks Emerson's thought 
after l8*+1 has more obvious eighteenth-century parallels 
than does his meliorism. David Hume clearly anticipates 
Emerson's fear that man may be trapped within the prison of 
the self, that man may be a very limited creature who is 
unable to see beyond himself. Hume writes that
36Arthur 0. Lovejoy. The Great Chain of Being (1936; 
rpt. New York: Harper, I960), p. 2él.
37Edward Young, "The Complaint: or Night Thoughts,"
in Minor English Poets 1660-1780. eds. Alexander Chalmers 
and David P. French, New Edition (New York: Blom, 1967), V,
2 0 3.
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when we analyze our thoughts or ideas, however com­
pounded or sublime, we always find that they resolve 
themselves into such simple ideas as were copied from 
a precedent feeling or sentiment. Even those ideas, 
which at first view, seem the most wide of this origin, 
are found upon a nearer scrutiny, to be derived from 
it. The idea of God, as meaning an infinitely intel­
ligent, wise, and good Being, arises from reflecting 
on the operations of our own mind, augmenting, without 
limit those qualities of goodness and wisdom.38
Implicit in this passage is the idea that man creates, if
somewhat mechanically, his own world, including even his
concept of God. Hume thus anticipates very definitely the
doubts Emerson expresses in essays like "Experience" and
"Montaigne." Indeed, Emerson even echoes Hume's words when
he states that "God is but one of its [the mind's] ideas"
(W, III, 75).
Finally, though Emerson is no materialist, his be­
lief in fate is foreshadowed in the works of eighteenth- 
century English materialists. Joseph Priestley, who unlike 
Emerson believes that spirit and matter are one, writes:
I maintain that there is some fixed law of nature re­
specting the will, as well as the other powers of the 
mind, and every thing else in the constitution of na­
ture; and consequently that is never determined without 
some real or apparent cause, foreign to itself, i.e. 
without some motive or choice, or that motives influence 
us in some definite and invariable manner; so that every 
volition or choice, is constantly regulated, and de­
termined, by what precedes it. And this constant de­
termination of mind, according to the motives
38David Hume, The Philosophical Works, ed.
Thomas Hill Green and Thomas Hodge Grose (1882; rpt. 
Darmstadt, Germany: Scientia Verlag Aalen, 19°'+) j IV, 15*
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presented to it. is all that I mean by its necessary
determination.39
Priestley does not deny that man makes choices; he merely 
argues that those choices are based upon motives which in­
variably influence man in a given way. Similarly, Emerson 
in "Power" states that self-reliance is a "constitutional 
trait." Man is inevitably led by his physical and mental 
nature into given areas of endeavor. In addition, in 
"Montaigne" Emerson suggests that man's task is "not to work 
but to be worked upon." He pictures man in the same sort of 
passive role as Priestley does. Priestley's determinism 
thus anticipates Emerson's view of man as controlled from 
without. But Emerson does not consistently adopt this view; 
he advances and then retracts it as Priestley does not. 
Emerson's belief in fate is then less rigid than Priestley's, 
but it does share in the necessitarian views of this 
eighteenth-century Englishman.
Emerson thus draws together a wide variety of phi­
losophies in moulding a second definition of self-reliance. 
He continues to some extent to share the beliefs of those 
eighteenth-century English moralists whose views appear in 
his early essays. But he adds to these ideas concepts from 
melioristic, skeptical, and deterministic thinkers. The re­
sult is pure Emerson, but that result is not obtained 
through a rejection of the eighteenth century. A variety of
39joseph Priestley, Doctrine of Philosophical Neces­
sity (London, 1777), PP* 7-8*
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eighteenth-century English traditions are most clearly per­
petuated in Emerson's late concept of self-reliance.
Throughout his career, therefore, Emerson's doctrine 
of self-reliance is closely tied to eighteenth-century 
English beliefs. His radical concept of self-reliance 
builds upon ideas in the works of common-sense and intellec­
tual moralists, though it asserts that man has greater power 
in this world and readier access to a noumenal world than 
eighteenth-century ideas might suggest. And Emerson's modi­
fied concept of self-reliance brings him even closer to these 
eighteenth-century beliefs and further suggests that he 
shares some beliefs with skeptics like Hume and determinists 
like Priestley. Emerson thus clearly gives continued life 





Harry Hayden Clark suggested in 1931 that an inter­
esting study could be made of the ways in which Emerson de­
rived his doctrine of correspondence from eighteenth-century 
English figures like Butler, Wollaston, and PaleyJ Yet 
since that time little has been done along these lines. 
Sherman Paul in his book Emerson's Angle of Vision does dis­
cuss the doctrine of correspondence at length, but even he 
only briefly deals with its relationship to eighteenth- 
century thought. Thus, it seems fitting that Clark's sugges­
tion should be followed here. This chapter will examine 
Emerson's theory of correspondence and consider how closely 
it parallels views held by eighteenth-century English moral­
ists .
-i-
Emerson best defines what he means by correspondence 
in the early part of his career as an essayist when on
1 Clark, pp. 226-2 7.
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February 1, I835 he writes to his future wife Lidian, "I am 
a poet in the sense of a perceiver and dear lover of the 
harmonies that are in the soul and in matter, and specially
pof the correspondence between these and those." To believe
in correspondence is, for Emerson, to believe that the nature
of man's soul can be seen in the natural world. Thus, in
Nature he finds that the "sky with its eternal calm, and
full of everlasting orbs, is the type of Reason" (W, I, 2 7).
As the sky is calm rather than tempestuous, the intuition is
calm and confident of what it perceives; as the sky is full
of everlasting orbs, the Reason is in touch with everlasting
truths. Man's intuitive power is a harmony of the soul
which corresponds to a harmony in nature.
Yet Emerson does not believe such symbols are merely
arbitrary metaphors which have no existence apart from the
individual mind which created them. As Vivial Hopkins notes.
While the artist's perceiving of spirit in objects 
does represent an activity of his own mind, it also 
constitutes a response to the spirit that exists in 
natural forms. When the artist's 'inner eye' really 
opens, the spirit in nature plainly manifests itself 
to his vision.3
Emerson thus believes that correspondences are "constant and 
pervade nature" (W, I, 2 7). Because God is within both man 
and nature (W, I, 64J, he reasons, man and nature are
^The Letters of Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. Ralph L. 
Rusk (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1939;, I, ^35*
3vivian C. Hopkins, Spires of Form (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1951), P • 36.
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necessarily and inevitably symbolic of each other. And, 
Emerson argues, the more clearly man realizes that God 
exists within himself, the more clearly he will see that 
nature is a symbol of his soul. Indeed, he writes that "in 
proportion as a man has in him anything divine, the firma­
ment flows before him and takes his signet and form" (W, I, 
105).
This is not to say that Emerson believes natural 
facts correspond to spiritual facts on a one-to-one basis. 
Emerson's esteemed Swedenborg believes they do and writes 
that
The animals of the earth correspond in general to af­
fection, mild and useful animals to good affections, 
fierce and useless ones to evil affections. In par­
ticular, cattle and their young correspond to the af­
fections of the natural mind, sheep and lambs to the 
affections of the spiritual mind; while birds corre­
spond, according to species, to the intellectual , 
things of the natural mind or the spiritual mind.^
But Emerson himself never proposes such a fixed natural sym­
bolism. Instead, he objects to works of art being so revered 
that the symbols in them come to be regarded as fixed. The 
interrelatedness of all things, he believes, enables each 
symbol to play innumerable roles.
Such is Emerson's belief in correspondence, and it 
can be seen throughout his early works. It is most cer­
tainly prevalent in Nature (I836). In this essay, for in­
stance, Emerson writes that
Emanuel Swedenborg, Heaven and its Wonders and Hell 
(New York: Swenborg Foundation, 1939), no. 110, as cited by
Whicher, pp. 8 7-8 8 .
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The river, as it flows resembles the air that flows 
over it; the air resembles the light which traverses 
it with more subtile currents; the light resembles the 
heat which rides with it through Space. Each creature 
is a modification of the other; the likeness in them 
is more than the difference, and their radical law is 
one and the same. A rule of one Art or a law of one 
organization holds true throughout nature. So intimate 
is this Unity, that, it is easily seen, it lies under 
the undermost garment of Nature, and betrays its source 
in Universal Spirit. For it pervades Thought also.
Every universal truth which we express in words, im­
plies or supposes every other truth. Omne verum vero 
consonat. (¥, I, 4̂ -)
Emerson notes that we can perceive one law running through 
everything around us and suggests that this law of unity 
extends into the realm of abstract ideas. The similarity of 
the currents present in water, in air, in light, and in heat 
suggests the similarity of the currents of thought present 
in the mind, the currents of truth, justice, love. Yet no­
where in this passage does Emerson state that these simi­
larities are merely the creation of an individual mind. In­
deed, he has already noted that
The relation between the mind and matter is not fancied 
by some poet, but stands in the will of God, and so is 
free to be known by all men. It appears to men or it 
does not appear. When in fortunate hours we ponder 
this miracle, the wise man doubts if at all other times 
he is not blind and deaf . . . .  (W, I, 33-3^)
For Emerson, therefore, correspondences have existence apart
from the perceptions of an individual; they are not the
"dreams of a few poets," but exist in the mind of God. Yet
to exist in the mind of God does not make correspondences
fixed, for Emerson asserts that every truth "supposes every
other truth" in this unified creation.
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In "The American Scholar" (1837) Emerson paints a
similar picture of correspondence, although he does not make
such explicit assurances of its absolute existence. In this
address he writes that man must learn
that nature is the opposite of the soul, answering to 
it part for part. One is seal and one is print. Its 
beauty is the beauty of his own mind. Its laws are 
the laws of his own mind. Nature then becomes to him 
the measure of his own attainments. So much of nature 
as he is ignorant of, so much of his own mind does he 
not yet possess. And, in fine, the ancient precept,
"Know thyself," and the modern precept, "Study nature," 
become at last one maxim. (W, 1, 87)
Nature, Emerson here suggests, is an image of what fallen 
man may achieve. It is the standard by which man may measure 
his own development. Thus, the correspondences between man 
and nature truly exist. Indeed, Emerson can recommend the 
study of nature as a way of learning the full potential of 
the self only if correspondences between the ideal man and 
nature are not arbitrary, but are absolute. If nature fur­
nishes no more than enlightening metaphors, it can hardly 
become an integral part of the discipline of psychology.
Yet, it should be noted that Emerson does not seek to estab­
lish fixed and detailed correspondences between man and na­
ture in this essay. On the contrary, he defines the simi­
larities between man and nature in the broadest terms; na­
ture's beauty is the beauty of the mind and nature's laws 
are the laws of the mind. Such correspondences are hardly of 
the literal nature of Swedenborg's.
The essay "Compensation" (18*+1) continues the view
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of correspondence we have seen in Nature and "The American
Scholar." In this essay Emerson writes that
Every thing in nature contains all the powers of nature. 
Every thing is made of one hidden stuff ; as the natu­
ralist sees one type under every metamorphosis, and re­
gards a horse as a running man, a fish as a swimming 
man, a bird as a flying man, a tree as a rooted man.
Each new form repeats not only the main character of 
the type, but part for part all the details, all the 
aims, furtherances, hindrances, energies and whole sys­
tem of every other. Every occupation, trade, art, 
transaction is a compend of the world and a correlative 
of every other. Each one is an entire emblem of human 
life; of its good and ill, its trials, its enemies, its 
course, and its end. (W, II, 101)
Emerson suggests that no matter where man looks in nature, he 
may see and learn to understand his own condition. The 
unity, the interrelatedness of the creation guarantees this. 
There is no one symbol to which he must turn in order to 
understand himself. His form is everwhere in nature. The 
tree which knows both the beneficence of rain and the cruel­
ness of drought is but one representative of man who knows 
the joy of love and the sorrow of loss. And here again 
Emerson offers correspondence as a discipline, not as a 
method or mode of seeing. He asserts forcefully that "Every 
thing in nature contains all the powers of nature." He does 
not merely suggest that a correspondential vision may help 
us to understand ourselves even though the correspondences 
are illusory. No, the analogies exist more absolutely than 
do sensory perceptions, and Emerson seems to feel here as 
he did in Nature that the wise man doubts if he is "not 
blind and deaf" when he does not see them.
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Finally, in "Prudence" (I8 3 7-I8 38) Emerson again pre­
sents this uniformitarian concept of correspondence. In this 
essay he argues that
The world of the senses a world of shows; it does 
not exist for itself, but has a symbolic character; 
and a true prudence or law of shows recognizes the co­
presence of other laws and knows that its own office 
is subaltern; knows that it is surface and not centre 
where it works. Prudence is false when detached. It 
is legitimate when it is the Natural History of the 
soul incarnate, when it unfolds the beauty of laws 
within the narrow scope of the senses. (W, II, 222)
Emerson clearly states then that the natural world we see
around us is not real, but is only appearance, and he just
as clearly states that the symbolic character of this world
gives it significance. Not the "world of senses" per se,
but the world of senses as the "Natural History of the soul
incarnate" is legitimate. This is but to say that a valid
consideration of nature must concern itself with parallels
between man's soul and the external world. Symbols thus are
not arbitrary devices for explaining mankind, but naturally
suggest the true reality with which the prudent man needs
to be in contact. And here, as elsewhere, Emerson refuses
to describe a fixed set of symbols, preferring to suggest
the similarities between man and nature in a general rather
than a literal and more limited fashion.
-ii-
This then is the essence of Emerson's early view of 
correspondence. He perceives analogies between man, nature, 
and God. He believes these analogies actually exist and are
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not the creations of a "few poets." And he refuses to allow 
these analogies to become fixed, believing instead that the 
unity of nature allows one symbol to suggest many things.
But this definition of correspondence is hardly unique. 
Swedenborg, the Swedish mystic, most directly inspires this 
concept. And, more importantly for the purposes of this 
study, it lies clearly within eighteenth-century English 
traditions as well. Common-sense, intellectual, and even 
utilitarian moralists anticipate Emerson's stance on cor­
respondence.
The common-sense moralists most distinctly anticipate 
Emerson's major ideas in this area. Like Emerson they find 
analogies between man and nature, and like Emerson they tend
to give them an absolute existence.^ John Norris, one of
the Cambridge Platonists who was so influential upon the 
common-sense moralist Shaftesbury and who continued to write 
in the eighteenth century, certainly offers this view of 
correspondence. In The Theory and Regulation of Love (1688) 
he writes,
this Affection call'd Gravity in Bodies is nothing else 
but that first Impression or Alteration made upon them 
by the various Actings of those Effluviums or Streams 
of Particles which issue out from the Womb of that great
Magnet, the Earth . . . so in the like manner this
radical Complacency and Connaturality of the Soul toward 
Good (which I call her Moral Gravity) is nothing else 
but that first Alteration of Impression which is made 
upon her by the streaming Influences of the Great and
^The common-sense thinkers I refer to are those dis­
cussed by Leslie Stephen— Shaftesbury and Butler.
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Supreme Magnet, God, continually acting upon her by his 
active and powerful Charms.°
Norris states here that man's attraction to the good corre­
sponds to the physical attraction of objects for the earth.
In Emersonian terms, he finds that a harmony of the soul and 
a harmony of nature correspond.
Moreover, in a later work (1704) Norris asks, "For is 
not the Natural World the Object of Divine Revelation as well 
as that of Sensible Perception?" And he immediately answers,
7"I grant it is so."' For Norris, therefore, the world of 
nature corresponds to the truths found in the Bible. God, 
he suggests, reveals his will in nature as well as in Scrip­
ture. And to argue that God's will is revealed in nature is 
to suggest that correspondences between natural and spirit­
ual truths exist absolutely. Like Emerson, Norris denies
Ojohn Norris, The Theory and Regulation of Love 
(London, 1723), p. 29, as cited by Michael Macklem, The 
Anatomy of the World (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minn. Press,
195Ô), PP. 100-1. Macklem goes on to write that the idea 
of moral gravitation is an important one in the first forty 
years of the eighteenth century in England. He quotes this 
passage from a sermon which Richard Bentley preached in 1717 
as evidence: "'every least particle of body . . . has its
operation and passion perpetual and reciprocal with all the 
rest of the world besides it; such an alliance being estab­
lished between all the matter of the universe, that the 
whole is linked together by mutual attraction or gravitation 
. . .'" (p. 101). And Macklem also cites works by Thomas 
Rundle (1734), George Turnbull (1740), John Reynolds (1735), 
David Mallet (I7 2 8), and John Bancks (1738) which use this 
same metaphor. Norris is thus representative of a good many 
eighteenth-century figures who foreshadow Emersonian cor­
respondence.
^Norris, Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World, 
I, 1 8 9. ----------
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that correspondences are the dreams of a few poets.
Finally, Norris, like Emerson many years after him, 
refuses to turn nature into a fixed symbol system. Indeed, 
he writes:
For is not Truth every where? So the necessity of the 
thing will constrain us to acknowledge. For is it not 
every where as well as alwais [sic] Intelligible, may 
it not be any where consulted and attended to, and 
does it not every where give its Answers and diffuse 
its Light, and is it not also perceived every where 
alike and after one and the same uniform Manner? But 
how can all this be if it be not every where, if it 
be not Omnipresent as well as Eternal, equally uncon­
fined to Place as well as Time.°
Abstract truth, Norris writes, can be perceived everywhere
because God is omnipresent and reveals his will in natural
law rather than in isolated phenomena. The unity of nature,
the self-similarity of all phenomena, he almost seems to
suggest, eliminates the need for a fixed symbol system.
Similarly, Shaftesbury holds what was to become an
Emersonian concept of correspondence. Indeed, R. L. Brett's
description of Shaftesbury's view of correspondence might
well describe Emerson:
Shaftesbury's problem in dealing with nature was to 
find some alternative to the mechanistic account which 
had become so dominant in the previous century and 
which, he considered, made nonsense of morality and 
the arts. As mechanism was based on an analogy between 
nature and the machine, so his own account is an ana­
logical one. In the first place, he goes back to the 
analogy which he found in Greek thought (and in par­
ticular in Xenophon's Memorabilia) and compares na­
ture with the human body. As in the human organism 
the mind animates the body, so in nature there is a
O
Norris, Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World.
I, 189.
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spirit diffused through all things which governs the 
body, not body which governs or gives rise to mind.
This is true both of the individual organism and of 
the whole of nature for Shaftesbury; the human organ­
ism is a reflection of the larger, outside world.9
For Shaftesbury, as for Emerson, the human organism and the 
outside world are analogous. Shaftesbury believes that as 
God orders nature so that each species may thrive in its en­
vironment, the mind of man should order the demands of his 
"passions, appetites, imaginations, fancies . . . ." He 
argues, in short, that man should seek to be one with the 
"principle and original self" who governs n a t u r e . T h e  
analogy between man and nature thus leads him to what would 
later be called an Emersonian concept of prudence.
Moreover, Shaftesbury like Emerson believes this 
analogy between man and nature to have an absolute existence. 
Shaftesbury finds a "rule of one Art" at work in nature and 
concludes that the natural world may "be viewed as symboli­
cal of a world lying behind sense appearances, just as a 
poem expresses imperfectly the incommunicable conception 
which exists in the poet’s mind."'' The world of senses, 
Shaftesbury thus suggests, is not the only world. The sym­
bolic character of nature is more significant than its 
physical character, and man should "never admire the
^Brett, p. 66. 
lOghaftesbury, II, 105* 
^^Brett, p. 68.
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10representative beauty except for the sake of the original." 
Here then Shaftesbury establishes the symbolic aspect of 
nature as its essence, for he suggests that nature is truly 
symbolic both of the "original" or of God and of man insofar 
as he partakes of God. The man who views nature only as 
matter merely experiences "the absurd enjoyment which 
reaches the sense a l o n e . it should be noted, in addition, 
that Shaftesbury's picture of nature as a divine work of art 
indicates that a one-to-one relationship between the harmo­
nies of man's soul and those of nature cannot be established. 
Like symbols in a poem, natural objects have a significance 
beyond themselves, but, as in a poem, that significance de­
fies easy translation into narrow, allegorical terms.
Finally, although he typically talks more of human 
than of external nature, Joseph Butler views correspondence 
much as Emerson was to view it. In The Analogy of Nature 
he proposes to compare "the acknowledged dispensations of 
Providence, or that government which we find ourselves under, 
with what religion teaches us to believe and expect; and see 
whether they are not analogous and of a p i e c e . A n d  for 
Butler, the dispensations of Providence do include the condi­
tions we find in nature. He thus seeks to show that the laws 
of nature are of a piece with the laws of man and the laws of
IZghaftesbury, II, 126.
Shaftesbury, II, 126. 
I^Butler, I, 15.
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God. For instance, he argues that the imperfection of many 
men does not prove that man's imperfection is intended by 
God. And he uses an analogy to the natural world in sup­
porting his point:
For, of the numerous seeds of vegetables and bodies 
of animals, which are adapted and put in the way, to 
improve to such a point or state of natural maturity 
and perfection, we do not see perhaps that one in a 
million actually does. Far the greatest part of them 
decay before they are improved to it; and appear to 
be absolutely destroyed. Yet no one, who does not 
deny all final causes, will deny, that those seeds 
and bodies, which do attain to that point of maturity 
and perfection, answer the end for which they were 
really designed by nature; and therefore that nature 
designed them for .such perfection. ̂ 5
As the maturity and perfection of a blooming daffodil is 
easily accepted as the goal of nature, the maturity and per­
fection of man should as easily be accepted as the goal of 
God, Butler reasons. Like Emerson, Butler finds clear anal­
ogies between man and his environment.
However, he does not use such analogies as absolute 
"confirmation and illustration of his a priori ethical sys­
tem. ^ He states only that analogies are very probable in­
dications that man and nature are both governed by a benef­
icent C r e a t o r . A n d  he goes on to argue that man's ignor­
ance of the methods of nature parallels his ignorance of 
God's purposes and that man's faith in the order of nature
I^Butler, I, 131. 
l&Porte, p. 9 1 ' 
I^Mossner, p. 81 .
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despite this should he matched by a faith that God's purposes
1 ftare beneficent. Emerson, on the other hand, suggests that 
man's ignorance of nature is one with his ignorance of self, 
but he suggests that man must strive to understand nature in 
order to fully know himself. He does not argue as Butler 
does that man should accept his lack of knowledge. Instead 
he argues that man should constantly seek to increase his 
knowledge and power. Yet these differences are relatively 
minor; Emerson shares to a great extent in Butler's concept 
of correspondence. If Butler does not assert that corre­
spondences exist absolutely, he believes nevertheless that 
they very probably do. And if he argues for religious faith 
on the grounds that man's ignorance of nature parallels his 
ignorance of God, he is nevertheless arguing by analogy.
Norris, Shaftesbury, and Butler are thus three 
common-sense moralists who quite clearly anticipate Emerson's 
doctrine of correspondence. But the works of intellectual 
moralists also intrinsically suggest the view of nature 
Emerson was to hold, for these writers identified God with 
nature. For them, God "moves the stars and directs the 
course of a bubble. The moral as well as the material uni­
verse is absolutely dependent on .his laws."^9 Emerson de­
sires that analogies between the laws of nature and the laws
I^Basil Willey, The Eighteenth Century Background 
(19^0; rpt. Boston: Beacon Press, 1961), p. 77.
’'^Stephen, II, 3.
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of man's being be perceived. And this attitude of the intel­
lectual moralists is very close to his desire. More spe­
cifically, William Wollaston in The Religion of Nature De­
lineated (17240 humanizes "the scientific universe of the 
Enlightenment," ^ for he sees the reflection of man in the 
natural world. He applies to psychology, for example, the 
principle that every action meets with an equal and opposite 
reaction:
The causes of pleasure and pain are relative things: 
and in order to estimate truly their effect upon any 
particular subject they ought to be drawn into the 
degrees of perception in that subject. When the cause 
is of the same kind, and acts with an equal force, if 
the perception of one person be equal to that of an­
other, what they perceive must needs be e q u a l . 2 1
Wollaston here describes the causes of human pleasure and 
pain in the language of physical science. The force which 
produces a given amount of pleasure in one person is equal 
to the force which produces pleasure in another only if the 
amounts of pleasure produced are equal. And Wollaston goes 
on to argue that an immoral action can never be a force pro­
ducing pleasure. Thus, a century before Emerson asserts 
that "the axioms of physics translate the laws of ethics," 
Wollaston finds man's character symbolized in a law of 
physics.
But Wollaston's quantitative psychology would surely
20Kern, p. 2 7 5.
^"'william Wollaston, The Religion of Nature De­
lineated. 5th ed. (London, 1731), p. 33.
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be very objectionable to Emerson. Perhaps Wollaston is
closer to Emerson in the following passage:
To be governed by reason is the general law imposed 
by the Author of nature upon them, whose uppermost 
faculty is reason: as the dictates of it in partic­
ular cases are the particular laws, to which they are 
subject. As there are beings, which have not so much 
sense, and others that have no faculty above it; so 
there may be some, who are indued with reason, but have 
nothing higher than that. It is sufficient at present 
to suppose there may be such. And if reason be the 
uppermost faculty, it has a right to controll the rest 
by being such. As in sensitive animals sense commands 
gravitation and mechanical motion in those instances, 
for which their senses are given, and carries them out 
into spontaneous acts: so in rational animals the
gradation requires, that reason should command s e n s e .^2
Wollaston here suggests that as the animals are controlled 
by their highest faculty, man should be controlled by his, 
his reason. And to be controlled by reason for Wollaston 
is to act according to accepted moral laws. Wollaston be­
lieves that the man who acts immorally denies the essence 
of his being and concludes that no one acting reasonably 
would do this. Thus, nature serves Wollaston indirectly as 
a sort of moral standard against which to judge himself.
And Emerson overtly postulates just such a standard in "The 
American Scholar." Though Wollaston's reason is not what 
Emerson would define as man's highest faculty, his belief in 
correspondence is much like Emerson's. Moreover, Wollaston's 
belief that correspondences are given in the scheme of things 
anticipates Emerson's. Wollaston finds that analogies spring 
from the "general law" which governs both man and nature.
^^Wollaston, p. 10*+.
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They are in no sense arbitrary. Yet, despite these similar­
ities, Wollaston does not place so great a significance upon 
correspondence as does Emerson. Indeed, the religion of 
nature which he delineates is more often solely human than 
it is human reflected in physical nature.
Finally, two very different utilitarian moralists 
anticipate Emerson's stance on correspondence. Bishop 
Berkeley closely anticipates Emerson's belief that nature is 
symbolic when he argues that the natural world corresponds 
to the divine; "whithersoever we direct our view we do at 
all times and in all places perceive manifest tokens of the 
Divinity: everything we see, hear, feel or anywise perceive
by sense, being a sign or effect of the power of God 
. . . Berkeley here writes that all sensations which we 
receive in observing the natural world are symbolic of God. 
And he believes these signs to stand in the will of God, to 
be constant. Indeed, Berkeley writes, in language that 
sounds distinctly Emersonian, that "the voice of nature, 
which speaks to our eyes, is not liable to that misinterpre­
tation and ambiguity that languages of human contrivance are
OLlunavoidably subject to." In addition, Berkeley like 
Emerson avoids a fixed symbol system. He does not postulate
23The Works of George Berkeley, ed.
Alexander Campbell Fraser (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1901),
I, 3>+2.
'^^George Berkeley, The Principles of Human Knowledge 
in Berkeley's Philosophical Writings, ed. David M. Armstrong 
(New York, 1965), P* 76, as cited by Richard, p. 95-
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one-to-one relationships between particular sensations and 
particular attributes of God. However, Berkeley does differ 
from Emerson in an extremely significant way. He finds na­
ture to be symbolic of God; Emerson finds it to be symbolic 
of God and of the God within man. Yet, if they differ in 
the correspondences they perceive, Berkeley and Emerson 
agree that correspondences exist.
In addition to Berkeley, William Paley must be seen 
as an utilitarian moralist who foreshadows Emerson's doctrine 
of correspondence. Religiously far more orthodox than 
Emerson, Paley nevertheless finds that correspondences be­
tween man and nature support his orthodoxy. He argues, for 
instance, that the beneficent rain which falls in some areas 
and not in others is much like the coming of Christianity to 
some cultures and not to others. And he concludes from this 
parallel that God's failure to insure the universal accept­
ance of Christianity is not so important as his granting
2 *5that some people may experience it.  ̂ Paley thus establishes 
a clear correspondence between the workings of the natural and 
the human worlds. However, Paley is basically different from 
Emerson, for as Leslie Stephen notes, "Paley finds God in 
nature by the help rather of small contrivances than of the 
general order." Emerson, as we have seen, does not. He
25rhe Works of William Paley (Philadelphia: Crissy
and Markley, 1850), p. 378.
28stephen, I, 352.
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sees correspondence as pervasive in nature and finds that 
even the laws of physics and astronomy symbolize the depth 
of man's moral nature. Moreover, when Paley does talk ex­
tensively about nature, he tends to view it only as the ef­
fect which proves the cause, God; he does not typically re­
gard nature as a symbol. Yet Paley's proof of God from the 
order of His creation does suggest rather obliquely 
Emerson's view of correspondence. Paley's discussion of the 
principle of compensation, for instance, foreshadows 
Emerson's own. Paley suggests that a principle of compensa­
tion exists in the natural world; the fact that birds have 
gizzards to make up for their lack of teeth is but one of 
his many examples illustrating this p r i n c i p l e . A n d  Paley 
further believes that the compensations seen in nature prove 
the existence of God. Emerson modifies this assertion and 
suggests that the compensations seen in nature correspond to 
the advantages which offset every loss man experiences.
Paley then clearly anticipates Emersonian correspondence, 
though he does so much less directly than a writer like 
Shaftesbury.
Thus, Emerson perpetuates views expressed by 
eighteenth-century common-sense, intellectual, and utili­
tarian moralists in espousing his doctrine of correspondence. 
His beliefs that the attributes of man and of external nature 
correspond, that such correspondences are not metaphoric but
27paley, p.
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real, and that no one-to-one relationships between man and 
nature should be held rigidly are all beliefs held by a 
variety of eighteenth-century moralists. Yet there is a key 
difference between these two approaches to correspondence, 
one which goes beyond the typical discussion of the abstract 
nature of eighteenth-century writing. Where Shaftesbury 
"endeavors to be one with" God and finds correspondences be­
tween man and nature insofar as he is constitutionally able
P Rto achieve union, Emerson says simply that man can be one 
with God and nature can be his double. Where Berkeley says 
God is nature, Emerson says one should study nature in order 
to know himself. And where Norris and Wollaston find moral 
principles in nature, Emerson finds not only such principles, 
but also an emblem of man himself. Emerson, in short, finds 
nature to be a double of man while his eighteenth-century 
English counterparts tend to be more restrictive in the cor­
respondences they perceive. Emerson thus offers a much more 
exalted view of the self in his doctrine of correspondence, 
for he finds all of the natural world focused on man. He 
finds that correspondences suggest the depth of human nature, 
the importance of man the individual, the self's possibil­
ities for power.
One can profitably speculate about the reasons for 
this difference in emphasis between eighteenth-century 
English and Emersonian correspondence. We have seen that
Shaftesbury, II, 10 5.
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eighteenth-century writers like Shaftesbury, Butler, and 
Norris at times share Emerson’s concept of the God within, 
but that they do not locate God within man so consistently 
as does Emerson early in his career. Emerson thus presents 
a more radical concept of self-reliance than do his English 
predecessors. And Emerson's greater self-trust is seen in 
his greater emphasis upon the self as the focal point of all 
nature. The focus of God's creation, of nature, quite in­
evitably is on the man who has the Creator within. Moreover, 
only a man with the greatest of self-confidence (or one who 
needs to convince himself of his own worth) could assert 
that the natural world is his double without fearing that 
perhaps the correspondences he sees are illusory. This fear 
overtakes Emerson in "Circles," but in other early essays he 
is not bothered by it. Indeed, once his self-confidence per­
mits him to proclaim the existance of correspondences be­
tween man and nature, those correspondences reinforce his 
self-trust. They come to seem external sources which vali­
date the beliefs of the self-sufficient, isolated man. Find­
ing nature to be an emblem of man results from self-trust, 
but in a circular fashion it also provides evidence justify­
ing that trust. Emerson's doctrine of correspondence thus 
clearly differs from eighteenth-century English doctrines in 
its exaltation of the self, but it just as clearly shares 




Be tween Essays: First Series (18U-1) and Essays :
Second Series (1844), Emerson's view of correspondence changes 
substantially. This doctrine is, as we have seen, closely 
related to his belief in self-reliance, and events between 
1841 and l844 combine to chasten Emerson's faith in man's 
possibilities for power. The death of his young son Waldo 
was such a tremendous source of grief that to Samuel Ripley 
"it seemed obvious enough that, since young Waldo's death, 
Emerson could never be the same again."^9 Moreover, Emerson 
was forced to confront other unpleasant facts less close to 
his heart. The possibility for work on a projected railroad 
caused Concord to be flooded by poor Irish laborers, and 
Emerson's view of man's prospects must have been affected.
And Emerson's study of geology and realization of how vast 
the history of the earth was made him conscious of the small­
ness of an individual as opposed to n a t u r e . S u c h  factors 
then cause Emerson to alter his view of the self. He moves 
away from a vision of unlimited possibilities for man to a 
picture of the free man hooped in by necessity. And since 
the correspondences Emerson perceives are inseparably re­
lated to his concept of the self, his view of correspondence 
necessarily shifts also. He at times comes to suggest that
^9Ralph L. Rusk, The Life of Ralph Waldo Emerson 
(New York: Scribners, 1949), p. 294.
3%hicher, pp. l45-l46.
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natural symbols are relative things, that they spring from 
the minds of limited individuals and have no absolute exist­
ence. However, he more typically continues to say that cor­
respondences are given in the scheme of things, but does so 
without suggesting, as he did in his early essays, that they 
greatly exalt man.
In Essays: Second Series both of these new attitudes
toward correspondence manifest themselves, although Emerson 
opens the volume with a restatement of his earlier view.
"The Poet" presents a view of correspondence which is neither 
tinged with skepticism nor tempered in its view of man's 
possibilities. Here Emerson finds that nature is a symbol, 
that the poet as representative man is divine and should 
match the splendor of nature, and that symbols should be 
kept fluid rather than becoming fixed. But Emerson also says 
that he looks in vain for such a poet. And the discourage­
ment of this statement points toward the altered view of cor­
respondence we shall see in the volume's other essays.
In "Experience," for instance, Emerson suggests that 
correspondences are products of individual minds and are not 
given in the scheme of things. He writes that "Nature and 
literature are subjective phenomena; every evil and every 
good thing is % shadow which we cast" (W, III, 7 6). Emerson 
seems to suggest here that nature is totally subjective, 
that it is not a "projection of God in the unconscious" (W,
I, 6k-) but is merely a product of temperament, and that
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therefore the symbols in nature like those in literature are 
creations of individual minds. But Emerson is still able to 
maintain some faith in the self and by implication in cor­
respondence even in this skeptical essay, for he writes that 
"it is not what we believe concerning the immortality of the 
soul or the like, but the universal impulse to believe, that 
is the material circumstance and is the principal fact in 
the history of the globe" (W, III, 7*+)* This impulse to be­
lieve moves us toward the Ideal, toward the truth, even if 
we cannot have absolute confidence in the symbols we per­
ceive .
In contrast, "Character" tends to be less skeptical 
than "Experience" and to present a tempered version of the 
earlier concept of correspondence. For instance, Emerson 
writes :
Everything in nature is bipolar, or has a positive 
and a negative pole. There is a male and a female, a 
spirit and a fact, a north and a south. Spirit is 
the positive, the event is the negative. Will is the 
north, action the south pole. Character may be ranked 
as having its natural place in the north. It shares 
the magnetic currents of the system. The feeble souls 
are drawn to the south or negative pole. (¥, III, 97)
This passage sounds much like Emerson's earlier statements 
about correspondence. Emerson presents a correspondence be­
tween the harmonies that are in the soul and in matter, and 
he nowhere suggests that this correspondence is a "shadow 
which we cast" (W, III, 76). It truly exists. Moreover, no 
one-to-one system of correspondences is proposed, for "every­
thing is bipolar." Yet the correspondence between natural
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polarity and the polarity of human nature does not emphasize 
the importance of man to the extent that earlier correspond­
ences had. Man seems to he another example of a universal 
law rather than the focal point of all correspondences. The 
example of a man who relies on intuition as opposed to the 
man who is chained to matter is but one of several polar­
ities Emerson lists, though surely the most important in the 
list. Clearly, then, the emphasis on man's significance has 
been tempered here; the emphasis on the order of the whole 
has been increased.
In "Nature" Emerson seems to regain the faith in cor­
respondence and man's significance which he had expressed in 
"The Poet" and in his earlier works. He writes that "we 
traverse the whole scale of being, from the centre to the 
poles of nature, and have some stake in every possibility"
(W, III, 195-196). Nature in all its parts once again seems 
to be a symbol of man; man seems to be the focus of nature. 
Yet Emerson paints a less exalted picture of man elsewhere 
in the essay. He writes that
so poor is nature with all her craft, that from the 
beginning to the end of the universe she has but one 
stuff,--but one stuff with its two ends, to serve up 
all her dream-like variety. Compound it how she will, 
star, sand, fire, water, tree, man, it is still one 
stuff, and betrays the same properties. (W, III, I8 0-
181)
Emerson thus suggests that there are laws which run through­
out nature and which are true for all of her creatures. The 
"whole code of her laws may be written on the thumbnail," he
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writes. The law of compensation, for instance, he finds 
true in all realms. The tree, the bird, the man all know 
that disadvantage will be offset by advantage. Yet, here as 
in "Character," man seems less powerful. He is made of the 
same atoms as the rest of nature, and Emerson mentions man 
only as another example in a list of nature's creations which 
must obey the same laws. The radical egoism of correspond­
ence before 1841 is missing in this passage.
In Representative Men (l850) this altered view of
correspondence persists. Emerson, for instance, describes
Plato's belief in correspondence, but he does so in much
more restrained terms than he had used in his early works.
He writes that
being from one, things correspond. There is a scale; 
and the correspondence of heaven to earth, of matter 
to mind, of the part to the whole, is our guide. As 
there is a science of stars, called astronomy; a science 
of quantities, called mathematics; a science of qual­
ities, called chemistry; so there is a science of 
sciences,— I call it Dialectic,— which is the Intellect 
discriminating the false and true. (W, IV, 62)
Emerson here finds as he had earlier that mind and matter
correspond, and that the correspondence is not arbitrary.
He does not suggest that the correspondences merely exist
in an individual's mind, but asserts simply that "things
correspond." Moreover, Emerson continues to describe these
correspondences in general terms, avoiding too literal a
view of them: thought and substance correspond, he asserts,
because they come from the same Source. Yet the earlier
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egoism seems gone. The self is not the focus of concern as 
it has been. Emerson does not write that "nature is the op­
posite of the soul," does not write ecstatically. Instead 
he merely states that there are correspondences "of heaven 
to earth, of matter to mind, of the part to the whole." The 
exultant tone is gone; the old egoism has been modified.
A similar shift in tone can be seen in "Swedenborg." 
Emerson objects to the theological implications of the sym­
bols Swedenborg finds in nature. He writes that "Swedenborg 
and Behmen both failed by attaching themselves to the 
Christian symbol, instead of to the moral sentiment, which 
carries innumerable Christianities, humanities, divinities, 
in its bosom" (W, IV, 135)» Emerson, in a sense, maintains 
his early position here. He writes that symbols from nature 
represent divinities in man. And he elsewhere notes that 
these symbols are both real and fluid: "The central identity
allows any one symbol to express successively all the qual­
ities and shades of real being" (W, IV, 121). But Emerson 
avoids the rhetoric which proclaims man to be a creator in 
the finite. Instead he writes that symbols are attached to 
the moral sentiment which contains innumerable divinities 
and transcends the bounds of particular faiths. He finds 
the moral sentiment rather than the entire mind to be divine 
and to correspond to nature. The old hyperbole is gone and 
Emerson's view of the possibilities that nature reveals for 
the self has clearly been chastened.
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Finally, in The Conduct of Life (i860) Emerson's be­
lief in correspondence continues to show this modified na­
ture. One reason this revised view of correspondence per­
sists and grows in strength may be Emerson's European trip 
of 18̂ -7-IBU-B. The essays in The Conduct of Life originally 
were lectures given in the l850's after Emerson's return 
from that trip. And Rusk notes that he returned "with a 
better understanding of the kind of world in which most per­
sons l i v e d . I n d e e d ,  Emerson's Aunt Mary felt that this 
trip caused Emerson to move "beyond the mists rainbow visions 
of transcendental philosophy."82 Whatever the reason, 
Emerson's doctrine of correspondence in this late volume em­
phasizes both the skeptical and the tempered versions of his 
earlier concept.
However, in "Beauty" Emerson shows some of the 
earlier egotism which characterized his discussions of cor­
respondence. He writes in this essay that man holds himself 
too cheaply:
All the elements pour through his system; he is the 
flood of the flood and fire of the fire; he feels the 
antipodes and the pole as drops of his blood; they are 
the extension of his personality. His duties are 
measured by that instrument he is; and a right and 
perfect man would be felt to be the centre of the 
Copernican system. (W, VI, 2 8 3)
The universe is centered on man, Emerson writes. He con­
tains the essence of all that is. The poles of the globe
8'̂ Rusk, p. 357* 
82R-usk, p. 358.
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correspond to the poles of his nature, to his Reason and 
understanding, his spirit and sense. Yet, elsewhere in The 
Conduct of Life Emerson backs away from such statements.
In "Worship" Emerson certainly does not paint such a
picture of man's place in the natural world:
Our recent culture has been in natural science. We 
have learned the manners of the sun and of the moon, 
of the rivers and the rain, of the mineral and ele­
mental kingdoms, of plants and animals. Man has 
learned to weigh the sun, and its weight neither loses 
nor gains. The path of a star, the moment of an 
eclipse, can be determined to the fraction of a 
second. Well, to him the book of history, the book of 
love, the lures of passion and the commandments of 
duty are opened; and the next lesson taught is the 
continuation of the inflexible law of matter into the 
subtile kingdom of will and of thought; that if in 
sidereal ages gravity and projection keep their craft, 
and the ball never loses its way in its wild path 
through space,— a secreter gravitation, a secreter 
projection rule not less tyrannically in human history, 
and keep the balance of power from age to age un­
broken. For though the new element of freedom and an 
individual has been admitted, yet the primordial atoms 
are prefigured and predetermined to moral issues, are in 
search of justice, and ultimate right is done. Re­
ligion or worship is the attitude of those who see this 
unity, intimacy and sincerity; who see that against all 
appearances the nature of things works for truth and 
right forever.
It is a short sight to limit our faith in laws to 
those of gravity, of chemistry, of botany, and so 
forth. Those laws do not stop where our eyes lose them, 
but push the same geometry and chemistry up into the in­
visible plane of social and rational life . . . . (W,
VI, 2 1 8-2 1 9)
Emerson proclaims here that the laws of nature are the laws 
of men, that just as gravity holds the planets in their 
proper orbits, it assures that men's activities work for the 
right. And Emerson obviously believes this correspondence 
to exist absolutely. He is not merely creating a metaphor.
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He asserts that the law of gravity extends "into the in­
visible plane of social and rational life." Moreover, as he 
had early in his career, Emerson talks in general terms 
liere. He does not seek to define the symbolic meaning of 
each effect produced by natural law. But the old egoism 
which marked Emerson's early essays is missing here. Cor­
respondence here does not show man's power, but his reliance 
upon beneficent laws. Emerson grants that man is free, but 
he does not picture him as effecting revolutions, as bring­
ing about the triumph of a principle through his own efforts. 
Rather he assures man that despite his impotence, right will 
be done. Nature is thus no longer a symbol of man the indi­
vidual so much as it is of the moral laws which govern men 
in general. Correspondences here do not exalt man so much 
as they provide him with peace of mind.
In "Illusions" as in "Experience" Emerson is skepti­
cal of the validity of correspondence. In this essay he 
suggests that all reality may be the creation of a limited 
man's limited mind and that therefore correspondences may be 
illusory. Indeed, he writes that
Our conversation with nature is not just what it seems. 
The cloudrack, the sunrise and sunset glories, rain­
bows and Northern Lights are not quite so spheral as 
our childhood thought them, and the part our organiza­
tion plays in them is too large. The senses interfere 
everywhere and mix their own structure with all they 
report of. (W, IV, 311)
The senses, Emerson argues, keep us from seeing things as
they are. The physical eye itself distorts the stimuli it
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receives. And Emerson goes on to say that passions, senti­
ments, and ideas can produce similar distortions (W, VI,
319)' The correspondences we see, he thus implies, do not 
exist absolutely; "The intellect is stimulated by the 
statement of truth in a trope, and the will by clothing the 
law of life in illusions." But Emerson is not content with 
this skeptical attitude, and he immediately adds that "the 
unities of Truth and of Right are not broken by the dis­
guise. There need never be any confusion in these" (W, VI, 
32^). He suggests that though the correspondences we per­
ceive may be illusions, absolute Truths do exist and can be 
known.
-iv-
Thus, the hyperbole in discussions of correspondence 
and the trust in the reality of correspondences is modified 
in the second part of Emerson's career as an essayist. The 
correspondences in his later works tend not to exalt the self 
in an unqualified fashion, and correspondences at times ap­
pear to be relative symbols, to be products of individual 
minds.
The tempering of the degree to which correspondence 
exalts mankind surely brings Emerson even closer to those 
eighteenth-century Englishmen who share his belief in na­
ture' s symbolic character. Emerson's belief that despite 
all appearances the "primordial atoms are prefigured and 
predetermined to moral issues" suggests Butler's belief that
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moral laws like natural laws are constantly at work, even 
though man may not be able to see them. Neither view exalts 
man. And the flatness of Emerson's assertion that "Every­
thing in nature is bipolar," including man, recalls the 
subdued tone in Wollaston's statement that every creature in 
nature must be governed by its highest faculty. But per­
haps because Emerson increasingly respects the power of fate 
late in his career, his ideas harken back most clearly to 
those of the necessitarian David Hartley. Hartley, like 
Emerson, tends to believe that "the axioms of physics trans­
late the laws of ethics," for he argues that science should 
be studied because there are numerous "Connexions of Truth 
of all kinds with those most amiable and important doctrines, 
which Religion, Natural and Revealed, teaches us." He 
like Emerson believes these analogies to truly exist. Man 
does not fabricate these similarities but discovers "The 
analogous natures of all the things about us."^^ And he like 
Emerson refuses to establish a system of one-to-one corre­
spondences, believing that "all things comment on each other 
in endless reciprocation."^^ Finally, Hartley, like Emerson 
late in his career, does not use correspondence to exalt 
man. On the contrary, he believes everything in nature
33oavid Hartley, Observations on Man (17^9; rpt. 
Gainesville, Florida: Scholars' Facsimiles and Reprints,
1966), Part 1, p. >+33.
3^Hartley, Part 1, p. 343.
^^Hartley, Part 1, p. 343.
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combines to exalt God: "Everything sweet, beautiful, or
glorious, brings in the idea of God, mixes with it, and 
vanishes into it. Thus, although Emerson does not share 
in Hartley's materialism, he undoubtedly comes to resemble 
Hartley and other eighteenth-century English moralists when 
he tempers the radical egoism of his early stand on corre­
spondence.
However, Emerson's skeptical stance on correspond­
ence, his suggestion that symbols are relative, is unlike the 
eighteenth-century views of correspondence we have seen. One 
might be able to see Butler's probable analogies as an 
oblique anticipation of this view. Yet surely Emerson's 
relativistic position has closer eighteenth-century English 
parallels. It closely resembles the philosophy of Hume and 
the views of nature seen in works by George Crabbe and Anne 
Radcliffe, for instance.
Hume most clearly anticipates the skepticism which
would tinge Emerson's later works. He writes, for example.
If we can depend on any principle which we learn from 
philosophy, this, I think, may be considered as certain 
and undoubted, that there is nothing, in itself, valu­
able or despicable, desirable or hateful, beautiful or 
deformed; but that these attributes arise from the par­
ticular constitution and fabric of human sentiment and 
affection.37
3&Hartley, Part 2, p. 313 .
37Hume, III, 216. Hume does not find this conclusion 
disconcerting because he believes standards of beauty and 
behavior have been established by custom: "There is a suf­
ficient uniformity in the senses and feelings of mankind, to
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Hime suggests here that the mind of man determines what he 
values and what he sees, that there are no absolute values 
or truths. Emerson, of course, never fully accepts this po­
sition. He believes throughout his career in ultimate 
spiritual realities, but in the later part of his career as 
an essayist he at times argues that the individual inevit­
ably distorts those realities, inevitably shapes them in his 
own image as he perceives them in nature. And this causes 
Emerson to doubt the viability of correspondence. If man 
cannot trust his perceptions, he can scarcely claim that the 
correspondences he sees exist absolutely. Emerson thus 
shares somewhat in Hume's sceptical attitude when he writes 
that correspondences are relative rather than absolute.
This relativistic view of correspondence is also an­
ticipated in the works of George Crabbe and Anne Radcliffe. 
Emerson finds reading Crabbe's poems "all one with taking a 
dose of medicine," but he acknowledges that "Crabbe knew 
men" (JMN. V, 3^5)• And perhaps one way in which Crabbe 
knew men was in his realization that the mind distorts what 
the eyes present to it. In "The Lovers Journey," he
make all these qualities the objects of art and reasoning, 
and to have the greatest influence on life and manners"
(III, 219). However, for Emerson this is not enough. He 
hopes to use nature as a standard of excellence which fallen 
man has never fully but may yet achieve. But when Emerson 
loses confidence in man's ability to know God within, he 
comes to feel that man inevitably distorts what he perceives 
in nature, inevitably shapes it in his own image rather than 
discovering his image there. And as a consequence, he tends 
to view correspondence as a less viable doctrine.
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certainly argues that this is true. The lover when expectant
and when disappointed views the same landscape in entirely
different terms because
It is the Soul that sees; the outward eyes 
Present the object but the Mind descries;
And thence delight, disgust, or cool indifference
rise . . .38
For Crabbe, therefore, correspondences could never have an 
absolute existence because man determines what he sees 
rather than seeing analogies that stand in the mind of God. 
Crabbe's approach to experience then clearly anticipates 
Emerson’s relativistic view of correspondence, for Emerson 
like Crabbe finds that there are "deceptions of the passions" 
(W, VI, 3 1 9) which affect one's view of nature.
Like Crabbe, Anne Radcliffe in The Mysteries of 
Udolpho suggests that the mind of man may distort what he 
sees. The Count of Chateau-le-Blanc explains that while na­
ture has not changed in the course of his life, his view of 
it has:
"though the grand features of the scenery admit of no 
change, they impress me with sensations very different 
from those I formerly experienced."
"Did these scenes," said Blanche, "ever appear more 
lovely than they do now? To me this seems hardly pos­
sible. "
The count, regarding her with a melancholy smile, 
said, "They were once as delightful to me, as they are 
now to you; the landscape is not changed, but the time 
has changed me; from my mind the illusion, which gave 
spirit to the colouring of nature, is fading fasti If 
you live, my dear Blanche, to revisit this spot, at the
38George Crabbe, Tales, 1812 and other Selected 
Poems (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, I9 6 7), p. 220.
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distance of many years, you will, perhaps, remember and 
understand the feelings of your father."39
Radcliffe here suggests that one's reaction to nature changes
as one's mind changes and develops; she suggests that what is
seen is distorted by the perceiver. If such is the case,
correspondences can hardly be constant and pervade nature.
Radcliffe's position thus foreshadows the basis for
Emerson's relativistic view of correspondence which emerges
in Essays; Second Series and troubles him throughout the
rest of his career.
Eighteenth-century English writers thus clearly hold 
the tempered view of correspondence Emerson was to adopt.
And a skeptic like Hume foreshadows the skeptical view of 
correspondence Emerson was at time to hold. In the later 
part of his career, then, Emerson is far from being in revolt 
against the Age of Reason. Instead, his doctrine of corre­
spondence ties him closely to it.
Emerson thus moves from a rather self-centered doc­
trine of correspondence in which he has absolute faith to a 
view of correspondence which is centered less on the self and 
is at times even relativistic. But whatever his position on 
correspondence, he follows closely in traditions established 
by eighteenth-century English moralists. Norris, Shaftesbury, 
Butler, Wollaston, Berkeley, Paley, and Hume provide in the
39Anne Radcliffe, Mysteries of Udolpho (New York: 
Dutton, 1931), II, 1^5.
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eighteenth century all the elements which would prove essen­
tial to Emersonian correspondence in the nineteenth.
CHAPTER IV
EMERSON, EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND, AND 
COMPENSATION: PART I, VIRTUE REWARDED
Compensation has been recognized as a doctrine which 
links Emerson to eighteenth-century English thought. Indeed, 
Joel Porte finds that eighteenth-century optimism "implies 
and contains Emerson's principle of c o m p e n s a t i o n . A n d  
Stephen Whicher argues that Emersonian compensation is really 
an Enlightenment concept.^ But it does not lie within the 
scope of Porte's or Whicher's study to discuss fully the 
nature of Emersonian compensation and its relationship to 
eighteenth-century English thought. It thus seems appropri­
ate to attempt such a discussion here.
Henry F. Pommer says that Emerson's doctrine of "Com­
pensation lived essentially unchanged through years of stress 
and of calm because its roots went down to the very founda­
tion of Emerson's thought and personality."3 And Pommer is
1 Porte, p. 12.
^Whicher, p. 37*
^Henry F. Pommer, "The Contents and Basis of 
Emerson's Belief in Compensation," PMLA, 77 (1962), 2k8-k9.
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surely correct in maintaining that Emerson believes in com­
pensation throughout his career. Yet I believe he is incor­
rect in suggesting that this concept remains unchanged. 
Emerson's belief in compensation, like his belief in cor­
respondence, is inevitably related to his evolving view of 
the self, and thus it necessarily changes somewhat during 
the course of his career.
Throughout his works Emerson offers two main defini­
tions of compensation, viewing it as the principle which 
rewards virtue and punishes evil and viewing it as the as­
surance, in Pope's words, that "all partial evil" is "uni-
Li.versai good," that "Whatever is, is right." The first def­
inition is clearly centered upon the individual who by his 
free choice of good or evil is rewarded or punished. The 
second definition, which Whicher might call a counterpunch- 
ing definition,^ is just as clearly centered less upon the 
individual and his choices and more upon the beneficent 
scheme of things which offsets any suffering. Thus, although 
both of these definitions recur throughout Emerson's career, 
his view of compensation as virtue rewarded tends to be most 
important early in his career as an essayist when he finds 
all things centered in the individual, and his view of com­
pensation as the principle which makes partial evil universal
^Alexander Pope, "An Essay on Man," in Eighteenth 
Century Poetry and Prose, ed. Louis I. Bredvold et al. [New 
York: Ronald Press, 1956), p. 38^*
^Whicher, p. 39.
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good tends to be most important later in his career when he 
sees the individual as a man rather than a god. Both views, 
as we shall see, are common to eighteenth-century English 
thought.
—i—
Early in his career as an essayist when his belief 
in man's freedom is at its height, Emerson inevitably empha­
sizes his faith that man's choice of good over evil is re­
warded. Indeed, without the freedom to choose, reward can 
have little significance. Living in Concord, seeing his 
friends rise "economically, intellectually, or spiritually,"^ 
Emerson quite easily can believe that virtue brings both 
private emotional rewards and, though he less often suggests 
this, social and material rewards.
In Nature Emerson certainly says that virtue is re­
warded. He asserts that "When men are innocent life shall 
be longer and shall pass into the immortal as gently as we 
awake from dreams" (W, I, 71)? and he adds that you can 
achieve such innocence "as fast as you conform your life to 
the pure idea in your mind" (W, I, 76). In poetic terms, 
Emerson here suggests that the man who centers his life 
around the ideas of universal order, God, and love rather 
than the satisfaction of his senses will have a fuller and 
more meaningful life because he has based it on eternal
^Canby, p. 157*
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concepts rather than temporal circumstances. And he believes 
that time is a deceptive element. When one lives a life 
based on sensation, time moves rapidly, for the pleasures 
are transitory. But when one lives a life of innocence, 
time seems somehow suspended, for the pleasures endure.
Life for Emerson is therefore longer, in a metaphoric sense, 
when one follows in the paths of virtue. Compensation is 
thus a significant concept in Nature. and it is only to be 
expected that Emerson would note in his journal for I836 that 
"nothing needs so much to be preached as the law of Compen­
sation out of the nature of things, that the good exalts & 
the evil degrades us not hereafter but in the moment of the 
deed" (JMN. V, 192). Psychological or spiritual rewards, he 
believes, are attendant upon virtue in this world, not in 
the next.
In "The Divinity School Address" Emerson quite natu­
rally, given the occasion of his speech, continues his moral 
emphasis in discussing compensation:
Thus in the soul of man there is a justice whose retri­
butions are instant and entire. He who does a good 
deed is instantly ennobled. He who does a mean deed is 
by the action itself contracted. He who puts off im­
purity, thereby puts on purity. If a man is at heart 
just, then so far is he God: the safety of God, the
immortality of God, the majesty of God do enter into 
that man with justice. If a man dissemble, deceive, he 
deceives himself, and goes out of acquaintance with his 
own being. (W, I, 122)
Here Emerson suggests that to act justly is to act naturally
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and to become one with God.7 The just man is spiritually 
safe from all harm, his life is based on a concept which is 
eternally true, and he gains the majestic quality we associ­
ate with a man who is incorruptible. To realize your own 
nature by acting virtuously, Emerson writes, brings great 
spiritual rewards. And later in the address Emerson adds 
that practical as well as spiritual rewards accompany virtue:
Thefts never enrich; alms never impoverish; murder will 
speak out of stone walls. The least admixture of a 
lie, for example, the taint of vanity, any attempt to 
make a good impression, a favorable appearance,— will 
instantly vitiate the effect. But speak the truth, 
and all nature and all spirits help you with unexpected 
furtherance. Speak the truth and all things alive or 
brute are vouchers and the very roots of the grass un­
derground there do seem to stir and move to bear you 
witness. (W, I, 123)
Emerson writes in this passage that an effort to deceive will 
inevitably fail whereas speaking the truth will help you 
toward your desires. It is a natural law, he believes, that 
honesty succeeds and dishonesty fails. And he metaphorically 
suggests this when he states that "the very roots of the 
grass underground there do seem to stir and move to bear you 
witness" when you speak the truth. The doctrine of compen­
sation in "The Divinity School Address" thus clearly empha­
sizes compensation as a sort of "self-administering
''When Emerson argues that a reward of virtue is the 
incoming of God, he is arguing in a somewhat circular fash­
ion. Indeed, in "The Over-Soul" he finds that virtue re­
sults when a man possesses the God within (W, II, 271), but 
in "The Divinity School Address" he finds that when a man is 
virtuous, then that man is God (W, I, 122).
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principle" of justice at work in the universe.
However, Whicher's persuasive argument that compen­
sation is not a major doctrine in these radical essays must 
be noted:
as a faith to live by, compensation had its limita­
tions. It was inherently a defensive faith, a counter- 
punch . . . .  The reward it guaranteed for virtue, to 
be sure, was an exception, but here the limitation was 
the moral condition put on good fortune. We can under­
stand, then, that when Emerson found a basis for the 
assertion of unconditional good, in his discovery of 
the God within the soul, the law of compensation slipped 
to a subordinate place in his thoughts. Then his inner 
limitations virtually evaporated before his limitless 
possibilities; and the outer world glowed with a vast 
promise in which all things were tuned and set to good.
A creed that could be reduced, as he once wrote, to the 
single article, 'Goodness is the only Reality,' 
clearly underwrote his security much more handsomely 
than the minimum coverage provided by compensation.9
Whicher here suggests that the concept of virtue rewarded is 
not especially important to the radical essays because it 
places a "moral condition . . .  on good fortune." He is un­
doubtedly correct in suggesting that Emerson objects to fol­
lowing an external code of behavior in order to achieve good 
fortune. But for Emerson, following one's own nature is 
tantamount to following rather conventional moral codes.
Thus, if Emerson argues that goodness will be the only re­
ality when man realizes his true nature, he is actually plac­
ing a moral condition on the achievement of good fortune. In
8Pommer, p. 2 5 3- 
^Whicher, p. 39.
lOgee Porte, pp. 82-83 for similar conclusions.
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Nature it is the innocent who finds life longer, and in "The
Divinity School Address" it is the just man who receives the
safety, immortality, and majesty of God and the evil man who
is punished because he "goes out of acquaintance with his
own Being." Moreover, "The Divinity School Address" suggests
that man's inner limitations evaporate "before his limitless
possibilities" only insofar as he is benevolent:
the world is not the product of manifold power, but of 
one will, of one mind; and that one mind is everywhere 
active, in each ray of the star, in each wavelet of the 
pool; and whatever opposes that will is everywhere 
balked and baffled, because things are made so, and not 
otherwise. Good is positive. Evil is merely privative, 
not absolute: it is like cold, which is the privation
of heat. All evil is so much death or nonentity. Be­
nevolence is absolute and real. So much benevolence as 
a man hath, so much life hath he. (¥, I, 123-124)
To be benevolent, to have the "spirit" of "love, justice, 
temperance," is for Emerson equivalent to truly living. These 
values make life meaningful; without them a man lives merely 
a death in life, without them one becomes a sort of Prufrock. 
Thus, even when he is denying the existence of evil, Emerson 
continues to emphasize his definition of compensation as 
virtue rewarded, for virtue brings life while evil brings 
only death. This virtue, one must hasten to add, however, is 
not so much a virtue of action as it is a feeling, a "senti­
ment" from which actions can arise. Thus, one is not compen­
sated in Emerson's scheme for mechanically and calculatingly 
doing good works but for possessing the spirit of virtue.
In Essays: First Series Emerson continues this empha­
sis upon compensation as virtue rewarded, on compensation as
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a self-administering principle of justice. In "Compensation,"
for example, he argues that
The soul which withiu us is a sentiment, outside of us 
is a law. We feel its inspiration; but there in his­
tory we can see its fatal strength. "It is in the 
world, and the world was made by it." Justice is not 
postponed. A perfect equity adjusts its balance is all 
parts of life, . . . The dice of God are always loaded.
The world looks like a multiplication-table, or a mathe­
matical equation, which turn it how you will, balances 
itself. . . . Every secret is told, every crime is 
punished, every virtue rewarded, every wrong redressed, 
in silence and certainty. (W, II, 102)
Emerson, using mathematical terminology worthy of an 
eighteenth-century rationalist, here specifically states that 
every virtue is rewarded. And he goes on to add that rewards 
exist "first in the thing, or in real nature; and secondly in 
the circumstance or apparent nature." Both internal and in­
terpersonal rewards come to the virtuous man. Virtue can 
bring "a serene eternal peace" (W, II, 123). And it can also 
insure that relationships with others will be enhanced. In­
deed, Emerson counsels, "Love and you shall be loved. All 
love is mathematically just, as much as two sides of an al­
gebraic equation." (W, II, 116)^^
lilt should be noted that Emerson is no Pollyanna in 
this essay. His description of the martyr could never en­
courage a hedonistic pursuit of virtue.
A mob is a society of bodies voluntarily bereaving them­
selves of reason and traversing its work. The mob is 
man voluntarily descending to the nature of the beast. 
Its fit hour of activity is night. Its actions are in­
sane, like its whole constitution. It persecutes a 
principle; it would whip a right; it would tar and 
feather justice, by inflicting fire and outrage upon the 
houses and persons of those who have these. It re­
sembles the prank of boys who run with fire-engines to
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Similarly, in "Spiritual Laws" compensation is a
major doctrine. In this essay Emerson suggests that virtue
may bring a man social advantages:
Always as much virtue as there is, so much appears; as 
much goodness as there is, so much reverence it com­
mands. All the devils respect virtue. The high, the 
generous, the self-devoted sect will always instruct 
and command mankind. Never a sincere word was utterly 
lost. Never a magnanimity fell to the ground. Always 
the heart of man greets and accepts it unexpectedly.
A man passes for what he is worth. What he is, engraves 
itself on his face, on his form, on his fortunes, in 
letters of light, which all men read but himself. Con­
cealment avails him nothing ; boasting, nothing. There 
is confession in the glances of our eyes, in our smiles, 
in salutations, and the grasp of hands. His sin be­
daubs him, mars all his good impression. Men know not 
why they do not trust him; but they do not trust him.
His vice glasses his eye, demeans his cheek, pinches 
the nose, sets the mark of the beast on the back of the 
head, and writes, 0 fooll fool! on the forehead of a 
king. (W, II, 158-59)
Here again Emerson argues that virtue is rewarded and vice
punished. The sincere and magnanimous man will be respected;
the dissembler will not. The compensation meted out to evil,
he argues, is failure in the world of experience. All the
world can recognize the liar; all men recognize insincerity
put out the ruddy aurora streaming to the stars. The 
inviolate spirit turns their spite against the wrong­
doers. The martyr cannot be dishonored. Every lash in­
flicted is a tongue of fame; every prison a more illus­
trious abode; every burned book or house enlightens the 
world; every suppressed or expunged word reverberates 
through the earth from side to side. Hours of sanity 
and consideration are always arriving to communities, 
as to individuals, when the truth is seen and the 
martyrs are justified. (W, II, 119-20)
The reward of honor which the virtuous man achieves in this 
passage is not a reward which would prompt a self-seeking 
pursuit of virtue. Yet, as we have seen, Emerson typically 
paints a much more attractive picture of virtue's rewards.
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and concealment and distrust the false man. Compensation is 
thus the principle which guarantees social as well as emo­
tional rewards and punishments for a man's choice of good or 
evil.
Finally, the emphasis upon compensation as the re­
ward for a free choice of virtue continues in the essay 
"Prudence." And in this essay, more than in any other, 
Emerson identifies worldly prudence and disinterested virtue:
The prudence which secures an outward well-being is not 
to be studied by one set of men, whilst heroism and 
holiness are studied by another, but they are recon­
cilable. Prudence concerns the present time, persons, 
property, and existing forms. But as every fact hath 
its roots in the soul, and if the soul were changed, 
would cease to be or would become some other thing, 
therefore the proper administration of outward things 
will always rest on a just apprehension of their cause 
and origin; that is the good man will be the wise man, 
and the single-hearted the politic man. Every violation 
of truth is not only a sort of suicide in the liar, but 
is a stab at the health of human society. On the most 
profitable lie the course of events presently lays a 
destructive tax; whilst frankness proves to be the best 
tactics, for it invites frankness, puts the parties on 
a convenient footing, and makes their business a friend­
ship. Trust men, and they will shew themselves great, 
though they make an exception in your favour to all their 
rules of trade. (¥, II, 236-237)
Virtue, Emerson suggests, has both material and psychological 
benefits. The man who chooses "truth, frankness, courage, 
love, humility, and all the virtues" finds that they con­
tribute significantly to "the art of securing a present well­
being" (W, II, 2h0). In short, Emerson believes that honesty 
literally pays in the world of business. But the man who 
chooses virtue, he goes on to write, also chooses life it­
self. Emerson suggests that to lie is to commit suicide, is
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to violate your very nature and condemn yourself to a death 
in life. Heroism, holiness, and good business relations thus 
all spring from virtue, and compensation is a law of life.
-ii-
Thus, in his early essays Emerson consistently em­
phasizes his definition of compensation as a principle of 
reward for virtue. And that principle tends to bring rewards 
which are primarily emotional or spiritual, but which can 
also be material or social in nature. Yet this definition 
is not, as Jonathan Bishop suggests, an idiosyncrasy of 
E m e r s o n ' s . T h i s  view is also significant in eighteenth- 
century English writing to an extent which has never been 
fully discussed in relation to Emerson. It is central to the 
utilitarian moralists, it appears in the writings of intel­
lectual and common-sense moralists, and it is essential to 
the whole cult of sensibility which was so prominent in 
eighteenth-century England.
The utilitarian moralists clearly anticipate 
Emerson’s belief that virtue is rewarded, though they do so 
in a fashion highly objectionable to Emerson. By definition 
these moralists believe that virtue is what man approves and 
vice what he disapproves. Locke, for instance, the earliest 
writer of this school, contends that "Good or evil are 
nothing but pleasure and pain, or that which occasions or
I^Bishop, p. 72.
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produces pleasure or pain in us."^^ For Locke, therefore, 
as Stephen writes, "Virtue is approved because visibly con­
ducive to happiness, and conscience is merely our opinion 
of the conformity of actions to certain moral rules, the 
utility of which has been proved by experience. It is no 
mysterious judge laying down absolute decisions for in­
scrutable r e a s o n s . E m e r s o n  surely shares Locke's belief 
that virtue brings happiness, for he writes that obeying the 
moral sentiment can bring "a serene eternal peace." And he 
asserts that his love of others brings him love in return.
But Emerson differs significantly from Locke, for he does 
not believe virtue can be defined solely by the results it 
produces. Indeed, virtue for Emerson is sanctioned by the 
Over-Soul and by the God within. It is not an artificial 
human construct based only on experience. Emerson writes in 
"Compensation" that the "soul which within us is a sentiment, 
outside of us is a law." A moral sentiment prompts us to 
virtue, he suggests, not the desire of rewards guaranteed by 
the principle of compensation. Thus, Emerson does not believe 
one pursues virtue for the sake of its effects. He only 
writes that disinterested virtue will bring contentment 
along the way. Locke, however, we should note, does not be­
lieve that defining virtue by its effects makes its nature
John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding « 
ed. A. C. Fraser (Oxford: Clarendon Press, lS94), I, 474.
'I'+Stephen, p. 69-
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uncertain. As Stephen suggests, "his notion seems to be 
that in moral questions we are reasoning about certain things 
of which we know 'the precise real essence,' because they are 
entire 'ideas in the mind.'"15 And such a stance is quite 
similar to the one Emerson takes, for Locke seems to believe 
that morality does have what is tantamount to an absolute 
existence.
Hume, the next major utilitarian moralist of the 
eighteenth century, also anticipates Emerson's belief in com­
pensation as virtue rewarded. Hume suggests that virtues 
must be defined as customs which have arisen because of the 
emotional pleasure attendent upon them or because of their 
utility to oneself and to others. Thus, he believes in the 
virtues of industry, discretion, frugality, cheerfulness, 
magnanimity, tranquility of mind, good manners, modesty, 
cleanliness because they bring both emotional and material 
r e w a r d s . T h e y  serve to "advance a man's fortune in the 
world," to "increase his power of self-enjoyment," and to
"I fs"render him a more valuable member of society."'^ Emerson 
accepts a similar set of virtues and sees the same effects 
resulting from them. The magnanimous man, he suggests, will
l^stephen, p. 7 2.
Importe draws a similar parallel between Locke and 




always be respected (W, II, 158) and humility will advance a 
man's situation in the world (W, II, 2U-0). Yet Hume, like 
Locke, differs substantially from Emerson in that he bases 
his definition of virtue solely on experience and custom.
He seeks no other sanction for it, and he at times recom­
mends a rather calculating pursuit of virtue: "To love the
glory of virtuous deeds is sure proof of the love of 
v i r t u e . 9 Emerson strives to avoid this sort of attitude.
At the opening of "Compensation" he mocks those people who 
hope to gain the "Houses and lands, offices, wine, horses, 
dress, luxury" in heaven that they are denied here, and he 
implies that our goal should be virtue, not the consequences 
of virtue (W, II, 9'+)- Yet insofar as Hume believes man to 
act naturally from altruistic motives, he more closely re­
sembles Emerson. Hume argues that man takes joy in the good 
fortune of others, even when that good fortune is purchased 
at his expense. He seems to deny the hedonistic qualities 
which otherwise might be associated with his view of virtue. 
Hume still argues that the existence of the natural inclina­
tion for altruism can only be verified by observation, but 
like Emerson he denies in such cases that virtue is purely 
selfish.
The intellectual moralists do not stress the rewards 
of virtue as much as do the utilitarians. On the contrary, 
they emphasize reason as the faculty by which man consciously
^%ume. III, 156.
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conforms his actions to sanctified standards of virtue rather
than stressing the consequences of an action. Yet, they do
write that emotional rewards accompany virtuous actions.
Richard Price, for instance, denies that the rewards which
come to the virtuous man furnish the primary motivation for
acting virtuously:
it is evidently contradictory to suppose, that the de­
sire of the pleasure attending virtue, or arising from 
the reflection upon it, can in any instance be sole 
motive to the practice of it. For a person to propose 
acting thus, is exactly the same as for him to propose 
acting from one motive, in order to have the pleasure 
of reflecting that he has acted from another.20
To act virtuously in order to experience self-approving joy
is impossible, Price suggests, because one always knows that
his ulterior motive is not admirable. But Price admits that
the reasonable decision to act virtuously can be reinforced
by the emotional pleasures which attend it:
Self-approbation, and sr .f-reproach, are the chief 
sources of private happiness and misery. These are con­
nected with, and entirely dependent on, our conscious­
ness of practising or not practising virtue. . . .
Virtue and vice, therefore, from the natures of things 
are the immediate and intimate causes of private happi­
ness or misery.21
Virtue, Price writes, is the source of contentment; virtue
truly brings self-approbation, if man does not pursue the
good only for its rewards. And Price also writes that "to
?oRichard Price. A Review of the Principle Questions 
in Morals (London, 1757), P* 389? as cited by Winston H. F. 
Barnes, "Richard Price: A Neglected Eighteenth-Century
Moralist," Philosophy. XVII (19̂ +2), 172.
21 Price, Review (1757), PP* 95-96, as cited in 
Barnes, p. I7 3.
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every rational mind properly disposed, morally good actions 
must for ever be acceptable, and can never of themselves
offend; and morally evil actions must for ever be disagree-
?2able, and can never of themselves please." A virtuous ac­
tion can never in itself make you unhappy and an evil action 
can never in itself make you happy. Thus, like Emerson,
Price rejects a calculating pursuit of virtue while at the 
same time stating that virtue brings emotional rewards. In 
fact. Price's belief that virtue brings self-approbation sug­
gests Emerson's approval of the "self-devoted" sect which 
consists of virtuous men, his approval of men who have the 
confidence to "instruct and command mankind" (W, II, 158)* 
However, Price places much less emphasis upon the rewards of 
virtue than does Emerson, and his statements about virtue re­
warded are typically more restrained than Emerson's. He 
merely finds virtue to be an immediate cause of private hap­
piness; he does not write that virtue brings all nature to 
one's aid. But such differences do not obscure the basic 
similarities, and Price the intellectual moralist anticipates 
Emerson's early stance on compensation.
In a similar fashion, William Wollaston finds virtue
to be a source of contentment for the man who chooses it:
As the true and ultimate happiness of no being can be 
produced bv any thing, that Interferes with truth, and
^^Richard Price, A Review of the Principle Questions 
and Difficulties in Morals, 2nd ed. (London, 1769), p. 93, as 
cited by Porte, p. 72.
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denies the natures of things; so neither can the prac­
tice of truth make any being ultimately imhappy. For 
that, which contradicts nature and truth, opposes the 
will of the Author of nature . . and to suppose, that 
an inferior being may in opposition to His will break 
through the constitution of things and by so doing make
himself happy, is to suppose that being more potent
than the author of nature and power of that very being 
himself, which is absurd. And as to the other part of 
the proposition, it is also absurd to think, that, by 
the constitution of nature and will of its author, any 
being should be finally miserable only for conforming 
himself to truth, and owning things and the relations 
lying between them to be what they are.23
In his cautious fashion Wollaston words his version of com­
pensation rather negatively. He argues that lies cannot 
make one happy and that truth cannot make one unhappy. And 
since he identifies any virtuous action with truth, he in­
deed suggests that virtue is a prudent course of action, 
though he chooses to recommend it as the reasonable course of 
action. Virtue insures that one will never be miserable 
while vice insures that one will never be happy. Clearly, 
Wollaston's statement is far from Emerson's optimistic proc­
lamation of compensation in tone, but in essence it is very
similar.
Like the intellectual moralists, the common-sense 
moralists do not emphasize a utilitarian view of virtue.
They believe that when man acts naturally, he acts virtu­
ously, and consequently they do not stress the result of an 
act so much as the sentiment which leads to it. Yet these 
moralists do recognize the rewards which are a by-product of
23wollaston, pp. 38-39*
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virtue. Willey writes of Bishop Butler, for example, " . . .  
it is not Butler's purpose to justify virtue on the score of 
its pleasantness; yet he feels free to use that argument, 
when it seems desirable, in order to refute those who seek
OIlpleasure in vice." Butler clearly does not want to recom­
mend a hedonistic pursuit of virtue, but just as clearly he 
does suggest that there are definite emotional rewards at­
tendant upon virtue: "The temper of compassion and benev­
olence is itself delightful; and the indulgence of it, by 
doing good, affords new positive delight and enjoyment. 
Furthermore, Butler indicates that more tangible rewards may 
also result from virtue :
It should seem, that a due concern about our own inter­
est or happiness, and a reasonable endeavor to secure 
and promote it, which is, I think, very much the mean­
ing of the word prudence, in our language: it should
seem, that this is virtue; and the contrary behavior
faulty and blamable: since, in the calmest way of re­
flections, we approve of the first, and condem the 
other conduct, both in ourselves and others.
Butler here argues much as Emerson was to in "Prudence" that
prudence and virtue are not opposed but complementary. To
seek one's own interest is to act virtuously and vice versa.
Thus, Emerson and Butler both stress a disinterested pursuit
of virtue, but both also find that emotional and material
rewards come to the virtuous man. Perhaps Butler is more
^Sfilley, p. 91. 
25Butler, II, 73- 
^^Butler, I,
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restrained than Emerson, for he cautions that whatever ex­
ceptions there are to this rule "shall be set right at the 
final distribution of t h i n g s w h e r e a s  Emerson believes that 
all shall be set right in the here and now. But surely such 
a difference does not invalidate the substantial similar­
ities we have seen.
Shaftesbury, much more the optimist than Butler, is 
a common-sense moralist who anticipates Emerson’s position 
even more closely. •Shaftesbury, like Emerson, does not 
recommend a hedonistic search for the joys of virtue. In­
deed, he believes that a good man can be content "even
p Qthough experiencing discomfort or unpleasant sensations."
But although Shaftesbury does not picture virtue as bring­
ing sensual delight, he does believe that genuine content­
ment comes to the virtuous man. For Shaftesbury, then, the 
rewards of virtue are primarily emotional, though they 
ideally include "physical well-being too."^9 And he well 
describes these emotional rewards:
To love, and to be kind; to have social or natural af­
fection, complacency, and good will, is to feel immedi­
ate satisfaction and genuine content. 'Tis in itself 
original joy, depending on no preceding pain or un­
easiness, and producing nothing beside satisfaction 
merely. On the other side, animosity, hatred, and
27sutler, II, 75.
^^Stanley Grean, Shaftesbury's Philosophy of Religion 




bitterness, is original misery and torment, producing no 
other pleasure or satisfaction than as the unnatural 
desire is for the instant satisfied by something which 
appeases it. How strong soever this pleasure therefore 
may appear, it only the more implies the misery of that 
state which produces it. For as the cruellest bodily 
pains do by intervals of assuagement produce (as has 
been shown) the highest bodily pleasure, so the fiercest 
and most raging torments of the mind do, by certain 
moments of relief, afford the greatest of mental enjoy­
ments to those who know little of the truer kind.30
Shaftesbury writes that virtue brings the greatest and most
lasting contentment possible to man and that vice brings
only misery and torment. He suggests that the pleasure one
might take in releasing his anger and hatred is not really a
pleasure but only a moment of respite from the perpetual
torment hate produces. He suggests, therefore, like Emerson,
that man truly lives only when he is benevolent.
In addition, Shaftesbury's position on compensation 
calls to mind the cult of sensibility which sprang not only 
from his teaching, but also from the preachings of Restora­
tion and eighteenth-century divines. And the "self- 
approving joy"31 which characterizes this cult anticipates 
the psychological rewards Emerson was to find in virtue. 
Eighteenth-century clergymen, for example, typically exhaust 
"the resources of their rhetoric in depicting the exquisite 
pleasure which the good man feels in contemplating his own
^^Shaftesbury, I, 33^*
3'Ir . s . Crane, "Suggestions toward a Genealogy of 
the 'Man of Feeling,"' ELH, I (December, 193^), P- 22?.
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benevolent d e e d s . C h a r l e s  Brent, for example, preaches
a sermon in Bristol in 170*+ which asserts that
There is for certain, even now, a most Divine and 
Heavenly Pleasure in doing Good; a Pleasure that is 
suited to the truest Movings of Humanity, that grati­
fies the purest of all our natural Inclinations, that 
Delights and Comforts even to the cherishing of our 
own Flesh, that runs along with our Affections and our 
Bowels so very sympathetically, that some good Men 
have indulged and epicuriz'd in it, till they have been 
tempted to call it downright Sensuality: And yet a
Pleasure without the least Abatement or Allay. A 
Pleasure too, that doth not lye lingering in the 
Futurities of a World to come, but commences with our 
very Act, nay before it; beginning even with our very 
Intensions: For we are no sooner entring upon a De­
sign of serving Mankind, but we take up great Sums of 
Delight and Alacrity upon it, beforehand; and one Ad­
vantage here is, that the Pleasure does not leave us 
as soon as the Work is done, but lasts as long and 
lively upon our Minds, as our Memories will serve us 
to recollect it . . . .33
The wording here is too extreme for Emerson even in his most
florid moments, and the pleasures Emerson finds in virtue 
never approach the sensuality Brent describes. But the ideas
Brent expresses are very similar to Emerson's. The man who
chooses the good experiences great satisfaction and con­
tentment. Like Emerson, Brent argues that the virtuous man 
is rewarded in this world for his actions; he need not wait 
for the day of judgment. Brent differs from Emerson in his 
failure to qualify his assertion, to point out that virtue 
may involve tremendous suffering even while it brings
32crane, "Suggestions," p. 228.
33charles Brent, Persuasions to a Publick Spirit 
(170^), pp. 15-1 6, as cited by Crane, "Suggestions," p. 229.
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contentment. But his similarity to Emerson overrides this 
difference.
Not only ministers like Brent put forth this concept 
which Emerson would call compensation. The literature of 
sensibility and sentimentality is filled with it. In 
Richard Steele's The Conscious Lovers. Bevil Junior notes, 
"If pleasure be worth purchasing how great a pleasure is it, 
to him who has a true taste of life, to ease an aching 
heart, to see the human countenance lighted up into smiles 
of joy, on the receipt of a bit of ore which is superfluous 
and otherwise useless in a man's own pocket."3^ Since wc 
constantly spend money for pleasure, Steele writes, we might 
well consider spending it to aid others, for that provides 
true pleasure. In Oliver Goldsmith's The Vicar of Wakefield 
Dr. Primrose asserts that he "felt a secret pleasure in 
doing my duty without reward,"3^ but surely his "secret 
pleasure" is a reward. And in Richard Cumberland's The West 
Indian, Belcour finds "true delight in rescuing a fellow 
creature from distress."3& This important strain in 
eighteenth-century English literature thus presents a
34-Richard Steele, The Conscious Lovers, in British 
Dramatists, eds. G. H. Nettleton et al., 2nd éd..(Boston: 
Houghton, Mifflin, 1969)? P* 4-53.
^^Oliver Goldsmith, The Vicar of Wakefield, in Col­
lected Works of Oliver Goldsmith, ed. Arthur Friedman 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), IV, 22.
36Richard Cumberland, The West Indian, in British 
Dramatists, eds. G. H. Nettleton et al., 2nd ed. (Boston: 
Houghton, Mifflin, 1969), p. 723.
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principle of compensation which assures emotional rewards 
for virtuous actions. But it also suggests, as Emerson him­
self at times was to do, that more tangible rewards may re­
sult from virtuous action. Bevil Junior wins the hand of 
Indiana and the fortune he did not know she possessed. The 
virtuous Dudley of The West Indian unexpectedly inherits his 
grandfather's estate. And Dr. Primrose discovers his 
daughter's fiance to be rich. Like Emerson, Steele, 
Cumberland, and Goldsmith find that virtue has both emotional 
and material rewards.
Perhaps the closeness of this relationship between 
Emersonian compensation and this eighteenth-century cult of 
sensibility can be fully appreciated only when the similar­
ity of Emerson's ideas to other aspects of sensibility is 
noted. R. S. Crane defines the distinguishing traits of 
sensibility as a belief in virtue as universal benevolence, 
a belief in benevolence as feeling, and a belief in benev­
olent feelings as natural to man.37 And Emerson early in 
his career shares these beliefs to a considerable extent.
Crane asserts that the eighteenth-century man of 
feeling believes in virtue as universal benevolence, that he 
is a preacher of social virtues who defines charity as a 
general kindness to mankind and who feels an active desire 
to relieve their s u f f e r i n g s . 3 ®  Emerson certainly shares in
37Crane, "Suggestions," pp. 208, 214-, and 220. 
3^Crane, "Suggestions," p. 211.
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these beliefs. In "Character," a Second Series essay close
in spirit to the First Series, he writes that
We have no pleasure in thinking of a benevolence that 
is only measured by its works. Love is inexhaustible 
and if its estate is wasted, its granary emptied, still 
cheers and enriches, and the man, though he sleep, 
seems to purify the air, and his house to adorn the 
landscape and strengthen the laws. People always 
recognize this difference. We know who is benevolent, 
by quite other means than the amount of subscription 
to soup-societies. It is only low merits that can be 
enumerated. Fear, when your friends say to you what 
you have done well, and say it through; but when they 
stand with uncertain timid looks of respect and half­
dislike, and must suspend their judgment for years to 
come, you may begin to hope. Those who live to the 
future must always appear selfish to those who live
to the present. (W, III, 103)
Here Emerson defines benevolence as a "general kindness to 
mankind" just as his eighteenth-century predecessors do. He 
suggests as they do that benevolence goes beyond cold alms­
giving. The benevolent man, says Emerson, has a love which 
is "inexhaustible," which seems to "purify the air." But 
Emerson does not stress benevolence to the same extent that 
these eighteenth-century men of feeling do. He believes 
that man’s development of himself is most important and 
writes in "Self-Reliance," "do not tell me, as a good man 
did today, of my obligation to put all poor men in good sit­
uations. Are they my poor?" (W, II, 52) He seems to sug­
gest, as Richard Price does, that "other duties apart, I 
ought to prefer my own good to another’s."^9 But both 
Emerson and Price surely believe self-love and benevolence
39Barnes, p. I67.
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to be compatible. Emerson suggests that true benevolence 
consists in encouraging self-reliance in others; indeed, his 
essays are a vivid example of that sort of benevolence. And 
Price lists both duty to self and benevolence as obligations 
which man must accept.^0
In addition, the eighteenth-century man of feeling 
defines benevolence as feeling and so does Emerson. Charles 
Hickman in a sermon at the beginning of the eighteenth- 
century writes: "It is not a sign of Goodness in Man, to
have no Passion in him, for such a Man is apparently Good 
for nothing at all. He does not hate his Brother, 'tis
Ll *1true: But then he does not love him neither." For
Hickman, the proper emotion, love, is a sign of goodness.
Virtue or benevolence is a feeling as well as an action.
Emerson certainly shares in this belief. He writes in
"Friendship" that
In poetry and in common speech, the emotions of benev­
olence and complacency which are felt toward others 
are likened to the material effects of fire; so swift, 
or much more swift, more active, more cheering, are 
these fine inward radiations. From the highest degree 
of passionate love, to the lowest degree of good will, 
they make the sweetness of life. (¥, II, 191)
Here then Emerson specifically defines benevolence as an
emotion which is "felt toward others." And in "The Divinity
School Address" he suggests this same definition when he
^^Barnes, p. I6 7 .
Charles Hickman, Fourteen Sermons (I7OO), p. 265, 
as cited by Crane, "Suggestions," p. 219.
118
refers to the "sentiment of virtue." This belief in virtue 
as emotion thus further links Emerson to eighteenth-century 
English sensibility.
Finally, Emerson, like the eighteenth-century men of 
sensibility, finds benevolent feelings to be natural to man. 
We have already seen this in our discussion of Emerson's 
essays. For instance, the following familiar passage from 
"The Divinity School Address" establishes virtue as natural 
to man: "So much benevolence as a man hath, so much life
hath he" (¥, I, 124). To be without benevolence, Emerson 
suggests, is to be without life. Benevolence is as natural 
and essential to man as breathing. Emerson in I8 3 6, instead 
of Tindal in 1730? might well have written that man "natu­
rally loves his own species, and is full of pity, tenderness
LlO& benevolence."
There are thus some rather striking similarities be­
tween Emerson and the eighteenth-century cult of sensibility. 
One must recognize, of course, that he differs from them in 
distinct ways. We have seen that he emphasizes self-help 
more than do these English writers and that he does not luxu­
riate in "self-approving joy" in the almost sensual fashion 
that many men of feeling do. Emerson does not typically 
use the term "pleasure" and "delight," the stock phrases of 
the men of feeling. He finds that virtue brings majesty.
^^Matthew Tindal, Christianity as Old as the Creation 
(1731), p* 4 9 , as cited by Crane, "Suggestions," p. 226.
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respect, and life itself. In short, he seems to find con­
tentment more than delight and a sense of purpose more than 
pleasure to he the rewards of v i r t u e . B u t  Emerson does 
share somewhat in every tenet which these writers hold. And 
his closeness to them suggests the closeness of his doctrine 
of compensation to their beliefs.
-iii-
Thus, Emerson's position on compensation early in 
his career as an essayist is hardly a unique one. He shares 
that position with utilitarian, intellectual and common 
sense moralists and with those writers who lived by the doc­
trine of sensibility. However, important as the concept of 
virtue rewarded is to Emerson, he does not continue to main­
tain this concept as strongly after 184-1 as he had before.
As he becomes increasingly conscious of human suffering and 
as he moves away from great aspirations for individual men 
towards a trust in the beneficent tendency which works for 
the good of the whole, Emerson quite naturally tempers his 
faith in the principle which rewards individual achievement. 
He continues to believe in virtue rewarded, but his exultant 
assertions of it are largely gone.
In Essays; Second Series the different tone of 
Emerson's belief in an automatic principle of justice at 
work in the universe is immediately seen. In "New England
^Blhis very difference can also be seen in a com­
parison of Emerson with the utilitarians.
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Reformers," for Instance, he says of the "Law" of justice,
"Work," it saith to man, "in every hour, paid or un­
paid, see only that thou work, and thou canst not 
escape the reward: whether thy work be fine or coarse,
planting corn or writing epics, so only it be honest 
work, done to thine own approbation, it shall earn a 
reward to the senses as well as to the thought: no
matter how often defeated, you are torn to victory.
The reward of a thing well done is to have done it."
(W, III, 283)
"The reward of a thing well done is to have done it." This 
is certainly Emerson's position in the earlier works, but it 
is just as certainly phrased in a much more subdued manner. 
Emerson does not promise to the honest worker that his "life 
shall be longer and shall pass into the immortal"; he does 
not promise that man shall have "the safety of God, the im­
mortality of God, the majesty of God." Neither does he 
promise that virtue will cause "all nature and all spirits" 
to "help with unexpected furtherance" or that "as much good­
ness as there is, so much reverence it commands." The tone 
of "New England Reformers" is far more restrained than the 
tone of Emerson's earlier essays.
Similarly, in "Manners" Emerson says, "The secret of 
success in society is a certain heartiness and sympathy." 
Indeed, he argues that acceptance in society springs from 
"good nature,— expressing all degrees of generosity, from the 
lowest willingness and faculty to oblige, up to the heights 
of magnanimity and love" (¥, III, l4G). In his early essays 
Emerson is not centrally concerned with acceptance in so­
ciety. His emphasis is on the private spiritual or
121
psychological rewards of virtue rather than such practical
rewards. Moreover, in "Manners" Emerson does not deal as
optimistically with practical rewards as he might have
earlier. In "Prudence" Emerson found that virtue and success
in society can be one if men will but see clearly. But in
"Manners" Emerson deals more with the actual situation than
with an ideal situation. He realizes that virtue and social
success are not always complementary:
We may easily seem ridiculous in our eulogy of courtesy, 
whenever we insist on benevolence as its foundation.
The painted phantasm Fashion rises to cast a species of 
derision on what we say. But I will neither be driven 
from some allowance to Fashion as a symbolic institu­
tion, nor from the belief that love is the basis of 
courtesy. (W, III, 1^2)
Emerson believes that the elements of courtesy may be 
hardened into fashion, that the formula for introductions 
originally intended to make individuals comfortable may be­
come an empty form used unfairly to judge the socially in­
experienced. In the world of society, then, Emerson finds 
that virtue is rewarded, but he acknowledges limitations to 
this assertion, limitations he sought to abolish in "Pru­
dence . "
In Representative Men a similar modification of the 
earlier view occurs. In "Plato: New Readings," for in­
stance, Emerson notes that Plato believes virtue to be re­
warded:
Plato affirms the coincidence of science and virtue5 
for vice can never know itself and virtue, but virtue 
knows both itself and vice. The eye attested that 
justice was best, as long as it was profitable; Plato
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affirms that it is profitable throughout; that the 
profit is intrinsic, though the just conceal his justice 
from gods and men. (W, IV, 8 3)
Justice is profitable; virtue is scientific. Virtue seems to 
bring spiritual rewards, for its profit is intrinsic. But 
again the rhetoric stressing the desirability of virtue and 
the inevitability of its rewards is missing. Emerson's tone 
is much quieter here than it had been earlier. In "The Di­
vinity School Address" Emerson had argued, "If a man is at 
heart just then so far is he God." But in "Plato: New
Readings" no such resounding assertion is made.
In "Swedenborg" this shift in tone is equally notice­
able. Emerson continues to talk about compensation in ethi­
cal terras, but here he suggests that the rewards of virtue 
may not be so great as he had earlier believed. He writes 
that Swedenborg
elected goodness as the clue to which the soul must 
cling in all this labyrinth of nature. Many opinions 
conflict as to the true center. In the shipwreck, 
some cling to running rigging, some to cask and barrel, 
some to spars, some to mast; the pilot chooses with 
science,— I plant myself here; all will sink before 
Lhis; "he comes to land who sails with me." Do not 
rely on heavenly favor, or on compassion to folly, or 
on prudence, on common sense, the old usage and main 
chance of men: nothing can keep you,— not fate, nor
health, nor admirable intellect; none can keep you, 
but rectitude only, rectitude for ever and ever! And 
with a tenacity that never swerved in all his studies, 
inventions, dreams, he adheres to this brave choice.
(W, IV, 1>+5)
In this passage Emerson continues to believe that virtue is 
rewarded. He holds Swedenborg up for our admiration when he 
writes that Swedenborg chose goodness as the guiding
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principle in his life. But the reward Emerson now posits 
for virtue seems to be of a different nature than those he 
had earlier described. In 1836 he had written that "the good 
exalts & the evil degrades us . . . in the moment of the 
deed" (JMN, V, 192), and in "Compensation" the martyr felt 
honor even as he was tortured (W, II, 120). But in this 
passage Emerson calls Swedenborg's decision for virtue a 
brave choice, and suggests, for a moment, that man must live 
in a perpetual shipwreck trusting that virtue will eventually 
bring him to shore and to God. The rewards of virtue here 
thus no longer seem so immediate as they had earlier. It 
should be noted, however, that earlier in this essay Emerson 
asserts that "He who loves goodness, harbors angels, reveres 
reverence and lives with God" (W, IV, 1 38). Such a positive 
statement suggests that Emerson is not in full retreat from 
his pre-l8lf1 position but is merely qualifying it.
Finally, in "Napoleon" Emerson's tempered assertion
of virtue rewarded continues. This essay, like "Prudence,"
is not concerned with spiritual matters so much as it is
with the art of success in more mundane affairs. But here
Emerson writes, as he did not in "Prudence," that a lack of
scruples may be a positive asset in achieving success in the
world of experience:
It is an advantage, within certain limits, to have re­
nounced the dominion of the sentiments of piety, grati­
tude, and generosity; since what was an impassable bar 
to us, and still is to others, becomes a convenient 
weapon for our purposes; just as the river which was a
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formidable barrier, winter transforms into the smoothest 
of roads. (W, IV, 228)
Emerson suggests that ignoring moral concerns may be an ad­
vantage to a politician and soldier like Napoleon. A 
Napoleon can sacrifice troops easily when it is necessary; 
he can "steal, slander, assassinate, drown and poison" as 
his interests dictate. Such a concession to the power of 
evil is a far cry from Emerson's assertion in "Prudence" 
that all the virtues contribute to "the art of securing a 
present well being." But Emerson, even in "Napoleon," be­
lieves evil to be an advantage only "within certain limits." 
Indeed, he writes that Napoleon's lack of moral principle 
was ultimately the cause of his downfall:
He did all that in him lay to live and thrive without 
moral principle. It was the nature of things, the 
eternal law of man and of the world which balked and 
ruined him; and the result, in a million experiments 
will be the same. Every experiment by multitudes or by 
individuals, that has a selfish aim, will fail. The 
pacific Fourier will be as inefficient as the pernicious 
Napoleon. As long as our civilization is essentially 
one of property, of fences, of exclusiveness, it will be 
mocked by delusions. Our riches will leave us sick; 
there will be bitterness in our laughter, and our wine 
will burn our mouth. Only that good profits which we 
can taste with all doors open, and which serves all
men. (W, IV, 258)
Once again Emerson finds that virtue is rewarded on both the
practical and spiritual planes of life. But he has reached
this conclusion by way of a detour which earlier in his
career he would not have been forced to take.
Finally, in The Conduct of Life this shift in tone 
continues to be evident. In "Wealth" Emerson argues much as
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he had in "Prudence" that virtue and business success go
hand in hand. But now he seems less naive than he had in
the earlier essay. He even admits that a "thirst for wealth"
is advantageous to a man in the business world:
The pulpit and the press have many commonplaces de­
nouncing the thirst for wealth; but if men should take 
these moralists at their word and leave off aiming to 
be rich, the moralists would rush to rekindle at all 
hazards this love of power in the people, lest civili­
zation should be undone. (¥, VI, 95-96)
Not merely the virtues of "truth, frankness, courage, love,
humility" bring success. The love of monetary power brings
it also. And Emerson seems almost to define this "thirst
for wealth" as a virtue itself:
The subject of economy mixes itself with morals, inas­
much as it is a preemptory point of virtue that a man's 
independence be secured. Poverty demoralizes. A man 
in debt is so far a slave, and Wall Street thinks it 
easy for a millionaire to be a man of his word, a man 
of honor, but that in failing circumstances no man can 
be relied on to keep his integrity. (W, VI, 90)
The man who desires to be virtuous, Emerson suggests, must 
also desire to secure his financial independence because 
poverty and debt may render virtue impossible. The desire 
for wealth is thus, when properly subordinated to the desire 
for virtue, a positive virtue, a positive good. Early in 
his career, Emerson at times argues that virtue can result 
in wealth, but he does not acknowledge that the lack of 
wealth might make virtue difficult to achieve. On the con­
trary, in his early essays Emerson typically scorns such ma­
terial concerns. In "Compensation," he writes that he does 
"not wish any more external goods" (W, II, 123). And in his
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journal for 1839 he writes, "The poor therefore are only they 
who feel poor and poverty consists in feeling poor. The rich 
as we reckon them, and among them the very rich, in a true 
scale would be found very indigent, very ragged." (JMN,
VII, 3 0 1) Here Emerson suggests that a thirst for wealth 
leads to spiritual poverty, not to virtue. Between 1839 and 
i860, then, Emerson has managed to take great account of the 
reality of experience. His audience is now "a prosperous 
middle class group," and Emerson accepts and translates 
their values "by successive ascensions, into moral and per­
sonal t e r m s . E m e r s o n  no longer tends to scorn wealth, 
but now accommodates it more fully than ever before into his 
ethical system.
If "Wealth" suggests that Emerson has a more realis­
tic picture of the relationship between virtue and material 
success, "Illusions" suggests that he no longer expects 
quite the spiritual rewards he had earlier envisioned as 
resulting from virtue. He still clearly believes that virtue 
is rewarded, but he no longer sees that reward in such un­
qualified terms:
We cannot write the order of the variable winds. How 
can we penetrate the law of our shifting moods and 
susceptibility? Yet they differ as all and nothing. 
Instead of the firmament of yesterday, which our eyes 
require, it is today an egg-shell which coops us in; 
we cannot even see what or where our stars of destiny 
are. From day to day the capital facts of human life 
are hidden from our eyes. Suddenly the mist rolls up
Whicher, p. 164-.
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and reveals them, and we think how much good time is 
gone that might have been saved had any hint of these 
things been shown. A sudden rise in the road shows us 
the system of mountains, and all the summits, which have 
been just as near us all the year, but quite out of 
mind. But these alternations are not without their 
order, and we are parties to our various fortune. If 
life seem a succession of dreams, yet poetic justice is 
done in dreams also. The visions of good men are good; 
it is the undisciplined will that is whipped with bad 
thoughts and bad fortunes. (W, VI, 321-322)
Emerson says, in a rather skeptical mood, that we live in
the midst of illusions, unable to remain in contact with
ultimate realities. But he denies that this skeptical view
of experience should alter our view of compensation, for
"poetic justice is done in dreams also." Poetic justice,
the reward of virtue, comes to man whether he is able to see
ultimate realities or not, so long as he strives for what he
believes to be good. In "Illusions," therefore, a belief in
compensation is maintained, but the spirit in which it is
offered is a chastened one.
However, it must be noted that in the essay "Worship"
Emerson approaches the old tone, very forcefully stating that
virtue is rewarded:
Every man takes care that his neighbor shall not cheat
him. But a day comes when he begins to care that he
does not cheat his neighbor. Then all goes well. He 
has changed his market-cart into a chariot of the sun. 
What a day dawns when we have taken to heart the doc­
trine of faith! to prefer, as a better investment, being
to doing; being to seeming; logic to rhythm and to dis­
play; the year to the day; the life to the year; char­
acter to performance;— and have come to know that 
justice will be done us; and if our genius is slow, the 
term will be long. (W, VI, 215-216)
Here the rhetoric is once again expansive. Virtue will turn
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a "market-cart into a chariot of the sun," will assure that 
"all goes well," will effectively alter the attitude with 
which one approaches each day. Emerson offers a very posi­
tive assertion that virtue is rewarded. But even in "Wor­
ship" these psychological or spiritual rewards are different 
from those he had earlier stressed. Emerson does not write 
that virtue is the "incoming of God" as he had in "Compen­
sation," for instance (W, II, 122). Thus, even in this 
essay, Emerson does not equal his most radical claims for 
the benefits of virtue.
-iv-
Thus, Emerson's belief that virtue is rewarded be­
comes more subdued after 184-1 . But this difference in tone 
does not totally differentiate him from the eighteenth- 
century traditions in which we have seen him following. In 
fact, his subdued tone brings his later works closer to the 
ideas of Price and Wollaston than his earlier works had 
been. Emerson's quiet assertion that the "reward of a thing 
well done is to have done it" suggests Price's statement that 
it is "contradictory to suppose that the desire of the pleas­
ure attending virtue . , . can be the sole motive to the 
practice of it." And Emerson's simple statement that virtue 
is "profitable throughout" and that the profit is "intrinsic" 
recalls Wollaston's conservative belief that the "true and 
ultimate happiness of no being can be produced by anything, 
that interfers with truth, and denies the natures of things."
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Emerson's shift of tone does, however, definitely 
separate him from the writers of sensibility. Indeed, late 
in his career he seldom equals the often excessive rhetoric 
of the men of feeling. But it is interesting to note that 
Shaftesbury, one of the men who inspired the cult of sensi­
bility, at times qualifies his assertion of virtue rewarded 
in the same way as does the later Emerson. Shaftesbury 
sounds much like the Emerson of "Illusions," for instance, 
when he writes that no scepticism can endanger the belief 
that virtue is compensated:
For let us carry scepticism ever so far, let us doubt 
if we can, of every thing about us, we cannot doubt of 
what passes within ourselves. Our passions and affec­
tions are known to us. They are certain, whatever the 
objects may be on which they are employed. Nor is it 
of any concern to our argument how these exterior ob­
jects stand: whether they are realities or mere il­
lusions; whether we wake or dream. For ill dreams will 
be equally disturbing; and a good dream (if life be 
nothing else) will be easily and happily passed. In 
this dream of life, therefore, our demonstrations have 
the same force; our balance and economy hold good, and 
our obligation to virtue is in every respect the 
s a m e . , ,
Emerson finds that "poetic justice is done in dreams also,"
and Shaftesbury here similarly finds that "a good dream . . ,
will be easily and happily passed." Both writers deny,
therefore, that a skeptical view of experience can alter the
fact that virtue is truly rewarded. Of course, Shaftesbury
deals only with a hypothetical situation and elsewhere he
^^Shaftesbury, I, 336.
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denies ■unconditionally the skeptical view of experience.
But nevertheless5 Emerson must still be seen as operating 
within the bounds of accepted eighteenth-century English 
doctrines in his late as well as his early statements that 
virtue is rewarded.
In addition, one modification Emerson makes in his 
assertion of virtue rewarded resembles statements made by 
Shaftesbury's antagonist, Bernard Mandeville. When Emerson 
argues that a thirst for wealth is essential to the exist­
ence of civilization, he sounds much like Mandeville in "The 
Grumbling Hive." In this poem Mandeville allegorically 
describes society as a bee hive and writes that avarice in 
the society or hive contributes to the common happiness:
Thus vice nursed ingenuity
Which joined with time and industry.
Had carried life's conveniencies.
It real pleasures, comforts, ease.
To such a height, the very poor 
Lived better than the rich before 
And nothing could be added more.^7
The desire for wealth improves the standard of living of all,
Mandeville here suggests, and in doing so, he anticipates
Emerson's statement that "civilization should be undone"
without a thirst for wealth. Yet Emerson does not sanction
"vice" the way Mandeville does. For example, Emerson does
^^Grean, p. 1 5-
^7Bernard Mandeville, "The Grumbling Hive; or Knaves 
Turned Honest," in Eighteenth Century Poetry and Prose, ed. 
Louis I. Bredvold et al. (New York: Ronald Press, 1956),
p. 333.
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not believe luxury to be a good. He desires wealth to be
spent for universities, for museums, for spanning continents
with railroads. And in this desire he seems much like
Shaftesbury. Shaftesbury finds that the pursuit of wealth,
when properly controlled, can be a virtue:
Now as to that passion which is esteemed peculiarly 
interesting, as having for its aim the possession of 
wealth, and what we call a settlement of fortune in 
the world: if the regard towards this kind be moderate
and in a reasonable degree; if it occasions no passion­
ate pursuit, nor raises any ardent desire or appetite; 
there is nothing in this case which is not compatible 
with virtue, and even suitable and beneficial to so­
ciety. The public as well as private system is ad­
vanced by the industry which affection excites. But if 
it grows at length into a real passion, the injury it 
does the public is not greater than that which it cre­
ates to the person himself. Such a one is in reality 
a self-oppressor, and lies heavier on himself than he 
can ever do on mankind.^8
Shaftesbury writes that the aim to possess wealth can encour­
age virtue in the individual and can advance the society so 
long as it does not become greed. The desire for wealth 
prompts industry in the individual and helps society thrive 
economically. Yet Shaftesbury seems to place a lower value 
on the desire for wealth than does Emerson in "Wealth." He 
does not write that poverty may be a terrific handicap in 
man's efforts to attain virtue and contentment. And he be­
lieves man's wish for money should be a moderate one, 
whereas Emerson suggests that society needs men who desire 
riches. Thus, Emerson seems to lie midway between two op­
posed eighteenth-century English thinkers when he modifies
^^Shaftesbury, I, 326.
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his original assertion of virtue rewarded. He steers a mid­
course between Shaftesbury and Mandeville in his essay 
"Wealth."
Therefore, Emerson maintains a rather constant 
vision of compensation as a principle which rewards the good 
and punishes the evil. But as his confidence in the self 
fades and his consideration of experience increases, the 
exultant tone of his early position is modified and even at 
times tinged with skepticism. And significantly, in his de­
velopment of this concept which is so central to his philos­
ophy, Emerson largely follows in eighteenth-century English 
patterns. His radical faith, his moderation, his skepticism 
all have neo-classical parallels, and Emerson the rebel is 




AND COMPENSATION: PART 2,
WHATEVER IS, IS RIGHT
Although virtue rewarded is an important concept to 
Emerson, it does not provide him with a sufficient explana­
tion of the moral order of the universe. It does not explain 
why one good man is given great talent and another is not.
It does not explain why a good man can experience great 
personal tragedy. In an effort to justify, if not explain, 
such incongruities, Emerson offers a second definition of 
compensation: "All things are double against one another,
said Solomon. The whole of what we know is a system of com­
pensations. Every defect in one manner is made up in an­
other. Every suffering is rewarded; every sacrifice is made 
up; every debt is paid." (JMN. II, 34U-^1) Here Emerson 
suggests that virtue is rewarded in the sense that "every 
sacrifice is made up." But he suggests also that there are 
compensations for the suffering which is inherent in the 
scheme of things. He argues that the loss of loved ones, 
the lack of talent, the inequality of conditions in society
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are offset by positive benefits. Man may find suffering a 
blessing, deformity an advantage, deficiency in one skill a 
concentration of force in another. And in so arguing,
Emerson places himself well within the boundaries of 
eighteenth-century English thought.
-i-
This definition of compensation is not so important 
early in Emerson's career as an essayist as it becomes later. 
Indeed, as Whicher notes, such a definition is inherently a 
"defensive f a i t h , a n d  in his most radical essays Emerson 
is clearly on the offensive. In Nature he calls for man to 
establish his "kingdom . . . over nature" (W, I, 7 7 ); in 
"The American Scholar" he issues America's intellectual dec­
laration of independence; in "The Divinity School Address" 
he calls for a revitalized clergy, free from the control of 
the past. In such works, Emerson's strategy is not to empha­
size compensations for man's limitations or for his status 
as a victim of forces beyond his control. Emerson wants in­
stead to stress man's power and his freedom from limitation. 
Thus, the emphasis in the early essays is clearly upon the 
rewards which come when man follows the directions of the 
God within.
Yet even in his early essays Emerson seems at times 
to place his faith in a defensive doctrine of compensation.
At times he argues, as Whicher recognizes, that compensation
^Whicher, p. 39*
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pteaches the "indifferency of circumstances." Most notably,
he espouses this view in "Compensation" when he finds that
Every excess causes a defect; every defect an excess. 
Every sweet hath its sour; every evil its good.
Every faculty which is a receiver of pleasure has an 
equal penalty put on its abuse. It is to answer for 
its moderation with its life. For every grain of wit 
there is a grain of folly. For every thing you have 
missed you have gained something else; and for every 
thing you gain, you lose something. If riches in­
crease, they are increased that use them. If the 
gatherer gathers too much. Nature takes out of the 
man what she puts into his chest; swells the estate 
but kills the owner. Nature hates monopolies and ex­
ceptions. The waves of the sea do not more speedily 
seek a level from the loftiest tossing than the va­
rieties of conditions tend to equalize themselves.
(W, II, 98)
Emerson here suggests that every condition in life has advan­
tages which offset its disadvantages or disadvantages which 
balance its advantages. The farmer, he goes on to write, 
may think the power and prestige of the Presidency are to be 
envied, but the farmer has peace of mind and privacy, some­
thing the President can never have (W, II, 99)- The specific 
conditions under which we live, Emerson therefore implies, 
are a matter of indifference, and man can be content wherever 
he is.
But Emerson typically seeks not to emphasize the in­
difference of conditions so much as the positive benefits 
which can come from suffering, loss, or deformity. He 
writes, for instance, that
A fever, a mutilation, a cruel disappointment, a loss of 
wealth, a loss of friends, seems at the moment unpaid
^Whicher, p. 39*
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loss, and unpayable. But the sure years reveal the deep 
remedial force that underlies all facts. The death of a 
dear friend, wife, brother, lover, which seemed nothing 
but privation, somewhat later assumes the aspect of a 
guide or genius; for it commonly operates revolutions 
in your way of life, terminates an epoch of infancy or 
youth which was waiting to be closed, breaks up a wonted 
occupation, or a household, or style of living, and 
allows the formation of new ones more friendly to the 
growth of the character. It permits or constrains the 
formation of new acquaintances, and the reception of new 
influences, that prove of the first importance to the 
next years; and the man or woman who would have remained 
a sunny garden-flower, with no room for its roots, and 
too much sunshine for its head, by the fall of the walls 
and the neglect of the gardener, is made the banian of 
the forest, yielding shade and fruit to wide neighbor­
hoods of men. (W, II, 126)
Emerson suggests then that one is compensated for the very 
real loss of a friend, wife, brother, or lover by the benef­
icent revolution the loss causes in one's way of life. And 
he goes on to indicate that our defects as well as our 
griefs may benefit us:
The stag in the fable admired his horns and blamed his 
feet; but when the hunter came, his feet saved him, and 
afterwards, caught in the thicket, his horns destroyed 
him. Every man in his lifetime needs to thank his 
faults. As no man thoroughly understands a truth until 
first he has contended against it, so no man has a 
thorough acquaintance with the hindrances or talents of 
men, until he has suffered from the one, and seen the 
triumph of the other over his own want of the same.
Has he a defect of temper that unfits him to live in 
society? Thereby he is driven to entertain himself 
alone, and acquire habits of self-help; and thus, like 
the wounded oyster, he mends his shell with pearls.
(W, II, 117)
Our defects may prevent us from achieving some goals,
Emerson writes, but in compensation they may be the cause of 
our achieving others. Am I unable to achieve great things 
in mathematics? Very well, then I will concentrate my
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efforts on the study of history and know it that much better. 
Such is Emerson's argument.
However, Emerson writes that compensations come not 
only in the form of practical benefits in the world of ex­
perience, but also in the form of spiritual insights. He 
asserts that "In the nature of the soul is the compensation 
for the inequalities of condition" (W, II, 123). Because we 
all partake of the Over-Soul, because the "heart and soul of 
all men" are one, Emerson argues, differences in condition 
are illusory. When we discover the nature of our souls, he 
suggests, "this bitterness of His and Mine ceases" (W, II, 
1 243. If man but realizes that all men are united by their 
participation in the Over-Soul, differences in power, wealth, 
prestige will seem unimportant. The true nature of the soul 
will compensate us for those differences. But in a sense, 
to argue along these lines is to argue that there is no need 
for defensive sorts of compensation. If inequalities are 
illusory or unimportant, why need we be consoled? Emerson 
himself recognizes this and writes that "There is a deeper 
fact in the soul than compensation, to wit, its own nature" 
(W, II, 120). But Emerson's emphasis in "Compensation" is on 
the importance of compensation, and he moves away quickly 
from doubt in its significance.
The defensive doctrine of compensation does not ap­
pear only in the essay "Compensation." In "Love," for in­
stance, Emerson notes :
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Every thing is beautiful seen from the point of the in­
tellect, or as truth. But all is sour if seen as ex­
perience. Details are melancholy; the plan is seemly 
and noble. In the actual world— the painful kingdom of 
time and place— dwell care and canker and fear. With 
thought, with the ideal, is immortal hilarity, the rose 
of joy. Round it all the Muses sing. But grief cleaves 
to names and persons and the partial interests of to-day 
and yesterday. (W, II, 1?1)
Here Emerson suggests that the abstract, eternal truth which
we can draw from experience compensates us for the pain of
experience. He suggests that one may find "incongruities,
defects, and disproportion" in one's spouse, for instance,
but that there are compensations:
The soul which is in the soul of each, craving for a 
perfect beatitude, detects incongruities, defects, 
and disproportion in the behavior of the other. Hence 
arises surprise, expostulation, and pain. Yet that which 
drew them to each other was signs of loveliness, signs 
of virtue: and these virtues are there, however 
eclipsed. They appear and reappear, and continue to at­
tract; but the regard changes, quits the sign, and at­
taches to the substance. This repairs the wounded af­
fection. (W, II, 1 8 6)
Emerson writes that we may love someone at first for his acts
of consideration, for the "flowers, pearls, poetry" he sends
us (W, II, 1 8 5) and that we are consequently doomed to be
disappointed when such tokens cease to come. But he adds that
we truly love the impulse which prompted the specific acts of
love and that that impulse is constant. In the substance of
love we find compensation for the absence of specific signs.
A final example of this defensive definition of com­
pensation lies in "The Over-Soul." Here Emerson clearly
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argues that, in Pope's words, "whatever is, is right"
You are running to seek your friend. Let your feet run, 
but your mind need not. If you do not find him, will 
you not acquiesce that it is best you should not find 
him? for there is a power, which, as it is in you, is 
in him also, and could therefore very well bring you 
together, if it were for the best. You are preparing 
with eagerness to go and render a service to which your 
talent and your taste invite you, the love of men and 
the hope of fame. Has it not occurred to you that you 
have no right to go, unless you are equally willing to 
be prevented from going? 0, believe, as thou livest, 
that every sound that is spoken over the round world, 
which thou oughtest to hear, will vibrate on thine 
ear! Every proverb, every book, every byword that be­
longs to thee for aid or comfort, shall surely come 
home through open or winding passages. (¥, II, 293-9^)
Emerson writes that though our desires to publicly support a 
cause or to privately aid a friend be frustrated, the knowl­
edge that our failure is for the best compensates us. He 
believes that the Soul, which exists within every man, be­
neficently orders events, beneficently coordinates our ac­
tivities. Our individual disappointments are offset by our 
knowledge that they contribute to the good of the whole.
This Emersonian belief surely has a Popeian ring to it.
-ii-
Such is Emerson's second definition of compensation. 
He believes that every situation has built-in advantages 
which offset its limitations. Although early in Emerson's 
career this definition is far less important than the idea of 
virtue rewarded, it does exist. And it is typical of the 
eighteenth century as well as of Emerson. Indeed, this view
3pope, p. 384-.
1^0
of compensation permeates Enlightenment England, appearing 
most explicitly in the works of Shaftesbury and his followers 
and in the poetry of men as different as Pope and Gray.
Samuel Johnson may object to Pope’s belief that in "partial 
evil" lies "universal good," but he is atypical.^ The con­
cept which was to become Emerson's defensive definition of 
compensation is of major importance throughout the 
eighteenth century in England.
Shaftesbury typically anticipates Emerson's radical 
views, and his emphasis upon virtue rewarded continues that 
pattern. But as a secondary line of defense, Shaftesbury, 
like Emerson after him, also argues that "partial evil" is 
"universal good." Early in "The Moralists" Philocles says 
to Palemon:
"Much is alleged . . .  to show why Nature errs, and 
how she came thus impotent and erring from an unerring 
hand. But I deny she errs; and when she seems most 
ignorant or perverse in her productions, I assert her 
even then as wise and provident as in her goodliest 
works. For 'tis not then that men complain of the 
world’s order, or abhor the face of things, when they 
see various interests mixed and interfering; natures 
subordinate of different kinds, opposed one to another, 
and in their different operations submitted the higher 
to the lower. 'Tis on the contrary from this order of 
inferior and superior things that we admire the world’s 
beauty, founded thus on contrarieties, whilst from 
such various and disagreeing principles a universal 
concord is established.
"Thus in the several orders of terrestrial forms a 
resignation is required, a sacrifice and mutual yielding 
of natures one to another. The vegetables by their
^Samuel Johnson, "From the Literary Magazine: or.
Universal Review," in Eighteenth-Century English Literature, 
ed. Geoffrey Tillotson et al. (New York: Harcourt, Brace,
1969), pp. 1009-1016.
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death sustain the animals, and animal bodies dissolved 
enrich the earth, and raise again the vegetable world.
The numerous insects are reduced by the superior kinds 
of birds and beasts, and these again are checked by 
man, who in his turn submits to other natures, and re­
signs his form a sacrifice in common to the rest of 
things. And if in natures so little exalted or pre­
eminent above each other, the sacrifice of interests 
can appear so just, how much more reasonable may all 
inferior natures be subjected to the superior nature of 
the world 1"5
Philocles, speaking for Shaftesbury here, suggests then that 
on the great chain of being the interests of one link must 
be subordinated to the interests of a higher link and that in 
subordination lies the good of the whole chain. Man, oc­
cupying an intermediate position on the chain, may thus 
have to sacrifice his interests for the good of higher orders 
of being, but at the same time lower orders of being are 
sacrificing their interests for the good of man. Like 
Emerson, Shaftesbury thus finds that every state of life has 
advantages which offset its disadvantages. And he further 
argues that mankind is compensated for its suffering by the 
knowledge that its pain contributes to the moral order of 
the universe. In Emersonian terms, he finds that though the 
details may be melancholy, the plan is beautiful.
Shaftesbury's disciples offer similar arguments.
For example, Henry Home, Lord Kames, justifies the existence
of pain, a seeming evil:
pain and distress are productive of manifold good ends, 
and . . . the present system could not well be without 
them. In the first place, pain is necessary, as a
^Shaftesbury, II, 22.
1^2
monitor of what is hurtful and dangerous to life.
Every man is trusted with the care of his own preserva­
tion; and he would be ill qualified for this trust, 
were he left entirely to the guidance of reason. . . .
In the next place pain is the great sanction of laws, 
both human and divine. There would be no order or 
discipline without it. In the third place, the dis­
tresses and disappointments, which arise from the un­
certainty of seasons, from the variable tempers of 
those we are connected with, and from other cross ac­
cidents, are wonderfully well adapted to our constitu­
tion, by keeping our hopes and fears in perpetual agi­
tation. Man is an active being and is not in his ele­
ment, but when in a variety of occupations.°
Kames certainly offers only those compensations which
Emerson would consider temporal in nature. He does not find
that the oneness of all mankind renders pain unimportant.
But Kames does suggest that there are compensations in the
scheme of things which offset the evil of pain. Pain helps
the individual by warning him of dangers to his health. And
the variety pain brings to life balances the suffering it
causes. After all, Kames almost seems to ask, can there be
happiness without unhappiness? He thus suggests, as Emerson
was to do, that a "deep remedial force underlies all facts."
Though not a disciple of Shaftesbury, Soame Jenyns 
should perhaps provide a final example of this Shaftesburian 
line of thought, if only because Dr. Johnson's attack has 
made him one of its most famous spokesmen.? Jenyns writes:
^Henry Home, Lord Kames, Essays on the Principles of 
Morality and Natural Religion (Edinburgh, 1751), pp. 370-71.
?Johnson, pp. 1011-1012. Dr. Johnson presents a 
devastating attack on Jenyns' argument, and especially on 
the arguments cited in this study. Johnson finds, for ex­
ample, that poverty can be both demeaning and demoralizing
1^3
Poverty, or the want of riches, is generally compen­
sated by having more hopes and fewer fears, by a greater 
share of health, and a more exquisite relish of the 
smallest enjoyments, than those who possess them are 
usually bless'd with. The want of taste and genius, 
with all the pleasures that arise from them, are com­
monly recompensed by a more useful kind of common sense, 
together with a wonderful delight, as well as success, 
in the busy pursuits of a scrambling world. The suf­
ferings of the sick are greatly relieved by many 
trifling gratifications imperceptible to others, and 
sometimes almost repaid by the inconceivable transports 
occasioned by the return of health and vigour. Folly 
cannot be very grievous, because imperceptible; and I 
doubt not but there is some truth in the rant of a mad
poet, that there is a pleasure in being mad, which none
but madmen know. Ignorance, or the want of knowledge 
and literature, the appointed lot of all born to pov­
erty, and the drudgeries of life, is the only opiate
capable of infusing that insensibility which can enable 
them to endure the miseries of the one, and the fatigues 
of the other. It is a cordial administered by the 
gracious hand of providence; of which they ought never 
to be deprived by an ill-judged and improper education.
It is the basis of all subordination . . .  : and I have
ever thought it a most remarkable instance of the divine 
wisdom, that whereas in all animals, whose individuals 
rise little above the rest of their species, knowledge 
is instinctive; in man whose individuals are so widely 
different, it is acquired by education; by which means 
ihe prince and the labourer, the philosopher and the 
peasant, are in some measure fitted for their respective 
situations
Here Jenyns states, as Emerson was to do, that a lack of 
talent in one field is offset by a concentration of force 
in another. A man may lack talent as a writer, but that lack 
is usually offset by a common sense which enables him to move
and concludes that Jenyns and Pope "perhaps never saw the 
miseries which they imagine thus easy to be born." And he 
finds that gross ignorance can be as dangerous as perverted 
knowledge and concludes that it must not be seen, as Jenyns 
would have it seen, as an opiate for the poor.
^Soame Jenyns, A Free Inquiry into the Nature and 
Origin of Evil, as cited by Johnson, pp. 1010-11.
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ahead in the business world, Jenyns suggests. Jenyns also 
suggests here what Emerson would have rejected, that ignor­
ance is a compensation for poverty. He writes that ignorance 
is an opiate which allows men to endure the physical and 
mental anguish poverty brings. The poor man condemned to 
digging ditches might find his life unbearably boring if he 
were educated enough to enjoy using his mind, Jenyns implies. 
Emerson would never argue along these lines. Indeed,
Emerson finds that man's ability to use his mind, his abil­
ity to intuitively perceive the oneness of all men, is a 
prime compensation for inequalities of condition. Still, 
the basic similarity persists, for both writers believe that 
there is a compensation in the scheme of things for every 
deficiency.
It is not merely in the abstract reasonings of phi­
losophers and moralists that the doctrine "whatever is, is 
right" appears. Indeed, it permeates the literature of the 
period as well. For instance. Pope and Gray, representative 
of two very different eighteenth-century poetic traditions, 
share this concept of compensation. Pope, the coiner of the 
phrase "whatever is, is right," defines compensation early 
in the "Essay on Man":
Respecting Man whatever wrong we call.
May, must be right, as relative to All.
In human works, tho' labour'd on with pain,
A thousand movements scarce one purpose gain;
In God's, one single can its End produce.
Yet serves to second too some other Use.
So Man, who here seems principal alone.
Perhaps acts second to some Sphere unknown.
1^5
Touches some Wheel, or verges to some Gole;
'Tls but a Part we see, and not a Whole.
When the proud Steed shall know, why Man restrains 
His fiery course, or drives him o'er the plains;
When the dull Ox, why now he breaks the clod,
Is now a Victim, and now Aegypt's God;
Then shall Man's Pride and Dulness comprehend 
His Action's, Passion's, Being's, Use and End;
Why doing, suff'ring, check'd, impell'd; and why 
This Hour a Slave, the next a Deity?9
Here Pope suggests that an individual life is part of a whole 
which man cannot see or comprehend. Hence, he goes on to 
add, man cannot with justice condemn God for allowing his 
desires to be "check'd." Indeed, Pope argues, an individual 
disappointment may contribute to the good of the world as a 
whole. Emerson takes much the same position in "The Over- 
Soul" when he argues that all is for the best even though 
our desires be frustrated. Yet unlike Pope, Emerson typically 
does believe that man can share the perspective of God, that
man can view the world from the "point of intellect" and see
the beautiful plan. However, Pope is not content to base his 
argument solely on man's ignorance, and he moves on to posi­
tive assertions that compensation does exist. He writes 
that there are advantages to every station in life:
Whate'er the passion, knowledge, fame, or pelf.
Not one will change his neighbor with himself.
The learned is happy nature to explore.
The fool is happy that he knows no more,
The rich is happy in the plenty given,
The poor contents him with the care of Heaven.
See the blind beggar dance, the cripple sing.
The sot a hero, lunatic a king;
The starving chemist in his gblden views
9pope, p. 370.
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Supremely blessed, the poet in his Muse.
See some strange comfort every state attend,
And pride bestowed on all, a common friend;
See some fit passion every age supply,
Hope travels through, nor quits us when we die.10
Pope, as Emerson was later to do, here asserts the indiffer- 
ency of circumstances, the advantages which attend every 
role in life. The scholar, the king, the beggar all know 
happiness, all know advantages which offset the disadvan­
tages of their positions. Pope recognizes that man may en­
counter seeming evils, may suffer at the hands of tyrants, 
may have to live in poverty. But as Emerson was later to 
do, he finds "a counter-statement as ponderous."
Gray perpetuates the emphasis upon defensive com­
pensation in his mid-century poetry. In "Elegy Written in a 
Country Church-Yard" he argues that the talents of rural 
laborers may have been neglected simply because these men 
were poor and unknown. He suggests that a rustic poet, given 
the opportunity, might have become another Milton. But Gray 
goes on to add that the lot of the poor not only circum­
scribed their accomplishments but also
their Crimes confin'd;
Forbad to wade through Slaughter to a Throne,
And shut the Gates of Mercy on Mankind,
The struggling Pangs of conscious Truth to hide.
To quench the Blushes of ingenuous Shame,
Or heap the Shrine of Luxury and Pride 
With Incense, kindled at the Muse's Flame.
Far from the madding Crowd's ignoble Strife,
Their sober wishes never learned to stray;
10Pope, p. 376.
1^7
Along the cool sequester'd Vale of Life
11They kept the noiseless Tenor of their Way.
Like Emerson, Gray finds that the poor farmer's life has ad­
vantages over the politician's. If poverty keeps a man from 
becoming a great statesman, Gray argues, it also keeps him 
from becoming a great tyrant. He thus anticipates Emerson's 
nineteenth-century assertion that every condition in life 
has its compensations.
Thus, Emerson and these eighteenth-century Englishmen 
share a vision of a morally ordered world, a world in which 
every defect, every incident of suffering, every loss is 
offset by good. However, Emerson does differ significantly 
from these writers. He tends to find compensations existing 
on the individual level. He may feel that the oneness of 
mankind is compensation for his individual suffering, but a 
sense of this oneness is achieved only as he is able to take 
Jesus and Shakespeare and "conquer and incorporate them in 
my own conscious domain." Emerson may hint that an indi­
vidual's suffering can result in benefit to "wide neighbor­
hoods of men," but he emphasizes that the suffering serves 
as a "guide of genius" for the individual. Pope, Gray, 
Jenyns, and Kames all suggest that there are individual com­
pensations for suffering. But on the whole the eighteenth- 
century writers emphasize general rather than individual
llfhomas Gray, "Elegy Written in a Country Church- 
Yard," in Gray ^ d  Collins Poetical Works, ed. Austin Lane 
Poole, 3rd ed. (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1937), pp.
95*
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compensations. They see individual suffering as contributing 
to the good of the whole. Shaftesbury argues that as ani­
mals must be slaughtered for the welfare of man, perhaps man 
must suffer for the welfare of higher orders. In the suffer­
ing of man is the good of the universe, and that is our com­
pensation, Shaftesbury suggests. Kames writes that pain 
must exist as a sanction for the laws which insure the gen­
eral welfare of mankind. And Jenyns believes that the pain
1 Pof one man in some way may aid all mankind. Such arguments 
for compensation on the general level are thus far more sig­
nificant in the eighteenth century than they are in Emerson's 
early works. Yet surely the very distinct similarities we 
have seen between Emerson's defensive definition of compen­
sation and eighteenth-century definitions overweigh this 
one difference. The common belief in an ordered world in 
which "whatever is, is right" must be held before a differ­
ence in the nature of compensations can even be discussed.
In eighteenth-century England, therefore, numerous writers 
clearly anticipate Emerson's defensive doctrine of compen­
sation.
-iii —
Emerson's emphasis on this defensive doctrine, which 
is slight early in his career, becomes increasingly
I^Dr. Johnson responds to this argument by writing: 
"He has told us of the benefits of evil, which no man feels, 
and relations between distant parts of the universe, which 
he cannot himself conceive" (p. 1015).
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significant after 1841. As his faith in the individual's 
ability to build his own world decreases and as his respect 
for the facts of experience grows, Emerson increasingly needs 
assurance that life is meaningful. The defensive doctrine of 
compensation thus rises in importance. But this doctrine as 
it had existed early in his career proves insufficient to 
provide the needed reassurance. Indeed, as Basil Willey 
notes in speaking of eighteenth-century England, such a be­
lief can ultimately produce pessimism rather than optimism;
What emerged then as the chief outcome of this kind
of optimism was a gospel of helplessness. The status
quo represents the last word of divine wisdom and 
goodness; the scale of being is fixed and unimprovable: 
what then is left to us but to content ourselves with
the station, both in the cosmical and the social scale,
to which it has pleased God to call us? No improve­
ments are to be expected; to demand them is in fact 
impious.13
Merely to accept the world without hope for its improvement 
would have been an impossible task for Emerson. He thus de­
velops a melioristic definition of compensation, one which 
mediates between pessimism and optimism and which suggests 
that the tendency toward improvement in the world is com­
pensation for its present imperfection. Emerson had, of 
course, suggested earlier that suffering is offset by its 
beneficent future consequences. And this idea tends to be 
increasingly important as Emerson comes to accept the 
Lamarckian concept of evolution. He comes to believe that 
individual suffering is offset not only by specific
13willey, p. 55.
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consequences but also by the beneficent, evolutionary tend­
ency of which it is a part. All things move toward perfec­
tion, Emerson writes, and in this tendency is the compensa­
tion for the suffering we must endure in a temporarily im­
perfect world. Emerson thus continues to believe "whatever 
is, is right," but the basis of this belief more often lies 
in the future than in the present moment. Though we must 
live in the present, Emerson suggests, we must trust that 
compensation lies in the future.
As early as 184-1 Emerson begins emphasizing this 
progressive or melioristic definition of compensation.^^ In 
"The Method of Nature," an address given at Waterville Col­
lege in Maine, Emerson states that nature inexorably moves 
toward a beneficent purpose and that this movement is com­
pensation for individual suffering. He writes that the cost 
of producing a great man far exceeds his worth, but finds 
consolation for this fact in the melioristic movement of na­
ture;
All is nascent, infant. When we are dizzied with the 
arithmetic of the savant toiling to compute the length 
of her [Nature's] line, the return of her curve, we 
are steadied by the perception that a great deal is 
doing; that all seems just begun; remote aims are in 
active accomplishment. We can point nowhere to anything 
final; but tendency appears on all hands: planet, sys­
tem, constellation, total nature is growing like a field 
of maize in July; is becoming somewhat else; is in rapid 
metamorphosis. (W, I, 202-03)
I^Essays: First Series, published in l84l, consists
largely of essays written in the late l830's. An essay like 
"The Method of Nature," written in l84l, tends therefore to 
be more melioristic than does Essays: First Series.
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If life seems imperfect to us, Emerson suggests, if even 
great men seem petty, we should not despair. He believes 
that we can draw consolation from the movement of all things 
toward perfection. Nature works to a "universal and not to 
a particular end" (W, 1, 201). And as a consequence Emerson 
believes we should not view life as absurd because of par­
ticular failures by men, but should trust in the beneficent 
tendency to which each man contributes.
If the melioristic tendency of the universe is com­
pensation for present imperfection in "The Method of Nature," 
it is also a prime source of consolation in "The Young 
American." In this address to the Mercantile Library Associ­
ation in Boston (1844), Emerson presents an almost grim sort 
of compensation. He instructs his audience to
Remark the unceasing effort throughout nature at some­
what better than the actual creatures: amelioration in
nature, which alone permits and authorizes amelioration 
in mankind. The population of the world is a conditional 
population; these are not the best, but the best that 
could live in the existing state of soils, gases, ani­
mals and morals: the best that could yet live; there
shall be a better, please God. This Genius or Destiny1“ <>.» ^ 4* V, /-s 4- "4 4- *v» "4 n r> 4“"U\ t r» -i w> -Y» r* f,
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of its secret tenderness. It may be styled a cruel 
kindness, serving the whole even to the ruin of the mem­
ber; a terrible communist, reserving all profits to the 
community, without dividend to individuals. Its law is, 
you shall have everything as a member, nothing to your­
self. For Nature is the noblest engineer, yet uses a 
grinding economy, working up all that is wasted to-day 
into to-morrow's creation;— not a superfluous grain of 
sand for all the ostentation she makes of expense and 
public works. It is because Nature thus saves and uses, 
laboring for the general, that we poor particulars are 
so crushed and straitened, and find it so hard to live. 
(W, 1, 372-73)
Emerson says here that compensation for individual ruin lies
1^2
in the ability of Nature to use all things for improvement 
of the future. Insofar as Destiny uses individual loss as 
its raw material, it is cruel, but insofar as it is melio­
ristic it is cruelly kind. A man may know no personal bene­
fit from the railroad he slaves to help build, but benefits 
which are essential to the country will accrue for future 
generations (W, I, 37^-75)* Emerson thus presents a tough- 
minded view of compensation as "amelioration" in "The Young 
American."
This belief is also evident in Essays: Second
Series, most notably in "Nature." In this essay Emerson 
finds that
Geology has initiated us into the secularity of nature, 
and taught us to disuse our dame-school measures, and 
exchange our Mosaic and Ptolemaic schemes for her large 
style. We knew nothing rightly, for want of perspec­
tive. Now we learn what patient periods must round 
themselves before the rock is formed, then before the 
rock is broken, and the first lichen race has disinte­
grated the thinnest external plate into soil, and 
opened the door for the remote Flora, Fauna, Ceres, 
and Pomona, to come in. How far off yet is the trilo- 
bite! how far off the quadruped! how inconceivably re­
mote is man! All duly arrive, and then race after 
race of man. It is a long way from granite to the 
oyster; farther yet to Plato, and the preaching of the 
immortality of the soul. Yet all must come, as surely 
as the first atom has two sides. (W, III, 179-80)
Emerson thus believes that the universe has developed through
a slow progress, and he implicitly suggests that man will
continue to develop over the ages as part of that progress.
The growth in man's power is thus a slow but inevitable part
of the progress of the world as a whole. Mankind's advance
to future greatness is "heralded by the appearance of
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superior individuals" like P l a t o .  15 And our consolation for 
being the insignificant creatures we are at present, Emerson 
suggests, lies in the greatness toward which the race is 
moving.
This melioristic definition of compensation continues
to be important in Representative Men. In "Uses of Great
Men" Emerson writes that "the destiny of organized nature is
amelioration" (W, IV, 35)* In Plato: New Readings" he notes
that "Modern science, by the extent of its generalization has
learned to Indemnify the student of man for the defects of
individuals by tracing growth and ascent in races . . . "  (W,
IV, 80). And in "Montaigne" Emerson offers perhaps his most
distinctive picture of melioristic compensation:
The lesson of life is practically to generalize; to be­
lieve what the years and the centuries say against the 
hours; to resist the ursurpation of particulars; to 
penetrate to their catholic sense. Things seem to say 
one thing, and say the reverse. The appearance is im­
moral; the result is moral. Things seem to tend down­
ward, to justify despondency, to promote rogues, to 
defeat the just; and by knaves as by martyrs the just 
cause is carried forward. Although knaves win in 
every political struggle, although society seems to be 
delivered over from the hands of one set of criminals 
into the hands of another set of criminals as fast as 
the government is changed, and the march of civiliza­
tion is a train of felonies,— yet, general ends are 
somehow answered. We see, now, events forced on which 
seem to retard or retrograde the civility of ages.
But the world-spirit is a good swimmer, and storms and 
waves cannot drown him. He snaps his finger at laws: 
and so, throughout history, heaven seems to affect low 
and poor means. Through the years and the centuries, 
through evil agents, through toys and atoms, a great
1 5Frederick William Conner, Cosmic Optimism 
(Gainesville, Florida: Univ. of Florida Press, 1949), p. 6̂ -.
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and beneficent tendency irresistibly streams. (W, IV,
185-8 6 )
If you have been victimized by rogues, ruled by knaves, 
Emerson writes, know that compensation exists in the form of 
a beneficent tendency. Evil may flourish, but it will even­
tually aid the "march of civilization" and serve "general 
ends." The motive for enacting civil rights legislation may 
be political expediency, but that legislation will eventually 
serve to aid many people, a modern day Emerson might write. 
And in taking this view of compensation, Emerson continues 
to be very tough-minded. He argues that our consolations 
may not be personal, we may always be governed by morally 
defective men, but that we can find a "general consolation" 
in the fact that through "years and centuries" the good of 
the whole is served.
If "Montaigne" is the one essay which most clearly 
espouses the progressive definition. The Conduct of Life and 
especially "Considerations by the Way" take up where it 
leaves off :
Good is a good doctor but Bad is sometimes a better.
The oppressions of William the Norman, savage forest 
laws and crushing despotism made possible the inspira­
tion of Magna Carta under John. Edward I. wanted money, 
armies, castles, and as much as he could get. It was 
necessary to call the people together by shorter, 
swifter ways,— and the House of Commons arose. To ob­
tain subsidies, he paid in privileges. In the twenty- 
fourth year of his reign he decreed "that no tax should 
be levied without consent of Lords and Commons;"— which 
is the basis of the English Constitution. (W, VI, 253)
For every evil, Emerson argues, there is a compensation in
the future. We cannot avoid the rule of evil men; we may
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suffer unjustly under them. But their evil may bring good 
to those who follow us. Our consolation must lie, therefore 
in the tendency of all things toward the general good. Per­
sonal suffering, Emerson asserts, is little enough to pay 
for the good of future generations.
Emerson takes a similar position in "Fate" as he con­
tinues to find that compensation lies in the melioristic 
tendency of nature:
Fate involves the melioration. No statement of the 
Universe can have any soundness which does not admit 
its ascending effort. The direction of the whole and 
of the parts is toward benefit, and in proportion to 
the health. Behind every individual closes organiza­
tion; before him opens liberty,— the Better, the Best.
The first and worse races are dead. The second and
imperfect races are dying out. or remain for the ma­
turing of higher. (W, VI, 35)
In this passage Emerson not only says that individuals grow
in power, but also that races or generations grow toward per­
fection. He suggests that consolation for the imperfection 
of the present moment lies in the future improvement of the 
race. We may suffer calamities, we may be victimized by men 
or by nature, but "Every calamity is a spur and valuable 
hint" (W, VI, 3 6). Steam was once a danger, but Watt and 
Fulton observed and then harnessed it. Every calamity, phys­
ical or spiritual, moves us toward a similar good, and in 
that movement, Emerson writes, lies the compensation. Man 
must therefore learn to take "sides with the Deity who se­
cures universal benefit by his pain" (W, VI, ^7).
A late and most eloquent assertion of progressive
1^6
compensation appears in the North American Review of May, 
1 8 78. "The Sovereignty of Ethics," drawn from several lec­
tures Emerson gave in the l860's, can thus well furnish our 
final example of this definition of compensation:
’Tis a long scale from the gorilla to the gentleman—  
from the gorilla to Plato, Newton, Shakespeare— to the 
sanctities of religion, the refinements of legisla­
tion, the summits of science, art and poetry. The be­
ginnings are slow and infirm, but it is an always- 
accelerated march. The geologic world is chronicled 
by the growing ripeness of the strata from lower to 
higher, as it becomes the abode of more highly- 
organized plants and animals. The civil history of 
men might be traced by the successive meliorations as 
marked in higher moral generalizations;— virtue meaning 
physical courage, then chastity and temperance, then 
justice and love;— bargains of Kings with people of 
certain rights to certain classes, then of rights to 
masses,— then at last came the day when, as the his­
torians rightly tell, the nerves of the world were 
electrified by the proclamation that all men were born 
free and equal. (W, X, 186-8 7)
Emerson writes that all things progress. Our concept of 
virtue becomes increasingly refined over the course of the 
years, so that love replaces force as the quality we most 
value. And history has shown that the right to freedom and 
equality has gradually come to be claimed for all men.
Thus, Emerson suggests that we should endure our present 
sufferings, confident that they contribute to the improve­
ment, both morally and socially, of mankind. Indeed, he 
writes.
Thus a sublime confidence is fed at the bottom of the 
heart that, in spite of appearances, in spite of ma­
lignity and blind self-interest living for the moment, 
an eternal, beneficent necessity is always bringing 
things right; and though we should fold our arms,—  
which we cannot do, for our duty requires us to be the 
very hands of this guiding sentiment, and work in the
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present moment,— the evils we suffer will at last end 
themselves through the incessant opposition of Nature 
to everything hurtful. (W, X, 188-89)
All things, Emerson argues, necessarily and inevitably move 
toward right. If man should cease striving for the good and 
merely observe the course of his life, the evils he suffers 
would continue to disappear because "Melioration is the 
law" (W, X, 188). Yet Emerson notes that man must not be­
come passive, for he believes that man is the agent through 
which the beneficent necessity works to right wrongs.
Still, the principle of melioristic compensation is clearly 
advanced here. The compensation for individual suffering 
is the inevitable movement of the universe to end that suf­
fering .
-iv-
Emerson in the later part of his career as an essay­
ist thus places much greater weight on his defensive view of 
compensation than he had earlier in his career. But he modi­
fies that definition, emphasizing the melioristic tendency 
of the universe as the source of compensation. However, 
this modification does not move Emerson away from eighteenth- 
century English traditions. Indeed, the idea of progress 
comes to full flower in the eighteenth century, appearing in 
the works of sceptics like Gibbon and Hume, of rather darkly 
optimistic writers like Butler, and of optimists like 
Priestley.
Gibbon surprisingly espouses a sort of melioristic
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compensation in The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire.
He does not foresee a glorious future which will offset the 
wretched present, but he does argue that progress is real and 
that we live in a much more congenial time than did the an­
cients :
The discoveries of ancient and modern navigators, and 
the domestic history of traditions of the most en­
lightened nations represent the human savage naked in 
mind and body, and destitute of laws, of arts, of ideas, 
and almost of language. From this abject condition, 
perhaps the primitive and universal state of man, he 
has gradually arisen to command the animals, to fer­
tilise the earth, to traverse the ocean, and to measure 
the heavens. His progress in the improvement and 
exercise of his mental and corporeal faculties has been 
irregular and various; infinitely slow in the beginning; 
and increasing by degrees with redoubled velocity: ages
of laborious ascent have been followed by a moment of 
rapid downfall; and the several climates of the globe 
have felt the vicissitudes of light and darkness. Yet 
the experience of four thous-and years should enlarge 
our hopes and diminish our apprehensions: we cannot
determine to what height the human species may aspire 
in their advance towards perfection; but it may safely 
be presumed that no people, unless the face of nature 
is changed, will relapse into their original barba­
rism.18
Gibbon here suggests that the unfavorable conditions in 
which we live may cause apprehensions about the future of 
our society. But he believes the tendency of history to 
show that we shall not lapse back into barbarism. Poverty, 
corruption, violence may cause us to fear that our civili­
zation is on the road to destruction, but history. Gibbon 
would argue, shows that such problems do not reverse the 
melioristic tendency of the whole. Gibbon, like Emerson,
1^Edward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman 
Empire (New York: Modern Library, 1932), II, 96-97-
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accepts the world because he is sure there are compensations 
which offset evils. Indeed, he writes, "We may therefore 
acquiesce in the pleasing conclusions that every age of the 
world has increased and still increases the real wealth, the 
happiness, the knowledge, and perhaps the virtue, of the 
human race."^^
Hume argues along lines similar to these. In his 
"Essay on the Populousness of Ancient Nations," for in­
stance, he notes that slavery was widespread as an institu­
tion in ancient times, and then adds that
to one who considers coolly on the subject it will ap­
pear, that human nature, in general, really enjoys more 
liberty at present, in the most arbitrary government of 
EUROPE, than it ever did during the most flourishing 
period of ancient times. As much as submission to a 
petty prince, whose dominions extend not beyond a 
single city, is more grievous than obedience to a great 
monarch; so much is domestic slavery more cruel and 
oppressive than any civil subjection whatsoever.
Implicit in this passage then is a melioristic definition of 
compensation, for Hume suggests that we are compensated for 
"civil subjection" by the fact that such subjection is so 
much easier to bear than was the slavery of earlier times.
It is more pleasant to live in Franco's Spain, Hume might 
argue, than it was to live as a slave in the American South. 
But the importance of Hume's melioristic definition of com­
pensation must not be exaggerated, for as Bury notes, "he
I^Gibbon, II, 9 8 . J. B. Bury in his book The Idea 
of Progress (New York: Dover, I960) takes note of this pas­
sage and the previous passage from Gibbon's work.
^^Hume, III, 385.
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was too sceptical to suppose that any general synthesis of 
history is possible, or that any considerable change for the
1Qbetter in the manners of mankind is likely to occur."
In addition to Hume and Gibbon, Bishop Butler antic­
ipates Emerson's progressive definition of compensation. 
Emerson, in fact, cites in his journal of l826 an article 
from the Quarterly Review which contained these "prodigious 
fine remarks" (JMN, III, 51) by Bishop Butler:
"It is not easy," says Butler, "even for our most 
reasonable men,always to bear in mind the degree of 
our ignorance." That ignorance affords a full and 
satisfactory answer to all objections against the 
perfection of the scheme, whether of the natural or 
of the moral world, and thence against the wisdom, 
justice, and benevolence of the common Parent and 
Preserver of them both.20
Like Pope, the article and Butler here suggest that what 
seems unjust to limited human minds would seem perfectly 
just if man could share the perspective of God. Compensa­
tion in this passage is thus defined as a principle which 
insures that seeming evil is positive good. But neither the 
article nor Butler presents a static view of compensation. 
Indeed, the article goes on to quote with approval Butler's 
assertion that "We are placed . . .  in the middle of a 
scheme, not a fixed but a progressive one, every way incom­
prehensible— incomprehensible in a manner equally with
19j. B. Bury, The Idea of Progress (New York: 
Dover, I960), p. 220.
20"Review of Transactions of the Geological So­
ciety," Quarterly Review, 3^ (September, 1826), 5*+0.
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respect to what has been, what now is, and what shall be 
h e r e a f t e r . B u t l e r  here presents a melioristic view of 
compensation, a view Emerson was to wholeheartedly adopt 
almost twenty years later. And in a passage not quoted, 
Butler clarifies this view, writing that God accomplishes 
his "natural ends by slow successive steps."22 He admits 
that we may be unable to understand how these steps con­
tribute to a good end, but argues that we must trust that 
they do. Butler suggests, therefore, that compensation lies 
in the faith that present suffering contributes to God's 
progressive development of the universe. Butler, rather 
than Emerson, might well have written that a "beneficent 
tendency is always bringing things right." However, Butler 
stresses man's ignorance far more than does Emerson. Both 
Butler and Emerson view evil as beneficent because essential 
to a progressive system, but perhaps Butler looks evil, in 
Basil Willey's words, "more directly in the face and with a 
more disillusioned eye."^3
The similarity between Butler and Emerson seems more 
significant when one realizes that Butler is representative 
of a group of Anglican apologists who between 1699 and 17*+5 
sought to "vindicate the beneficence of God's providence and





especially to combat deism by reinterpreting the history of 
revelation itself, and consequently of the whole spiritual 
and moral experience of mankind, in terms of a continuous
plxand necessary movement from worse to better." William
Worthington argues, for instance, that all parts of nature
"are endued with a Principle not only to preserve their
state, but to advance it" and thus believes that "every Thing
has a Tendency to its own P e r f e c t i o n . H e  thus implies
that we can bear the imperfection of the present because it
is but a step on the way to perfection. And Edmund Law, like
Worthington, argues that progress is inevitable. He admits
the virtues of primitive races and confesses that some evils
come from civilization, but he concludes,
if they [commerce, arts, etc.] have abated the force 
of some of the natural virtues, by the luxury which 
attends them; [they] have taken likewise the sting of 
our natural vices, and softened the ferocity of the 
human race, without enervating their c o u r a g e .26
For Law, therefore, man is clearly progressing toward "true
charity, or universal benevolence" and in that progress lies
compensation for the lack of charity in the present.
S. Crane, "Anglican Apologetics and the Idea of 
Progress," MP, XXXI (193^), 2?^.
^William Worthington, An essay on the scheme and 
conduct, procedure and extent of man's redemption, wherein 
is shewn from the Holy Scripture, that this great work is to 
be accomplished gradually (17̂ -3). p. 223. as cited bv Crane. 
"Anglican Apologetics," p. 299*
26Edmund Law, Considerations on the Theory of Re­
ligion. 6th ed. (Cambridge, 177^)} P* 239, as cited by 
Ernest Tuveson, Millennium and Utopia (Berkeley: Univ. of
Cal. Press, 19^9)? p« 1^9*
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Emerson's purpose is not to combat deism or to uphold 
Anglicanism, but his melioristic view of compensation is 
certainly quite similar to the one held by these divines.
Like them, he seeks to vindicate the beneficence of provi­
dence through a melioristic view of human history.
Joseph Priestley can well serve as a final example 
of the eighteenth century's progressive doctrine of compen­
sation. Priestley argues that
the full persuasion that nothing can come to pass with­
out the knowledge and express appointment of the great­
est and best of beings, must tend to diffuse a joyful 
serenity over the mind, producing a conviction, that 
notwithstanding all present unfavorable appearances, 
whatever is. is right; that even all evils, respecting 
individuals or societies, any part, or the whole of 
the human race, will terminate in good; and that the 
greatest sum of good could not, in the nature of things, 
be attained by any other means.27
Priestley here argues that the "whole of the human race will 
terminate in good"; he suggests that mankind will eventually 
experience perfection, though they must endure evils at pres­
ent. And he asserts that the existence of evils is necessary 
to the production of the final perfection. He thus estab­
lishes in 1777 the essential ingredients of Emerson’s melio­
ristic doctrine of compensation. Moreover, although 
Priestley's use of the phrase "whatever is, is right" may 
suggest that his belief in compensation is static rather than 
melioristic, the following statement clearly indicates the 
progressive nature of Priestley's concept;
27priestley, Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity.
p. 109.
16̂ -
It seems to be the ■uniform intention of divine provi­
dence, to lead mankind to happiness in a progressive, 
which is the surest, though the slowest method. Evil 
always leads to good, and imperfect to perfect. The 
divine being might, no doubt, have adopted a different 
plan, have made human nature and human governments 
perfect from the beginning. He might have formed the 
human mind with an intuitive knowledge of truth, with­
out leading men through so many labyrinths of error.
He might have made man perfectly vertuous, without 
giving so much exercise to his passions in his strug­
gles with the habits of vice. . . . but though it would 
be impiety in us to pretend to fathom the depth of di­
vine councils, 1 think we may fairly conclude, that if 
this method of proceeding had been the best for us, he, 
whom we cannot conceive to be influenced by any thing 
but his desire to promote the happiness of his creatures, 
would have pursued it. But a contrary method has been 
adopted in every thing relative to us.28
Priestley thus states that all things necessarily and pro­
gressively move toward perfection and argues that this pro­
gressive movement leads man to happiness. A tendency toward 
perfection and happiness is then the compensation Priestley 
discovers for the ignorance, the spiritual failings, and the 
discontent which exist as he writes. And such a discovery 
certainly anticipates Emerson's assertion that "Through the 
years and the centuries . . .  a great and beneficent tendency 
irresistibly streams."
However, significant differences between Emerson and 
these eighteenth-century English meliorists must be noted. 
Gibbon and Hume, for instance, find compensation more in a 
retrospective than in a prospective view of history. Gibbon
28joseph Priestley, An Essay on the First Principles 
of government; and on the native of political, civil, and 
religious liberty (London. 1760). pp. 78-79. as cited bv 
Crane, "Anglican Apologetics," p. 38O.
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finds that a look at the past can "enlarge our hopes and 
diminish our apprehensions," and Hume finds satisfaction in 
the fact that "human nature in general really enjoys more 
liberty at present . . . than it ever did during the most 
flourishing period of ancient times." These writers there­
fore tend to emphasize advantages over earlier times as 
compensation for present distresses. Emerson, on the other 
hand, tends to emphasize the perfection which lies in the 
future as the compensation for our present suffering. In­
deed, in "Culture" he asserts that "The time will come when 
the evil forms we have known can no more be organized"
(W, VI, 166), and this assertion is surely typical.
In addition, Priestley and Law tend to see the prog­
ress of the universe in different terms than does Emerson. 
They envision what Willey would call a "Baconian paradise."^9 
Priestley argues that in this paradise toward which all 
things move,
nature, including both its materials, and its laws, 
will be more at our command: men will make their 
situation in this world abundantly more easy and 
comfortable; they will probably prolong their exist­
ence in it, and will grow daily more happy, each in 
himself, and more able . . .  to communicate happinessto others.30
Priestley here describes his ideal in very tangible terms.
He sees the world progressing toward technological, medical.
29willey, p. 195.
30priestley, Essay, p. 6, as cited by Willey, p. 195.
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and agricultural achievement and believes an increase in 
happiness and good will toward men will be realized concur­
rently and partially as a consequence. His mentor Hartley 
is certainly convinced "that the arts and sciences not only 
improve in themselves but by their improvement facilitate a 
general progress in religious and moral understanding."31 
And Law explicitly argues that developments in commerce and 
the arts have "softened the ferocity of the human race." 
Emerson, like Priestley, Hartley, and Law, emphasizes man's 
increasing control of nature. Indeed, in "The Young 
American" Emerson stresses the spiritual progress encouraged 
by the development of trade. Yet he does not fully accept 
this sort of technological meliorism. In "Nature," for ex­
ample, he writes:
We anticipate a new era from the invention of a loco­
motive or a balloon; the new engine brings with it the 
old checks. They say that by electromagnetism, your 
salad shall be grown from the seed, whilst your fowl is 
roasting for dinner: it is the symbol of modern aims
and endeavours,— of our condensation and acceleration 
of objects; but nothing is gained. (W, III, 195)
Emerson thus tends to regard technological progress as of
secondary importance. It alone cannot bring the new era he
wishes to see. He sees a developing emphasis upon love
rather than physical courage as a more important progressive
movement in the universe, and as one which does not depend
upon technology to make it possible.
The emphasis by Law and Priestley upon tangible
31 Crane, "Anglican Apologetics," p. 372.
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evidences of progress points up another significant differ­
ence between Emerson and many eighteenth-century progressiv- 
ists. Frederick William Conner suggests this difference 
when he writes that progress in the eighteenth-century French 
tradition "rested on the Lockeian conception of human nature 
as molded from without, and this was the complete contradic­
tion of Emerson's transcendentalism."3^ We have seen that 
eighteenth-century English meliorism is far from a complete 
contradiction of Emerson's philosophy. But, nevertheless, 
Conner's statement is a valuable one, suggesting that at 
times the operation of Emerson's principle of compensation 
differs from the operation of some eighteenth-century prin­
ciples. Law, for example, believes in Locke's concept of the 
association of ideas. And Law reasons that as these associ­
ations become more complex "religion by degrees" becomes so 
too.33 Man's spiritual progress is thus for Law largely a 
function of the associative principle. Emerson, however, 
does not see progress in terms of increasingly complex ideas 
becoming available to man. He believes that evil can even­
tually serve to enhance the quality of men's lives, that the 
abuse of slaves in the West Indies, for instance, stimulated 
the British government to emancipate those slaves (W, XI, 
105). And he also believes that great, inspired men appear
32conner, p. 6k-.
33haw, p. 226, as cited by Tuveson, Millennium and 
Utopia, p. lk-9.
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infrequently among us and through the force of their inspira­
tion expand the possibilities for moral and intellectual ad­
vancement. He asserts that "When Nature has work to be done, 
she creates a genius to do it" (W, I, 207). We do not me­
chanically associate ideas and therefore progress, Emerson 
would say. Rather we are periodically inspired and moved 
ahead by great men.3̂ ' Yet even this difference between 
Emerson and Law cannot obscure their very basic similarity. 
Indeed, both men believe that the principle of compensation 
is "self-administering." Miraculous, divine intervention is 
not necessary in either view, for the universe is so ordered 
that compensation in the form of progress inevitably ap­
pears.
Emerson's futurist perspective, his objection to 
equating technological and spiritual progress, and his re­
jection of Lockeian psychology thus differentiate him from 
some eighteenth-century English meliorists. Despite these 
differences, however, the fundamental similarities persist, 
and Emerson's melioristic concept of compensation lies 
clearly within established eighteenth-century English tradi­
tions. Both Emerson and his predecessors believe that evil 
is good in the making, that imperfection in self and others 
is progressively being eliminated. A melioristic view of
3^Conner, pp. 6̂ --65. Conner uses a very similar argu­
ment to effectively refute Mildred Silver's contention that 
Emerson does not believe in general progress as a law of na­
ture. See Mildred Silver, "Emerson and the Idea of 
Progress," AL, XII (1540), 1-19-
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compensation exists a century before Emerson makes it a cen­
tral tenet in his works.
Thus, a defensive doctrine of compensation is an 
element in Emerson's thought throughout his career as an es­
sayist, and the importance of this doctrine grows as Emerson 
comes to see it in melioristic terms. Yet eighteenth-century 
English writers, those men Emerson supposedly rejects, an­
ticipate his use of this doctrine in both stages of its de­
velopment. Indeed, the eighteenth century is not only the 
period in which Pope proclaimed "whatever is, is right." It 
is also the period in which a belief in progress comes to 
full flower. In terms of his defensive definition of com­
pensation, Emerson might therefore be appropriately called a 
man of the Enlightenment.
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION
In the previous chapters we have seen substantial 
similarities between the nineteenth-century American phi­
losophy of Ralph Waldo Emerson and the philosophies of a 
wide variety of eighteenth-century English moralists. In­
deed, eighteenth-century writers as different as Shaftesbury 
and Hume, Price and Gibbon, Norris and Hartley anticipate 
three of Emerson's major doctrines —  self-reliance, corre­
spondence, and compensation.
For Emerson, self-reliance grows out of God reliance. 
The self-sufficient man, he argues early in his career, is 
the man who knows God to be within and who finds Him to be a 
source of intellectual insight, moral decisiveness, and 
practical power. And this concept is certainly not alien to 
Enlightenment England. Shaftesbury's moral sense, Butler's 
conscience, and Price's intuitive ability to know a priori 
truths all perform functions which Emerson attributes to the 
God within. And Shaftesbury and Norris suggest that the 
sense of union man can feel with God is truly real. They
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thus overtly anticipate Emerson's assertion that man and God 
are one.
After 18^ 1, however, Emerson's belief in self- 
reliance and the God within tends to be unstable. Emerson 
at times argues that man evolves toward union with God, 
though he cannot achieve that union immediately. He typi­
cally suggests that man is hooped in and limited by fate.
And he at times believes that man is trapped within himself, 
that his private perceptions may be illusions rather than 
the insights of the God within. Yet here again eighteenth- 
century parallels exist. Thomson, Akenside, and Young pic­
ture man as evolving toward a higher order of being.
Writers like Priestley clearly suggest that man is limited by 
fate. And Hume's skepticism distinctly anticipates Emerson's 
doubt in man's ability to perceive absolute realities.
If Emersonian self-reliance exists in large part one 
hundred years before Emerson, Emersonian correspondence does 
as well. Emerson's doctrine of correspondence suggests that 
man and nature are analogous, that the analogies we can draw 
between them exist absolutely, and that these analogies can­
not be affixed to unalterable significances but must remain 
fluid. And eighteenth-century English concepts of corre­
spondence suggest much the same thing, though they do not 
use analogies to exalt man so much as does Emerson's doc­
trine. Norris finds the natural world the object of divine 
revelation and refuses to limit significances of natural
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objects. Shaftesbury suggests that man and nature are analo­
gous, that their relationship truly exists, and that the sym­
bols we find in nature cannot be limited in meaning because 
nature, like a poem, cannot be literally translated. Butler 
too finds one law for man and nature, though he believes 
that we can only gain a probable knowledge of ourselves and 
of God through the study of nature. And Wollaston, Paley, 
and Berkeley also anticipate, though to a lesser extent, 
Emerson's belief in correspondence.
In the second half of his career, Emerson less often 
sees correspondences as exalting man, and he comes at times 
to doubt the existence of correspondence. But his modifi­
cation of his doctrine so that it does not glorify the indi­
vidual surely brings him closer to those eighteenth-century 
writers who anticipate his early position on correspondence. 
And his skepticism clearly links him to Hume and less 
clearly ties him to writers like Crabbe and Radcliffe who 
emphasize the way in which a man's mental condition affects 
his perception of nature.
Finally, anticipations of Emersonian compensation 
permeace Augustan England. Emerson offers two definitions 
of compensation. He sees it as a principle which rewards 
virtue, and he sees it also as a principle which guarantees 
that "whatever is, is right." And both definitions have 
roots in eighteenth-century Britain.- Compensation as virtue 
rewarded is the prominent definition early in Emerson's
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career when his faith in the individual is at its height.
The psychological and material rewards he depicts as coming 
to the virtuous man are also depicted by utilitarians like 
Locke and Hume who, unlike Emerson, define virtue by the re­
wards it brings, by intellectual moralists who tend to be 
more temperate in the rewards they posit, by common-sense 
moralists like Butler and Shaftesbury, and by writers of 
sensibility who suggest that virtue inevitably brings man a 
self-approving joy. In the second half of his career, more­
over, Emerson continues to proclaim this doctrine. Even 
though skepticism challenges his faith in the self and his 
faith in correspondence, he continues to believe in the 
principle of virtue rewarded. Like Shaftesbury, he suggests 
that virtue is rewarded whether we live amidst illusions or 
realities. Still, after 184-1 Emerson's assertions of this 
doctrine tend to be restrained. But this very restraint 
moves Emerson closer to the cautious statements of Price and 
Wollaston.
Emerson's belief that "whatever is, is right" tends 
to be a somewhat static concept early in his career and to 
become melioristic later. In his early essays, he suggests 
as do Shaftesbury, Kames, Jenyns, Pope, Gray, and numerous 
other eighteenth-century Englishmen that "partial evil" is 
"universal good." He believes that man may find suffering a 
blessing, deformity an advantage, deficiency in one skill a 
concentration of force in another. But later in his career.
17^
Emerson shifts his position somewhat and asserts that "what­
ever is" contributes to the creation of "what is right." He 
suggests that the compensation for present imperfection in 
the scheme of things is that it purchases future improvement 
for mankind as a whole. And this concept is implicit in the 
beliefs which Hume, Gibbon, Butler, Law, and Priestley all 
hold in progress.
When I began this study, I hoped to be able to call 
the view of Emerson as a rebel against eighteenth-century 
England into serious doubt by showing that a variety of 
eighteenth-century moralists from diverse schools of thought 
anticipated three of Emerson's major doctrines. That hope 
has been largely fulfilled. Self-reliance, correspondence, 
and compensation tie Emerson to Augustan England and suggest 
that he might well be styled a man of the Enlightenment.
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